diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index dd54d20ace2f..d4593571c404 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1384,13 +1384,15 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, if (type != expected_type) goto err_type; } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM || + arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL || arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) { expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be * passed in as argument, it's a SCALAR_VALUE type. Final test * happens during stack boundary checking. */ - if (register_is_null(*reg)) + if (register_is_null(*reg) && + arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_NULL) /* final test in check_stack_boundary() */; else if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && @@ -3825,6 +3827,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; regs = cur_regs(env); + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true; if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { err = check_alu_op(env, insn); if (err) @@ -4020,6 +4023,7 @@ process_bpf_exit: return err; insn_idx++; + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true; } else { verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -4202,6 +4206,7 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len, u32 off, u32 cnt) { struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data; + int i; if (cnt == 1) return 0; @@ -4211,6 +4216,8 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len, memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off); memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1)); + for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) + new_data[i].seen = true; env->insn_aux_data = new_data; vfree(old_data); return 0; @@ -4229,6 +4236,25 @@ static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 of return new_prog; } +/* The verifier does more data flow analysis than llvm and will not explore + * branches that are dead at run time. Malicious programs can have dead code + * too. Therefore replace all dead at-run-time code with nops. + */ +static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +{ + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data; + struct bpf_insn nop = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0); + struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi; + const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { + if (aux_data[i].seen) + continue; + memcpy(insn + i, &nop, sizeof(nop)); + } +} + /* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff' * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff' */ @@ -4556,6 +4582,9 @@ skip_full_check: free_states(env); if (ret == 0) + sanitize_dead_code(env); + + if (ret == 0) /* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */ ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env); |