diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 125 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index b0a6dbbb760b..fb5900e2c29a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_PERF_REGS select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP select MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE if PARAVIRT + select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS select HAVE_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE if UNWINDER_ORC || STACK_VALIDATION @@ -277,6 +278,7 @@ config X86 select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK select TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT + select TRACE_IRQFLAGS_NMI_SUPPORT select USER_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT select VIRT_TO_BUS select HAVE_ARCH_KCSAN if X86_64 @@ -391,8 +393,8 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS config CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR bool - default $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh $(CC)) if 64BIT - default $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh $(CC)) + default $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS)) if 64BIT + default $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS)) help We have to make sure stack protector is unconditionally disabled if the compiler produces broken code or if it does not let us control @@ -462,29 +464,6 @@ config GOLDFISH def_bool y depends on X86_GOLDFISH -config RETPOLINE - bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL - default y - help - Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against - kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect - branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern - support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. - -config CC_HAS_SLS - def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) - -config SLS - bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" - depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 - select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL - default n - help - Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard - against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly - larger. - config X86_CPU_RESCTRL bool "x86 CPU resource control support" depends on X86 && (CPU_SUP_INTEL || CPU_SUP_AMD) @@ -1833,15 +1812,6 @@ config ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED def_bool y depends on X86_PAT -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "x86 architectural random number generator" if EXPERT - help - Enable the x86 architectural RDRAND instruction - (Intel Bull Mountain technology) to generate random numbers. - If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically - secure hardware random number generator. - config X86_UMIP def_bool y prompt "User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT @@ -2032,7 +2002,7 @@ config KEXEC config KEXEC_FILE bool "kexec file based system call" select KEXEC_CORE - select BUILD_BIN2C + select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA depends on X86_64 depends on CRYPTO=y depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y @@ -2453,6 +2423,91 @@ source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig" endmenu +config CC_HAS_SLS + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all) + +config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + +menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities" + default y + help + Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for + speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities. + + If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really + should know what you are doing to say so. + +if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS + +config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" + default y + depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) + help + This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by + ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped + into userspace. + + See Documentation/x86/pti.rst for more details. + +config RETPOLINE + bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel" + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default y + help + Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against + kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect + branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config RETHUNK + bool "Enable return-thunks" + depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default y if X86_64 + help + Compile the kernel with the return-thunks compiler option to guard + against kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding return speculation. + Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern + support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. + +config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY + bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64 + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation. + +config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. + +config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY + bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64 + default y + help + Compile the kernel with support for the spectre_v2=ibrs mitigation. + This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to + performance. + +config SLS + bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" + depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 + select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL + default n + help + Compile the kernel with straight-line-speculation options to guard + against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly + larger. + +endif + config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES def_bool y depends on ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG |