diff options
41 files changed, 673 insertions, 517 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index a2f70cf6763a..20d05719bceb 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -1029,6 +1029,10 @@ payload contents" for more information. struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm, + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *, + const struct key_type *, + unsigned long, + const union key_payload *), unsigned long flags, struct key *dest); @@ -1040,6 +1044,24 @@ payload contents" for more information. KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted towards the user's quota). Error ENOMEM can also be returned. + If restrict_link not NULL, it should point to a function that will be + called each time an attempt is made to link a key into the new keyring. + This function is called to check whether a key may be added into the keying + or not. Callers of key_create_or_update() within the kernel can pass + KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to suppress the check. An example of using + this is to manage rings of cryptographic keys that are set up when the + kernel boots where userspace is also permitted to add keys - provided they + can be verified by a key the kernel already has. + + When called, the restriction function will be passed the keyring being + added to, the key flags value and the type and payload of the key being + added. Note that when a new key is being created, this is called between + payload preparsing and actual key creation. The function should return 0 + to allow the link or an error to reject it. + + A convenience function, restrict_link_reject, exists to always return + -EPERM to in this case. + (*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 2af478e3fd4e..f2356bda2b05 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/efi.h> -#include <linux/verify_pefile.h> -#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <asm/bootparam.h> #include <asm/setup.h> @@ -529,18 +528,9 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data) #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) { - bool trusted; - int ret; - - ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - system_trusted_keyring, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE, - &trusted); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - if (!trusted) - return -EKEYREJECTED; - return 0; + return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + NULL, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); } #endif diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig index f0f8a4433685..fc5955f5fc8a 100644 --- a/certs/Kconfig +++ b/certs/Kconfig @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys" depends on KEYS + depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE help Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will @@ -55,4 +56,12 @@ config SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE_SIZE This is the number of bytes reserved in the kernel image for a certificate to be inserted. +config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + bool "Provide a keyring to which extra trustable keys may be added" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + If set, provide a keyring to which extra keys may be added, provided + those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built + into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring. + endmenu diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index f4180326c2e1..50979d6dcecd 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -18,29 +18,88 @@ #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include <crypto/pkcs7.h> -struct key *system_trusted_keyring; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring); +static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING +static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys; +#endif extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[]; extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size; +/** + * restrict_link_to_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by built in CA + * + * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added + * being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring. + */ +int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload) +{ + return restrict_link_by_signature(builtin_trusted_keys, type, payload); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING +/** + * restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted - Restrict keyring + * addition by both builtin and secondary keyrings + * + * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added + * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in or the secondary system + * keyrings. + */ +int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( + struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload) +{ + /* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link + * through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link. + */ + if (type == &key_type_keyring && + keyring == secondary_trusted_keys && + payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload) + /* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */ + return 0; + + return restrict_link_by_signature(secondary_trusted_keys, type, payload); +} +#endif + /* - * Load the compiled-in keys + * Create the trusted keyrings */ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void) { - pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n"); + pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyrings\n"); - system_trusted_keyring = - keyring_alloc(".system_keyring", + builtin_trusted_keys = + keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring)) - panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n"); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys)) + panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n"); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + secondary_trusted_keys = + keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH | + KEY_USR_WRITE), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted, + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys)) + panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n"); + + if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0) + panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n"); +#endif - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags); return 0; } @@ -76,7 +135,7 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) if (plen > end - p) goto dodgy_cert; - key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1), + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(builtin_trusted_keys, 1), "asymmetric", NULL, p, @@ -84,8 +143,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | - KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED | - KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); + KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN | + KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION); if (IS_ERR(key)) { pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); @@ -108,19 +167,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION /** - * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. - * @data: The data to be verified. + * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. + * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). * @len: Size of @data. * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. + * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, + * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. + * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. + * @ctx: Context for callback. */ -int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len, - const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, - enum key_being_used_for usage) +int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, + const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) { struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; - bool trusted; int ret; pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); @@ -128,7 +195,7 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len, return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */ - if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) { + if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) { pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n"); ret = -EBADMSG; goto error; @@ -138,13 +205,33 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len, if (ret < 0) goto error; - ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted); - if (ret < 0) + if (!trusted_keys) { + trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; + } else if (trusted_keys == (void *)1UL) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; +#endif + } + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENOKEY) + pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); goto error; + } + + if (view_content) { + size_t asn1hdrlen; + + ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &len, &asn1hdrlen); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENODATA) + pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n"); + goto error; + } - if (!trusted) { - pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); - ret = -ENOKEY; + ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, asn1hdrlen); } error: @@ -152,6 +239,6 @@ error: pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature); #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 91a7e047a765..e28e912000a7 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ menuconfig ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE - tristate "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type" + bool "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type" depends on KEYS help This option provides support for a key type that holds the data for @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER config PKCS7_TEST_KEY tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type" - depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER - select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION help This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key. If @@ -54,6 +53,7 @@ config PKCS7_TEST_KEY config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION bool "Support for PE file signature verification" depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION select ASN1 select OID_REGISTRY help diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index f90486256f01..6516855bec18 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o -asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o +asymmetric_keys-y := \ + asymmetric_type.o \ + restrict.o \ + signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h index 1d450b580245..ca8e9ac34ce6 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. */ +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id); extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id, diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index a79d30128821..6600181d5d01 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -35,6 +35,95 @@ static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers); static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); /** + * find_asymmetric_key - Find a key by ID. + * @keyring: The keys to search. + * @id_0: The first ID to look for or NULL. + * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL. + * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. + * + * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is + * the id_0 and the fallback identifier is the id_1. If both are given, the + * lookup is by the former, but the latter must also match. + */ +struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1, + bool partial) +{ + struct key *key; + key_ref_t ref; + const char *lookup; + char *req, *p; + int len; + + if (id_0) { + lookup = id_0->data; + len = id_0->len; + } else { + lookup = id_1->data; + len = id_1->len; + } + + /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ + p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (partial) { + *p++ = 'i'; + *p++ = 'd'; + } else { + *p++ = 'e'; + *p++ = 'x'; + } + *p++ = ':'; + p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len); + *p = 0; + + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req); + + ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, req); + if (IS_ERR(ref)) + pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref)); + kfree(req); + + if (IS_ERR(ref)) { + switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return ERR_CAST(ref); + } + } + + key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref); + if (id_0 && id_1) { + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); + + if (!kids->id[0]) { + pr_debug("First ID matches, but second is missing\n"); + goto reject; + } + if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(id_1, kids->id[1])) { + pr_debug("First ID matches, but second does not\n"); + goto reject; + } + } + + pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key)); + return key; + +reject: + key_put(key); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_asymmetric_key); + +/** * asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID * @val_1: First binary blob * @len_1: Length of first binary blob diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c index 3242cbfaeaa2..6a76d5c70ef6 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c @@ -21,19 +21,13 @@ /* * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob */ -int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx) +int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len, + size_t asn1hdrlen) { - const void *content_data; - size_t data_len; - int ret; - - ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1); - - if (ret) { - pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n"); - return ret; - } + struct pefile_context *ctx = _ctx; + content_data -= asn1hdrlen; + data_len += asn1hdrlen; pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len), content_data); @@ -129,7 +123,6 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen, { struct pefile_context *ctx = context; - ctx->digest = value; - ctx->digest_len = vlen; - return 0; + ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL); + return ctx->digest ? 0 : -ENOMEM; } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c index e2d0edbbc71a..3b92523882e5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c @@ -13,12 +13,9 @@ #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> -#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> #include <keys/user-type.h> -#include <keys/system_keyring.h> -#include "pkcs7_parser.h" MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type"); @@ -29,60 +26,47 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage, "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message"); /* - * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob. + * Retrieve the PKCS#7 message content. */ -static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int pkcs7_view_content(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen) { - enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage; - struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; - const void *data, *saved_prep_data; - size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen; - bool trusted; + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep = ctx; + const void *saved_prep_data; + size_t saved_prep_datalen; int ret; - kenter(""); - - if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) { - pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage); - return -EINVAL; - } - saved_prep_data = prep->data; saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen; - pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen); - if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7); - goto error; - } - - ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free; - - ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free; - if (!trusted) - pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n"); - - ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_free; - prep->data = data; - prep->datalen = datalen; + prep->datalen = len; + ret = user_preparse(prep); + prep->data = saved_prep_data; prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen; - -error_free: - pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7); -error: - kleave(" = %d", ret); return ret; } /* + * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob. + */ +static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage; + + if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) { + pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, + prep->data, prep->datalen, + NULL, usage, + pkcs7_view_content, prep); +} + +/* * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an * arbitrary blob of data as the payload */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index 835701613125..af4cd8649117 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -168,24 +168,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message); * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data * @_data_len: Place to return the data length - * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data + * @_headerlen: Size of ASN.1 header not included in _data * - * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally, - * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it. Returns -ENODATA if the - * data object was missing from the message. + * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message. The size of the + * header of the ASN.1 object that contains it is also provided and can be used + * to adjust *_data and *_data_len to get the entire object. + * + * Returns -ENODATA if the data object was missing from the message. */ int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const void **_data, size_t *_data_len, - bool want_wrapper) + size_t *_headerlen) { - size_t wrapper; - if (!pkcs7->data) return -ENODATA; - wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0; - *_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper; - *_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper; + *_data = pkcs7->data; + *_data_len = pkcs7->data_len; + if (_headerlen) + *_headerlen = pkcs7->data_hdrlen; return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h index d5eec31e95b6..f4e81074f5e0 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info { struct pkcs7_signed_info *next; struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */ unsigned index; - bool trusted; bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */ /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index b9a5487cd82d..f6a009d88a33 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig; struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p; struct key *key; - bool trusted; int ret; kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index); @@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) { if (x509->seen) { - if (x509->verified) { - trusted = x509->trusted; + if (x509->verified) goto verified; - } kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]"); return -ENOKEY; } @@ -54,9 +51,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted * keys. */ - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - x509->id, x509->skid, - false); + key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + x509->id, x509->skid, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message * is apparently the same as one we already trust. @@ -87,10 +83,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * trusted keys. */ if (last && (last->sig->auth_ids[0] || last->sig->auth_ids[1])) { - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - last->sig->auth_ids[0], - last->sig->auth_ids[1], - false); + key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + last->sig->auth_ids[0], + last->sig->auth_ids[1], + false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { x509 = last; pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n", @@ -104,10 +100,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches * the signed info directly. */ - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], - NULL, - false); + key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n", sinfo->index, key_serial(key)); @@ -122,7 +116,6 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, matched: ret = verify_signature(key, sig); - trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags); key_put(key); if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOMEM) @@ -134,12 +127,9 @@ matched: verified: if (x509) { x509->verified = true; - for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) { + for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) p->verified = true; - p->trusted = trusted; - } } - sinfo->trusted = trusted; kleave(" = 0"); return 0; } @@ -148,7 +138,6 @@ verified: * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points - * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise * * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects * keys we already know and trust. @@ -170,16 +159,13 @@ verified: * May also return -ENOMEM. */ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, - struct key *trust_keyring, - bool *_trusted) + struct key *trust_keyring) { struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; struct x509_certificate *p; int cached_ret = -ENOKEY; int ret; - *_trusted = false; - for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) p->seen = false; @@ -193,7 +179,6 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, cached_ret = -ENOPKG; continue; case 0: - *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted; cached_ret = 0; continue; default: diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ac4bddf669de --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate + * + * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include "asymmetric_keys.h" + +static bool use_builtin_keys; +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; + +#ifndef MODULE +static struct { + struct asymmetric_key_id id; + unsigned char data[10]; +} cakey; + +static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) +{ + if (!str) /* default system keyring */ + return 1; + + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { + struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; + size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; + int ret; + + if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { + pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); + return 1; + } + + ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); + else + ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ + } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { + use_builtin_keys = true; + } + + return 1; +} +__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); +#endif + +/** + * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys + * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert. + * @type: The type of key being added. + * @payload: The payload of the new key. + * + * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of + * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the + * new certificate as being trusted. + * + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a + * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the + * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if + * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. + */ +int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload) +{ + const struct public_key_signature *sig; + struct key *key; + int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); + + if (!trust_keyring) + return -ENOKEY; + + if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) + return 0; + + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) + return -EPERM; + + /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */ + key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], + false); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return -ENOKEY; + + if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) + ret = -ENOKEY; + else + ret = verify_signature(key, sig); + key_put(key); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index 7e8c2338ae25..672a94c2c3ff 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/pe.h> #include <linux/asn1.h> -#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include "verify_pefile.h" @@ -392,9 +392,8 @@ error_no_desc: * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image * @pelen: Length of the binary image - * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points + * @trust_keys: Signing certificate(s) to use as starting points * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. - * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise * * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust. @@ -418,14 +417,10 @@ error_no_desc: * May also return -ENOMEM. */ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, - struct key *trusted_keyring, - enum key_being_used_for usage, - bool *_trusted) + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage) { - struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; struct pefile_context ctx; - const void *data; - size_t datalen; int ret; kenter(""); @@ -439,19 +434,10 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, if (ret < 0) return ret; - pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len); - if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) - return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); - ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7; - - ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false); - if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) { - pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n"); - ret = -EBADMSG; - goto error; - } - - ret = mscode_parse(&ctx); + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, + pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len, + trusted_keys, usage, + mscode_parse, &ctx); if (ret < 0) goto error; @@ -462,16 +448,8 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, * contents. */ ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; - - ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; - - ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted); error: - pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7); + kfree(ctx.digest); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h index a133eb81a492..cd4d20930728 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. */ -#include <linux/verify_pefile.h> #include <crypto/pkcs7.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> @@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ struct pefile_context { unsigned sig_offset; unsigned sig_len; const struct section_header *secs; - struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; /* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */ const void *digest; /* Digest */ @@ -39,4 +37,5 @@ struct pefile_context { /* * mscode_parser.c */ -extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx); +extern int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len, + size_t asn1hdrlen); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index f24f4d808e7f..05eef1c68881 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ struct x509_certificate { unsigned index; bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ bool verified; - bool trusted; bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */ bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */ bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index fc77a2bd70ba..fb732296cd36 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -20,133 +20,6 @@ #include "asymmetric_keys.h" #include "x509_parser.h" -static bool use_builtin_keys; -static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; - -#ifndef MODULE -static struct { - struct asymmetric_key_id id; - unsigned char data[10]; -} cakey; - -static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) -{ - if (!str) /* default system keyring */ - return 1; - - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { - struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; - size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; - int ret; - - if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { - pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); - return 1; - } - - ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); - if (ret < 0) - pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); - else - ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ - } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { - use_builtin_keys = true; - } - - return 1; -} -__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); -#endif - -/** - * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params. - * @keyring: The keys to search. - * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL. - * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL. - * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. - * - * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is - * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the - * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but - * the latter must also match. - */ -struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *id, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid, - bool partial) -{ - struct key *key; - key_ref_t ref; - const char *lookup; - char *req, *p; - int len; - - if (id) { - lookup = id->data; - len = id->len; - } else { - lookup = skid->data; - len = skid->len; - } - - /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ - p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - if (partial) { - *p++ = 'i'; - *p++ = 'd'; - } else { - *p++ = 'e'; - *p++ = 'x'; - } - *p++ = ':'; - p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len); - *p = 0; - - pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req); - - ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), - &key_type_asymmetric, req); - if (IS_ERR(ref)) - pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref)); - kfree(req); - - if (IS_ERR(ref)) { - switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) { - /* Hide some search errors */ - case -EACCES: - case -ENOTDIR: - case -EAGAIN: - return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); - default: - return ERR_CAST(ref); - } - } - - key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref); - if (id && skid) { - const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); - if (!kids->id[1]) { - pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n"); - goto reject; - } - if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) { - pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n"); - goto reject; - } - } - - pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key)); - return key; - -reject: - key_put(key); - return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key); - /* * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature. @@ -277,49 +150,6 @@ not_self_signed: } /* - * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of - * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the - * new certificate as being trusted. - * - * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't - * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there - * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails. - */ -static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, - struct key *trust_keyring) -{ - struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; - struct key *key; - int ret = 1; - - if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) - return 1; - - if (!trust_keyring) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) - return -EPERM; - if (cert->unsupported_sig) - return -ENOPKG; - - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], - false); - if (IS_ERR(key)) - return PTR_ERR(key); - - if (!use_builtin_keys || - test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) { - ret = public_key_verify_signature( - key->payload.data[asym_crypto], cert->sig); - if (ret == -ENOPKG) - cert->unsupported_sig = true; - } - key_put(key); - return ret; -} - -/* * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. */ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) @@ -348,31 +178,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub->id_type = "X509"; - /* See if we can derive the trustability of this certificate. - * - * When it comes to self-signed certificates, we cannot evaluate - * trustedness except by the fact that we obtained it from a trusted - * location. So we just rely on x509_validate_trust() failing in this - * case. - * - * Note that there's a possibility of a self-signed cert matching a - * cert that we have (most likely a duplicate that we already trust) - - * in which case it will be marked trusted. - */ - if (cert->unsupported_sig || cert->self_signed) { + if (cert->unsupported_sig) { public_key_signature_free(cert->sig); cert->sig = NULL; } else { pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo); - - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring()); - if (ret) - ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring()); - if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) - goto error_free_cert; - if (!ret) - prep->trusted = true; } /* Propose a description */ diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c index 3f93125916bf..71e8a56e9479 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void) GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto failed_put_cred; diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c index 5ba22c6b0ffa..c444285bb1b1 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int nfs_idmap_init(void) GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto failed_put_cred; diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h index 441aff9b5aa7..583f199400a3 100644 --- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H #define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> struct key; @@ -26,14 +27,13 @@ extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const void **_data, size_t *_datalen, - bool want_wrapper); + size_t *_headerlen); /* * pkcs7_trust.c */ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, - struct key *trust_keyring, - bool *_trusted); + struct key *trust_keyring); /* * pkcs7_verify.c diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index 2f5de5c1a3a0..882ca0e1e7a5 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -15,20 +15,6 @@ #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H /* - * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put. - */ -enum key_being_used_for { - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, - VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE, - VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE, - VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE, - VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, - NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR -}; -extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR]; - -/* * Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type. * * Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public @@ -61,15 +47,16 @@ extern void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig); extern struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype; struct key; +struct key_type; +union key_payload; + +extern int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload); + extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key, const struct public_key_signature *sig); -struct asymmetric_key_id; -extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *id, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid, - bool partial); - int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, const struct public_key_signature *sig); diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h index 70a8775bb444..b38240716d41 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_TYPE_H #include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric; @@ -75,6 +76,11 @@ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key) return key->payload.data[asym_key_ids]; } +extern struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1, + bool partial); + /* * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. */ diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index 39fd38cfa8c9..fbd4647767e9 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -12,51 +12,40 @@ #ifndef _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H #define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H +#include <linux/key.h> + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING -#include <linux/key.h> -#include <crypto/public_key.h> +extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload); -extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring; -static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void) -{ - return system_trusted_keyring; -} #else -static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void) -{ - return NULL; -} +#define restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_reject #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION -extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len, - const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, - enum key_being_used_for usage); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING +extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( + struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload); +#else +#define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING -extern struct key *ima_mok_keyring; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING extern struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; -static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void) -{ - return ima_mok_keyring; -} static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void) { return ima_blacklist_keyring; } #else -static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void) -{ - return NULL; -} static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void) { return NULL; } -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */ #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index 7463355a198b..eaee981c5558 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload { size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */ - bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */ }; typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 5f5b1129dc92..722914798f37 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -173,11 +173,9 @@ struct key { #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */ #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */ #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */ -#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */ -#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */ -#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10 /* set if key is builtin */ -#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ -#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 12 /* set if key should not be removed */ +#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 8 /* set if key is built in to the kernel */ +#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 9 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10 /* set if key should not be removed */ /* the key type and key description string * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria @@ -205,6 +203,20 @@ struct key { }; int reject_error; }; + + /* This is set on a keyring to restrict the addition of a link to a key + * to it. If this method isn't provided then it is assumed that the + * keyring is open to any addition. It is ignored for non-keyring + * keys. + * + * This is intended for use with rings of trusted keys whereby addition + * to the keyring needs to be controlled. KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION + * overrides this, allowing the kernel to add extra keys without + * restriction. + */ + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload); }; extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, @@ -212,14 +224,17 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm, - unsigned long flags); + unsigned long flags, + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *, + const struct key_type *, + const union key_payload *)); -#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */ -#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */ -#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */ -#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED 0x0004 /* Key should be flagged as trusted */ -#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0008 /* Key is built into kernel */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004 /* Key is built into kernel */ +#define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008 /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */ extern void key_revoke(struct key *key); extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key); @@ -288,8 +303,15 @@ extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags, + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *, + const struct key_type *, + const union key_payload *), struct key *dest); +extern int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload); + extern int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring); extern key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a10549a6c7cd --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* Signature verification + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H +#define _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H + +/* + * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put. + */ +enum key_being_used_for { + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR +}; +extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + +struct key; + +extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, + const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION +extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage); +#endif + +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ +#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h deleted file mode 100644 index da2049b5161c..000000000000 --- a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -/* Signed PE file verification - * - * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. - * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence - * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version - * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. - */ - -#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H -#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H - -#include <crypto/public_key.h> - -extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, - struct key *trusted_keyring, - enum key_being_used_for usage, - bool *_trusted); - -#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 64b9dead4a07..937c844bee4a 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/string.h> -#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen) return -EBADMSG; } - return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE); + return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, + NULL, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index c79b85eb4d4c..8737412c7b27 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void) GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto failed_put_cred; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c index 3fb492eedeb9..1021b4c0bdd2 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c @@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ int rxrpc_get_server_data_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(key)) { _leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key)); return -ENOMEM; @@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ struct key *rxrpc_get_null_key(const char *keyname) key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, keyname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, - KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(key)) return key; diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 8ef15118cc78..4304372b323f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/digsig.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "integrity.h" @@ -40,6 +42,12 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata = true; static bool init_keyring __initdata; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY +#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted +#else +#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted +#endif + int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) { @@ -83,10 +91,9 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); - if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id])) - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags); - else { + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + restrict_link_to_ima, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) { err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n", keyring_name[id], err); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index e54a8a8dae94..5487827fa86c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -155,23 +155,33 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING -config IMA_MOK_KEYRING - bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings" +config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY + bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the + key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or + secondary trusted keyrings. + + Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the + IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring, + provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the + built-in or secondary trusted keyrings. + +config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)" depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING default n help - This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an - intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, - effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a - key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system - keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be - signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty - at kernel boot. - - IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted - before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested - operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. + This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all + revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If + the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and + an error is returned to the caller. config IMA_LOAD_X509 bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring" diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index a8539f9e060f..9aeaedad1e2b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -8,4 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o -obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c index 676885e4320e..74a279957464 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c @@ -17,38 +17,29 @@ #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/init.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> -struct key *ima_mok_keyring; struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; /* - * Allocate the IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings + * Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring */ __init int ima_mok_init(void) { - pr_notice("Allocating IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.\n"); - - ima_mok_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_mok", - KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | - KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | - KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + pr_notice("Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"); ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(ima_mok_keyring) || IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring)) - panic("Can't allocate IMA MOK or blacklist keyrings."); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_mok_keyring->flags); + if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring."); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags); return 0; } diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index b28755131687..bd5a272f28a6 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ serial_exists: * @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace. * @perm: The permissions mask of the new key. * @flags: Flags specifying quota properties. + * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction method for new keyrings. * * Allocate a key of the specified type with the attributes given. The key is * returned in an uninstantiated state and the caller needs to instantiate the @@ -223,7 +224,10 @@ serial_exists: */ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, - key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags) + key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags, + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *, + const struct key_type *, + const union key_payload *)) { struct key_user *user = NULL; struct key *key; @@ -291,11 +295,10 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->uid = uid; key->gid = gid; key->perm = perm; + key->restrict_link = restrict_link; if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; - if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED) - key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED; if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN; @@ -496,6 +499,12 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, } if (keyring) { + if (keyring->restrict_link) { + ret = keyring->restrict_link(keyring, key->type, + &prep.payload); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + } ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); if (ret < 0) goto error; @@ -551,8 +560,12 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, awaken = 0; ret = -EBUSY; - if (keyring) + if (keyring) { + if (keyring->restrict_link) + return -EPERM; + link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); + } mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); @@ -793,6 +806,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; key_ref_t key_ref; int ret; + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *, + const struct key_type *, + const union key_payload *) = NULL; /* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel * types */ @@ -811,6 +827,10 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_check(keyring); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION)) + restrict_link = keyring->restrict_link; + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) goto error_put_type; @@ -819,7 +839,6 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; - prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED; prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); @@ -835,10 +854,13 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description); - key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags)) - goto error_free_prep; - flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0; + if (restrict_link) { + ret = restrict_link(keyring, index_key.type, &prep.payload); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } + } ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit); if (ret < 0) { @@ -879,7 +901,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, /* allocate a new key */ key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description, - cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags); + cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags, NULL); if (IS_ERR(key)) { key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); goto error_link_end; diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index f931ccfeefb0..c91e4e0cea08 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -491,13 +491,17 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, */ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm, - unsigned long flags, struct key *dest) + unsigned long flags, + int (*restrict_link)(struct key *, + const struct key_type *, + const union key_payload *), + struct key *dest) { struct key *keyring; int ret; keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description, - uid, gid, cred, perm, flags); + uid, gid, cred, perm, flags, restrict_link); if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL); if (ret < 0) { @@ -510,6 +514,26 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc); +/** + * restrict_link_reject - Give -EPERM to restrict link + * @keyring: The keyring being added to. + * @type: The type of key being added. + * @payload: The payload of the key intended to be added. + * + * Reject the addition of any links to a keyring. It can be overridden by + * passing KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to key_instantiate_and_link() when + * adding a key to a keyring. + * + * This is meant to be passed as the restrict_link parameter to + * keyring_alloc(). + */ +int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload) +{ + return -EPERM; +} + /* * By default, we keys found by getting an exact match on their descriptions. */ @@ -1191,6 +1215,16 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, up_write(&keyring->sem); } +/* + * Check addition of keys to restricted keyrings. + */ +static int __key_link_check_restriction(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) +{ + if (!keyring->restrict_link) + return 0; + return keyring->restrict_link(keyring, key->type, &key->payload); +} + /** * key_link - Link a key to a keyring * @keyring: The keyring to make the link in. @@ -1221,14 +1255,12 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key) key_check(keyring); key_check(key); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags)) - return -EPERM; - ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); if (ret == 0) { kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage)); - ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key); + ret = __key_link_check_restriction(keyring, key); + if (ret == 0) + ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key); if (ret == 0) __key_link(key, &edit); __key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit); diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c index c9fae5ea89fe..2ef45b319dd9 100644 --- a/security/keys/persistent.c +++ b/security/keys/persistent.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns) current_cred(), ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(reg)) return PTR_ERR(reg); @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(), ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, ns->persistent_keyring_register); if (IS_ERR(persistent)) return ERR_CAST(persistent); diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index e6d50172872f..40a885239782 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, user_keyring_perm, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, + NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring); goto error; @@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, user_keyring_perm, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, + NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring); goto error_release; @@ -134,7 +136,8 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW, - KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, + NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -180,7 +183,8 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new) keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW, - KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, + NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -231,7 +235,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring) keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - flags, NULL); + flags, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); } else { @@ -785,7 +789,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name) keyring = keyring_alloc( name, old->uid, old->gid, old, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); goto error2; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index c7a117c9a8f3..a29e3554751e 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, cred = get_current_cred(); keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, - KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL); put_cred(cred); if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(keyring); @@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description, ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred, - perm, flags); + perm, flags, NULL); if (IS_ERR(key)) goto alloc_failed; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 4f0f112fe276..9db8b4a82787 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH | - KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { ret = PTR_ERR(authkey); goto error_alloc; |