diff options
43 files changed, 235 insertions, 201 deletions
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 6fccf6531770..2309b435c07f 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -720,11 +720,11 @@ endif # INSTALL_MOD_STRIP export mod_strip_cmd -ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) +ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509 export MODPUBKEY -mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY) +mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY) else mod_sign_cmd = true endif diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c index 272666d006df..4037461a6493 100644 --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15) #endif printk("%s(%d): %s %ld\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, err); dik_show_regs(regs, r9_15); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); dik_show_trace((unsigned long *)(regs+1)); dik_show_code((unsigned int *)regs->pc); diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c index b0179b89a04c..1c089119b2d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) bust_spinlocks(0); die_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); die_nest_count--; if (!die_nest_count) /* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c index 3883f842434f..b3c5f628bdb4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err) crash_kexec(regs); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c index 3d760c06f024..682b2478691a 100644 --- a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) show_regs_log_lvl(regs, KERN_EMERG); show_stack_log_lvl(current, regs->sp, regs, KERN_EMERG); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); if (in_interrupt()) diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c index a41eeb8eeaa1..be5e2dd9c9d3 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) do_show_stack(current, ®s->r30, pt_elr(regs)); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock); diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c index bd42b76000d1..f7f9f9c6caf0 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) bust_spinlocks(0); die.lock_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock); if (!regs) diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c index cbc624af4494..f32ab22e7ed3 100644 --- a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c @@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr) console_verbose(); printk("%s: %08x\n",str,nr); show_registers(fp); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); do_exit(SIGSEGV); } diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c index cf7ac5483f53..9007966d56d4 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs) printk("%s[#%d]:\n", str, ++die_counter); show_registers(regs); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c index 45ba99f5080b..aeb8f8f2c07a 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) show_regs(regs); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); if (in_interrupt()) panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c index f9b751b29558..37cc40ef5043 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, { bust_spinlocks(0); die_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); die_nest_count--; oops_exit(); printk("\n"); diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c index 70ecfc5fe8f0..13dd63fba367 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str) print_modules(); show_regs(regs); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); if (in_interrupt()) panic("Fatal exception in interrupt"); diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c index 72246bc06884..dfdad72c61ca 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err) notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c index 0eaf0059aaef..88a127b9c69e 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void __init process_switch(char c) break; } cheetah_pcache_forced_on = 1; - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); cheetah_enable_pcache(); break; diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c index a5785ea2a85d..662982946a89 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs) printk("%s(%d): %s [#%d]\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, ++die_counter); show_regs(regs); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c index e7ecf1507d90..8d38ca97aa23 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c @@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs) notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, 255, SIGSEGV); __asm__ __volatile__("flushw"); show_regs(regs); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) { struct thread_info *tp = current_thread_info(); struct reg_window *rw = (struct reg_window *) diff --git a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c index 2054f0d4db13..0870b68d2ad9 100644 --- a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err) ret = __die(str, err, thread, regs); bust_spinlocks(0); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); oops_exit(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index edd77e7508b3..fa96eb0d02fb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) */ WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD" " processors is not suitable for SMP.\n"); - if (!test_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP)) - add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP); + add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); valid_k7: ; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index fc7608a89d93..7bc126346ace 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) /* * Set taint even when machine check was not enabled. */ - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); severity = mce_severity(&m, cfg->tolerant, NULL); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c index 2d5454cd2c4f..1c044b1ccc59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) smp_processor_id()); } - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } /* Set up machine check reporting for processors with Intel style MCE: */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c index 2d7998fb628c..e9a701aecaa1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ static void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { printk(KERN_EMERG "CPU0: Machine Check Exception.\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK); + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } /* Set up machine check reporting on the Winchip C6 series */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c index e9fe907cd249..fa72a39e5d46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base, if (tmp != mask_lo) { printk(KERN_WARNING "mtrr: your BIOS has configured an incorrect mask, fixing it.\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND); + add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); mask_lo = tmp; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c index ae42418bc50f..c8797d55b245 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) bust_spinlocks(0); die_owner = -1; - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); die_nest_count--; if (!die_nest_count) /* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */ diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c index 01e0111bf787..ded955d45155 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err) if (!user_mode(regs)) show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)regs->areg[1]); - add_taint(TAINT_DIE); + add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock); if (in_interrupt()) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c index 6adfc706a1de..12b62f2cdb3f 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, buf = NULL; if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) return -EINVAL; - add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE); + add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } return count; diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c index 908b02d5da1b..8080588f88cb 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void acpi_table_taint(struct acpi_table_header *table) pr_warn(PREFIX "Override [%4.4s-%8.8s], this is unsafe: tainting kernel\n", table->signature, table->oem_table_id); - add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE); + add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c index 78d5f20c5f5b..81d6f605c92e 100644 --- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static ssize_t regmap_map_write_file(struct file *file, return -EINVAL; /* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */ - add_taint(TAINT_USER); + add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); regmap_write(map, reg, value); return buf_size; diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index c566927efcbd..80d36874689b 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -398,7 +398,11 @@ extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; extern int panic_on_io_nmi; extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; extern const char *print_tainted(void); -extern void add_taint(unsigned flag); +enum lockdep_ok { + LOCKDEP_STILL_OK, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE +}; +extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok); extern int test_taint(unsigned flag); extern unsigned long get_taint(void); extern int root_mountflags; diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index 1375ee3f03aa..ead1b5719a12 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -396,13 +396,13 @@ bool is_module_address(unsigned long addr); bool is_module_percpu_address(unsigned long addr); bool is_module_text_address(unsigned long addr); -static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod) +static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod) { return (unsigned long)mod->module_core <= addr && addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_core + mod->core_size; } -static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod) +static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod) { return (unsigned long)mod->module_init <= addr && addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_init + mod->init_size; diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 28c5b9dcc91e..968c539f0ac3 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1670,6 +1670,17 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel. +config MODULE_SIG_ALL + bool "Automatically sign all modules" + default y + depends on MODULE_SIG + help + Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option, + modules must be signed manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool. + +comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file" + depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL + choice prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" depends on MODULE_SIG @@ -1702,6 +1713,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_SHA512 endchoice +config MODULE_SIG_HASH + string + depends on MODULE_SIG + default "sha1" if MODULE_SIG_SHA1 + default "sha224" if MODULE_SIG_SHA224 + default "sha256" if MODULE_SIG_SHA256 + default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384 + default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512 + endif # MODULES config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 6c072b6da239..eceac38f3c65 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -153,23 +153,7 @@ kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates # fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards. # ############################################################################### -sign_key_with_hash := -ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1),y) -sign_key_with_hash := -sha1 -endif -ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224),y) -sign_key_with_hash := -sha224 -endif -ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256),y) -sign_key_with_hash := -sha256 -endif -ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384),y) -sign_key_with_hash := -sha384 -endif -ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512),y) -sign_key_with_hash := -sha512 -endif -ifeq ($(sign_key_with_hash),) +ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH $(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config) endif @@ -182,8 +166,8 @@ signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey @echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random" @echo "### number generator if one is available." @echo "###" - openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 $(sign_key_with_hash) -days 36500 -batch \ - -x509 -config x509.genkey \ + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \ + -batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \ -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \ -keyout signing_key.priv @echo "###" diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index eab08274ec9b..921bed4794e9 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -197,9 +197,10 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod) return -ENOENT; } -static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag) +static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag, + enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) { - add_taint(flag); + add_taint(flag, lockdep_ok); mod->taints |= (1U << flag); } @@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ static inline int try_force_unload(unsigned int flags) { int ret = (flags & O_TRUNC); if (ret) - add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD); + add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); return ret; } #else @@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *reason) if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE)) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s: kernel tainted.\n", mod->name, reason); - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); return 0; #else return -ENOEXEC; @@ -2147,7 +2148,8 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license) if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE)) printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints " "kernel.\n", mod->name, license); - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } } @@ -2700,10 +2702,10 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags) } if (!get_modinfo(info, "intree")) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module is from the staging directory," " the quality is unknown, you have been warned.\n", mod->name); @@ -2869,15 +2871,17 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod) * using GPL-only symbols it needs. */ if (strcmp(mod->name, "ndiswrapper") == 0) - add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); /* driverloader was caught wrongly pretending to be under GPL */ if (strcmp(mod->name, "driverloader") == 0) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); /* lve claims to be GPL but upstream won't provide source */ if (strcmp(mod->name, "lve") == 0) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, + LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); #ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS if ((mod->num_syms && !mod->crcs) @@ -3141,12 +3145,72 @@ static int may_init_module(void) return 0; } +/* + * We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique before + * we dedicate too many resources. In particular, temporary percpu + * memory exhaustion. + */ +static int add_unformed_module(struct module *mod) +{ + int err; + struct module *old; + + mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED; + +again: + mutex_lock(&module_mutex); + if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) { + if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING + || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) { + /* Wait in case it fails to load. */ + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq, + finished_loading(mod->name)); + if (err) + goto out_unlocked; + goto again; + } + err = -EEXIST; + goto out; + } + list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules); + err = 0; + +out: + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); +out_unlocked: + return err; +} + +static int complete_formation(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + int err; + + mutex_lock(&module_mutex); + + /* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */ + err = verify_export_symbols(mod); + if (err < 0) + goto out; + + /* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */ + module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod); + + /* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us, + * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */ + mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING; + +out: + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + return err; +} + /* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs, int flags) { - struct module *mod, *old; + struct module *mod; long err; err = module_sig_check(info); @@ -3164,36 +3228,20 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs, goto free_copy; } - /* - * We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique - * before we dedicate too many resources. In particular, - * temporary percpu memory exhaustion. - */ - mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED; -again: - mutex_lock(&module_mutex); - if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) { - if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING - || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) { - /* Wait in case it fails to load. */ - mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); - err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq, - finished_loading(mod->name)); - if (err) - goto free_module; - goto again; - } - err = -EEXIST; - mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + /* Reserve our place in the list. */ + err = add_unformed_module(mod); + if (err) goto free_module; - } - list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules); - mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG mod->sig_ok = info->sig_ok; - if (!mod->sig_ok) - add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); + if (!mod->sig_ok) { + printk_once(KERN_NOTICE + "%s: module verification failed: signature and/or" + " required key missing - tainting kernel\n", + mod->name); + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); + } #endif /* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */ @@ -3236,21 +3284,11 @@ again: dynamic_debug_setup(info->debug, info->num_debug); - mutex_lock(&module_mutex); - /* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */ - err = verify_export_symbols(mod); - if (err < 0) + /* Finally it's fully formed, ready to start executing. */ + err = complete_formation(mod, info); + if (err) goto ddebug_cleanup; - /* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */ - module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod); - - /* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us, - * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */ - mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING; - - mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); - /* Module is ready to execute: parsing args may do that. */ err = parse_args(mod->name, mod->args, mod->kp, mod->num_kp, -32768, 32767, &ddebug_dyndbg_module_param_cb); @@ -3274,8 +3312,8 @@ again: /* module_bug_cleanup needs module_mutex protection */ mutex_lock(&module_mutex); module_bug_cleanup(mod); - ddebug_cleanup: mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + ddebug_cleanup: dynamic_debug_remove(info->debug); synchronize_sched(); kfree(mod->args); diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index e1b2822fff97..7c57cc9eee2c 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -259,26 +259,19 @@ unsigned long get_taint(void) return tainted_mask; } -void add_taint(unsigned flag) +/** + * add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set. + * @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants. + * @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK. + * + * If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for + * some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true. + */ +void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok) { - /* - * Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore. - * We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue - * is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1 - * Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging/out-of-tree - * development and post-warning case. - */ - switch (flag) { - case TAINT_CRAP: - case TAINT_OOT_MODULE: - case TAINT_WARN: - case TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND: - break; - - default: - if (__debug_locks_off()) - printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); - } + if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off()) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n"); set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask); } @@ -421,7 +414,8 @@ static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller, print_modules(); dump_stack(); print_oops_end_marker(); - add_taint(taint); + /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */ + add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index f1bdecf09afb..fc9103e9ff03 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev) if (irqs_disabled()) print_irqtrace_events(prev); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_WARN); + add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } /* diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 95e9e55602a8..d8df00e69c14 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int i; for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) { if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1) - add_taint(i); + add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } } diff --git a/lib/bug.c b/lib/bug.c index d0cdf14c651a..168603477f02 100644 --- a/lib/bug.c +++ b/lib/bug.c @@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned long bugaddr, struct pt_regs *regs) print_modules(); show_regs(regs); print_oops_end_marker(); - add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug)); + /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */ + add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug), LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN; } diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 705473afc1f4..494526ae024a 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: %s\n", (unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index e9075fdef695..0dade3f18f7d 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static void bad_page(struct page *page) out: /* Leave bad fields for debug, except PageBuddy could make trouble */ page_mapcount_reset(page); /* remove PageBuddy */ - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } /* diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c index e7667a3584bc..856e4a192d25 100644 --- a/mm/slab.c +++ b/mm/slab.c @@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ static void __slab_error(const char *function, struct kmem_cache *cachep, printk(KERN_ERR "slab error in %s(): cache `%s': %s\n", function, cachep->name, msg); dump_stack(); - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } #endif diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index ebcc44eb43b9..4aec53705e4f 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...) printk(KERN_ERR "----------------------------------------" "-------------------------------------\n\n"); - add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE); + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static void slab_fix(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...) diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c index ff36c508a10e..1c6fbb1a4f8e 100644 --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -830,6 +830,8 @@ static const char *section_white_list[] = ".toc*", ".xt.prop", /* xtensa */ ".xt.lit", /* xtensa */ + ".arcextmap*", /* arc */ + ".gnu.linkonce.arcext*", /* arc : modules */ NULL }; diff --git a/scripts/sign-file b/scripts/sign-file index 974a20b661b7..2b7c4484d46c 100755 --- a/scripts/sign-file +++ b/scripts/sign-file @@ -2,51 +2,45 @@ # # Sign a module file using the given key. # -# Format: -# -# ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>] -# -# + +my $USAGE = +"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" . +" scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n"; + use strict; use FileHandle; use IPC::Open2; +use Getopt::Std; -my $verbose = 0; -if ($#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] eq "-v") { - $verbose = 1; - shift; -} +my %opts; +getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE; +my $verbose = $opts{'v'}; +my $signature_file = $opts{'s'}; -die "Format: ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" - if ($#ARGV != 2 && $#ARGV != 3); +die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4); +die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2); -my $private_key = $ARGV[0]; -my $x509 = $ARGV[1]; -my $module = $ARGV[2]; -my $dest = ($#ARGV == 3) ? $ARGV[3] : $ARGV[2] . "~"; +my $dgst = shift @ARGV; +my $private_key; +if (!$signature_file) { + $private_key = shift @ARGV; +} +my $x509 = shift @ARGV; +my $module = shift @ARGV; +my ($dest, $keep_orig); +if (@ARGV) { + $dest = $ARGV[0]; + $keep_orig = 1; +} else { + $dest = $module . "~"; +} -die "Can't read private key\n" unless (-r $private_key); +die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key); +die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file); die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509); die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module); # -# Read the kernel configuration -# -my %config = ( - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 => 1 - ); - -if (-r ".config") { - open(FD, "<.config") || die ".config"; - while (<FD>) { - if ($_ =~ /^(CONFIG_.*)=[ym]/) { - $config{$1} = 1; - } - } - close(FD); -} - -# # Function to read the contents of a file into a variable. # sub read_file($) @@ -321,73 +315,71 @@ my $id_type = 1; # Identifier type: X.509 # # Digest the data # -my ($dgst, $prologue) = (); -if (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1"}) { +my $prologue; +if ($dgst eq "sha1") { $prologue = pack("C*", 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14); - $dgst = "-sha1"; $hash = 2; -} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224"}) { +} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") { $prologue = pack("C*", 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C); - $dgst = "-sha224"; $hash = 7; -} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256"}) { +} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") { $prologue = pack("C*", 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20); - $dgst = "-sha256"; $hash = 4; -} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384"}) { +} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") { $prologue = pack("C*", 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30); - $dgst = "-sha384"; $hash = 5; -} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512"}) { +} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") { $prologue = pack("C*", 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40); - $dgst = "-sha512"; $hash = 6; } else { - die "Can't determine hash algorithm"; + die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n"; } -# -# Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout -# -my $digest; -$digest = readpipe("openssl dgst $dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst"; - -# -# Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that comprises -# the signature with no metadata attached. -# -my $pid; -$pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to, - "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") || - die "openssl rsautl"; -binmode write_to; -print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl"; -close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl"; - -binmode read_from; my $signature; -read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl"; -close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl"; +if ($signature_file) { + $signature = read_file($signature_file); +} else { + # + # Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout + # + my $digest; + $digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst"; + + # + # Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that + # comprises the signature with no metadata attached. + # + my $pid; + $pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to, + "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") || + die "openssl rsautl"; + binmode write_to; + print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl"; + close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl"; + + binmode read_from; + read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl"; + close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl"; + waitpid($pid, 0) || die; + die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8); +} $signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature, -waitpid($pid, 0) || die; -die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8); - # # Build the signed binary # @@ -424,6 +416,6 @@ print FD ; close FD || die $dest; -if ($#ARGV != 3) { +if (!$keep_orig) { rename($dest, $module) || die $module; } diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-core.c b/sound/soc/soc-core.c index 8df1b3feaf2b..b7e84a7cd9ee 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-core.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-core.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static ssize_t codec_reg_write_file(struct file *file, return -EINVAL; /* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */ - add_taint(TAINT_USER); + add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); snd_soc_write(codec, reg, value); return buf_size; |