27 files changed, 501 insertions, 387 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst b/Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst
index 3b5614b1d1a5..430a16283103 100644
--- a/Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst
+++ b/Documentation/trace/ftrace.rst
@@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@ display-graph option::
    => remove_vma
    => exit_mmap
    => mmput
-   => flush_old_exec
+   => begin_new_exec
    => load_elf_binary
    => search_binary_handler
    => __do_execve_file.isra.32
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/binfmt_loader.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/binfmt_loader.c
index a8d0d6e06526..e4be7a543ecf 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/binfmt_loader.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/binfmt_loader.c
@@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ static int load_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->loader)
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 
-	allow_write_access(bprm->file);
-	fput(bprm->file);
-	bprm->file = NULL;
-
 	loader = bprm->vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
 
 	file = open_exec("/sbin/loader");
@@ -33,12 +29,9 @@ static int load_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	/* Remember if the application is TASO.  */
 	bprm->taso = eh->ah.entry < 0x100000000UL;
 
-	bprm->file = file;
+	bprm->interpreter = file;
 	bprm->loader = loader;
-	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		return retval;
-	return search_binary_handler(bprm);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static struct linux_binfmt loader_format = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
index 9bb71abd66bd..385d3d172ee1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
-	retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
+	retval = begin_new_exec(bprm);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
@@ -156,8 +156,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		return retval;
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
-
 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
 		unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
 
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_aout.c b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
index 8e8346a81723..3e84e9bb9084 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_aout.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
-	retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
+	retval = begin_new_exec(bprm);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
@@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		return retval;
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 
 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
 		unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 8945671fe0e5..44813ceecc47 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct elfhdr *exec,
 		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE_PLATFORM,
 			    (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_base_platform);
 	}
-	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD) {
-		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFD, bprm->interp_data);
+	if (bprm->have_execfd) {
+		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFD, bprm->execfd);
 	}
 #undef NEW_AUX_ENT
 	/* AT_NULL is zero; clear the rest too */
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ out_free_interp:
 		goto out_free_dentry;
 
 	/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
-	retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
+	retval = begin_new_exec(bprm);
 	if (retval)
 		goto out_free_dentry;
 
@@ -989,7 +989,6 @@ out_free_interp:
 		current->flags |= PF_RANDOMIZE;
 
 	setup_new_exec(bprm);
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 
 	/* Do this so that we can load the interpreter, if need be.  We will
 	   change some of these later */
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
index d9501a86cec9..aaf332d32326 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		interp_params.flags |= ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_CONSTDISP;
 
 	/* flush all traces of the currently running executable */
-	retval = flush_old_exec(bprm);
+	retval = begin_new_exec(bprm);
 	if (retval)
 		goto error;
 
@@ -434,7 +434,6 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	current->mm->start_stack = current->mm->start_brk + stack_size;
 #endif
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 	if (create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm,
 				    &exec_params, &interp_params) < 0)
 		goto error;
@@ -589,7 +588,7 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	nitems = 1 + DLINFO_ITEMS + (k_platform ? 1 : 0) +
 		(k_base_platform ? 1 : 0) + AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH;
 
-	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD)
+	if (bprm->have_execfd)
 		nitems++;
 
 	csp = sp;
@@ -629,10 +628,10 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 			    (elf_addr_t) (unsigned long) u_base_platform);
 	}
 
-	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD) {
+	if (bprm->have_execfd) {
 		nr = 0;
 		csp -= 2 * sizeof(unsigned long);
-		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFD, bprm->interp_data);
+		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFD, bprm->execfd);
 	}
 
 	nr = 0;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_em86.c b/fs/binfmt_em86.c
index 466497860c62..995883693cb2 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_em86.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_em86.c
@@ -48,10 +48,6 @@ static int load_em86(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	allow_write_access(bprm->file);
-	fput(bprm->file);
-	bprm->file = NULL;
-
 	/* Unlike in the script case, we don't have to do any hairy
 	 * parsing to find our interpreter... it's hardcoded!
 	 */
@@ -89,13 +85,8 @@ static int load_em86(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		return PTR_ERR(file);
 
-	bprm->file = file;
-
-	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		return retval;
-
-	return search_binary_handler(bprm);
+	bprm->interpreter = file;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static struct linux_binfmt em86_format = {
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
index 831a2b25ba79..9b82bc111d0a 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 
 	/* Flush all traces of the currently running executable */
 	if (id == 0) {
-		ret = flush_old_exec(bprm);
+		ret = begin_new_exec(bprm);
 		if (ret)
 			goto err;
 
@@ -963,8 +963,6 @@ static int load_flat_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		}
 	}
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
-
 	set_binfmt(&flat_format);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
index cdb45829354d..bc5506619b7e 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	Node *fmt;
 	struct file *interp_file = NULL;
 	int retval;
-	int fd_binary = -1;
 
 	retval = -ENOEXEC;
 	if (!enabled)
@@ -160,51 +159,25 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			goto ret;
 	}
 
-	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY) {
+	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY)
+		bprm->have_execfd = 1;
 
-		/* if the binary should be opened on behalf of the
-		 * interpreter than keep it open and assign descriptor
-		 * to it
-		 */
-		fd_binary = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
-		if (fd_binary < 0) {
-			retval = fd_binary;
-			goto ret;
-		}
-		fd_install(fd_binary, bprm->file);
-
-		/* if the binary is not readable than enforce mm->dumpable=0
-		   regardless of the interpreter's permissions */
-		would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
-
-		allow_write_access(bprm->file);
-		bprm->file = NULL;
-
-		/* mark the bprm that fd should be passed to interp */
-		bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD;
-		bprm->interp_data = fd_binary;
-
-	} else {
-		allow_write_access(bprm->file);
-		fput(bprm->file);
-		bprm->file = NULL;
-	}
 	/* make argv[1] be the path to the binary */
 	retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->interp, bprm);
 	if (retval < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto ret;
 	bprm->argc++;
 
 	/* add the interp as argv[0] */
 	retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &fmt->interpreter, bprm);
 	if (retval < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto ret;
 	bprm->argc++;
 
 	/* Update interp in case binfmt_script needs it. */
 	retval = bprm_change_interp(fmt->interpreter, bprm);
 	if (retval < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto ret;
 
 	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) {
 		interp_file = file_clone_open(fmt->interp_file);
@@ -215,38 +188,16 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 	retval = PTR_ERR(interp_file);
 	if (IS_ERR(interp_file))
-		goto error;
-
-	bprm->file = interp_file;
-	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) {
-		loff_t pos = 0;
-
-		/*
-		 * No need to call prepare_binprm(), it's already been
-		 * done.  bprm->buf is stale, update from interp_file.
-		 */
-		memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
-		retval = kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE,
-				&pos);
-	} else
-		retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
-
-	if (retval < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto ret;
 
-	retval = search_binary_handler(bprm);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		goto error;
+	bprm->interpreter = interp_file;
+	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS)
+		bprm->execfd_creds = 1;
 
+	retval = 0;
 ret:
 	dput(fmt->dentry);
 	return retval;
-error:
-	if (fd_binary > 0)
-		ksys_close(fd_binary);
-	bprm->interp_flags = 0;
-	bprm->interp_data = 0;
-	goto ret;
 }
 
 /* Command parsers */
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_script.c b/fs/binfmt_script.c
index e9e6a6f4a35f..0e8b953d12cf 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_script.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_script.c
@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 
 static inline bool spacetab(char c) { return c == ' ' || c == '\t'; }
-static inline char *next_non_spacetab(char *first, const char *last)
+static inline const char *next_non_spacetab(const char *first, const char *last)
 {
 	for (; first <= last; first++)
 		if (!spacetab(*first))
 			return first;
 	return NULL;
 }
-static inline char *next_terminator(char *first, const char *last)
+static inline const char *next_terminator(const char *first, const char *last)
 {
 	for (; first <= last; first++)
 		if (spacetab(*first) || !*first)
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ static inline char *next_terminator(char *first, const char *last)
 
 static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	const char *i_arg, *i_name;
-	char *cp, *buf_end;
+	const char *i_name, *i_sep, *i_arg, *i_end, *buf_end;
 	struct file *file;
 	int retval;
 
@@ -43,20 +42,6 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 
 	/*
-	 * If the script filename will be inaccessible after exec, typically
-	 * because it is a "/dev/fd/<fd>/.." path against an O_CLOEXEC fd, give
-	 * up now (on the assumption that the interpreter will want to load
-	 * this file).
-	 */
-	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	/* Release since we are not mapping a binary into memory. */
-	allow_write_access(bprm->file);
-	fput(bprm->file);
-	bprm->file = NULL;
-
-	/*
 	 * This section handles parsing the #! line into separate
 	 * interpreter path and argument strings. We must be careful
 	 * because bprm->buf is not yet guaranteed to be NUL-terminated
@@ -71,39 +56,43 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * parse them on its own.
 	 */
 	buf_end = bprm->buf + sizeof(bprm->buf) - 1;
-	cp = strnchr(bprm->buf, sizeof(bprm->buf), '\n');
-	if (!cp) {
-		cp = next_non_spacetab(bprm->buf + 2, buf_end);
-		if (!cp)
+	i_end = strnchr(bprm->buf, sizeof(bprm->buf), '\n');
+	if (!i_end) {
+		i_end = next_non_spacetab(bprm->buf + 2, buf_end);
+		if (!i_end)
 			return -ENOEXEC; /* Entire buf is spaces/tabs */
 		/*
 		 * If there is no later space/tab/NUL we must assume the
 		 * interpreter path is truncated.
 		 */
-		if (!next_terminator(cp, buf_end))
+		if (!next_terminator(i_end, buf_end))
 			return -ENOEXEC;
-		cp = buf_end;
+		i_end = buf_end;
 	}
-	/* NUL-terminate the buffer and any trailing spaces/tabs. */
-	*cp = '\0';
-	while (cp > bprm->buf) {
-		cp--;
-		if ((*cp == ' ') || (*cp == '\t'))
-			*cp = '\0';
-		else
-			break;
-	}
-	for (cp = bprm->buf+2; (*cp == ' ') || (*cp == '\t'); cp++);
-	if (*cp == '\0')
+	/* Trim any trailing spaces/tabs from i_end */
+	while (spacetab(i_end[-1]))
+		i_end--;
+
+	/* Skip over leading spaces/tabs */
+	i_name = next_non_spacetab(bprm->buf+2, i_end);
+	if (!i_name || (i_name == i_end))
 		return -ENOEXEC; /* No interpreter name found */
-	i_name = cp;
+
+	/* Is there an optional argument? */
 	i_arg = NULL;
-	for ( ; *cp && (*cp != ' ') && (*cp != '\t'); cp++)
-		/* nothing */ ;
-	while ((*cp == ' ') || (*cp == '\t'))
-		*cp++ = '\0';
-	if (*cp)
-		i_arg = cp;
+	i_sep = next_terminator(i_name, i_end);
+	if (i_sep && (*i_sep != '\0'))
+		i_arg = next_non_spacetab(i_sep, i_end);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the script filename will be inaccessible after exec, typically
+	 * because it is a "/dev/fd/<fd>/.." path against an O_CLOEXEC fd, give
+	 * up now (on the assumption that the interpreter will want to load
+	 * this file).
+	 */
+	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
 	/*
 	 * OK, we've parsed out the interpreter name and
 	 * (optional) argument.
@@ -121,7 +110,9 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		return retval;
 	bprm->argc++;
+	*((char *)i_end) = '\0';
 	if (i_arg) {
+		*((char *)i_sep) = '\0';
 		retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &i_arg, bprm);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			return retval;
@@ -142,11 +133,8 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		return PTR_ERR(file);
 
-	bprm->file = file;
-	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		return retval;
-	return search_binary_handler(bprm);
+	bprm->interpreter = file;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static struct linux_binfmt script_format = {
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 2f0a74582ac9..e850ee7dd636 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 
 #include <trace/events/sched.h>
 
+static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
 int suid_dumpable = 0;
 
 static LIST_HEAD(formats);
@@ -1051,13 +1053,14 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	tsk = current;
 	old_mm = current->mm;
 	exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm);
+	if (old_mm)
+		sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
 
 	ret = mutex_lock_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (old_mm) {
-		sync_mm_rss(old_mm);
 		/*
 		 * Make sure that if there is a core dump in progress
 		 * for the old mm, we get out and die instead of going
@@ -1093,12 +1096,6 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
- * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
- * disturbing other processes.  (Other processes might share the signal
- * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
- */
 static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
@@ -1236,6 +1233,12 @@ killed:
 }
 
 
+/*
+ * This function makes sure the current process has its own signal table,
+ * so that flush_signal_handlers can later reset the handlers without
+ * disturbing other processes.  (Other processes might share the signal
+ * table via the CLONE_SIGHAND option to clone().)
+ */
 static int unshare_sighand(struct task_struct *me)
 {
 	struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = me->sighand;
@@ -1292,13 +1295,23 @@ void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec)
  * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
  * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
  * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
- * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handlers (see below).
+ * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
  */
-int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
+int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 {
 	struct task_struct *me = current;
 	int retval;
 
+	/* Once we are committed compute the creds */
+	retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
+	 */
+	bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
+
 	/*
 	 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
 	 */
@@ -1313,7 +1326,10 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	 */
 	set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
 
+	/* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
 	would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
+	if (bprm->have_execfd)
+		would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
 
 	/*
 	 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
@@ -1323,13 +1339,6 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	if (retval)
 		goto out;
 
-	/*
-	 * After setting bprm->called_exec_mmap (to mark that current is
-	 * using the prepared mm now), we have nothing left of the original
-	 * process. If anything from here on returns an error, the check
-	 * in search_binary_handler() will SEGV current.
-	 */
-	bprm->called_exec_mmap = 1;
 	bprm->mm = NULL;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
@@ -1342,7 +1351,7 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	 */
 	retval = unshare_sighand(me);
 	if (retval)
-		goto out;
+		goto out_unlock;
 
 	set_fs(USER_DS);
 	me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD |
@@ -1357,12 +1366,84 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	 * undergoing exec(2).
 	 */
 	do_close_on_exec(me->files);
+
+	if (bprm->secureexec) {
+		/* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
+		me->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
+		 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
+		 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
+		 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
+		 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
+		 */
+		if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
+			bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
+	}
+
+	me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+	 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+	 * bprm->secureexec instead.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
+	    !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+	      gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
+		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+	else
+		set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+
+	perf_event_exec();
+	__set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
+
+	/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
+	   group */
+	WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
+	flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * install the new credentials for this executable
+	 */
+	security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+
+	commit_creds(bprm->cred);
+	bprm->cred = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable monitoring for regular users
+	 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
+	 * wait until new credentials are committed
+	 * by commit_creds() above
+	 */
+	if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+		perf_event_exit_task(me);
+	/*
+	 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+	 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
+	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
+	 */
+	security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+
+	/* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
+	if (bprm->have_execfd) {
+		retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
+		if (retval < 0)
+			goto out_unlock;
+		fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
+		bprm->executable = NULL;
+		bprm->execfd = retval;
+	}
 	return 0;
 
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&me->signal->exec_update_mutex);
 out:
 	return retval;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_old_exec);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
 
 void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 {
@@ -1387,58 +1468,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
 
 void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 {
-	/*
-	 * Once here, prepare_binrpm() will not be called any more, so
-	 * the final state of setuid/setgid/fscaps can be merged into the
-	 * secureexec flag.
-	 */
-	bprm->secureexec |= bprm->cap_elevated;
-
-	if (bprm->secureexec) {
-		/* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
-		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-
-		/*
-		 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
-		 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
-		 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
-		 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
-		 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
-		 */
-		if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
-			bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
-	}
-
-	arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack);
-
-	current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
+	/* Setup things that can depend upon the personality */
+	struct task_struct *me = current;
 
-	/*
-	 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
-	 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
-	 * bprm->secureexec instead.
-	 */
-	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
-	    !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
-	      gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
-		set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
-	else
-		set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+	arch_pick_mmap_layout(me->mm, &bprm->rlim_stack);
 
 	arch_setup_new_exec();
-	perf_event_exec();
-	__set_task_comm(current, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
 
 	/* Set the new mm task size. We have to do that late because it may
 	 * depend on TIF_32BIT which is only updated in flush_thread() on
 	 * some architectures like powerpc
 	 */
-	current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
-
-	/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
-	   group */
-	WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1);
-	flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
+	me->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
+	mutex_unlock(&me->signal->exec_update_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&me->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
 
@@ -1454,7 +1497,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec);
 
 /*
  * Prepare credentials and lock ->cred_guard_mutex.
- * install_exec_creds() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
+ * setup_new_exec() commits the new creds and drops the lock.
  * Or, if exec fails before, free_bprm() should release ->cred and
  * and unlock.
  */
@@ -1475,8 +1518,6 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	free_arg_pages(bprm);
 	if (bprm->cred) {
-		if (bprm->called_exec_mmap)
-			mutex_unlock(&current->signal->exec_update_mutex);
 		mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 		abort_creds(bprm->cred);
 	}
@@ -1484,6 +1525,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		allow_write_access(bprm->file);
 		fput(bprm->file);
 	}
+	if (bprm->executable)
+		fput(bprm->executable);
 	/* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */
 	if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
 		kfree(bprm->interp);
@@ -1503,35 +1546,6 @@ int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(bprm_change_interp);
 
 /*
- * install the new credentials for this executable
- */
-void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
-	commit_creds(bprm->cred);
-	bprm->cred = NULL;
-
-	/*
-	 * Disable monitoring for regular users
-	 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
-	 * wait until new credentials are committed
-	 * by commit_creds() above
-	 */
-	if (get_dumpable(current->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
-		perf_event_exit_task(current);
-	/*
-	 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
-	 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
-	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
-	 */
-	security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
-	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->exec_update_mutex);
-	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
-
-/*
  * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
  * - the caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
  *   PTRACE_ATTACH or seccomp thread-sync
@@ -1568,29 +1582,21 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
 }
 
-static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 {
+	/* Handle suid and sgid on files */
 	struct inode *inode;
 	unsigned int mode;
 	kuid_t uid;
 	kgid_t gid;
 
-	/*
-	 * Since this can be called multiple times (via prepare_binprm),
-	 * we must clear any previous work done when setting set[ug]id
-	 * bits from any earlier bprm->file uses (for example when run
-	 * first for a setuid script then again for its interpreter).
-	 */
-	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
-	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
-
-	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
+	if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
 		return;
 
 	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
 		return;
 
-	inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+	inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode);
 	if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)))
 		return;
@@ -1621,30 +1627,31 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary.
+ */
+static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* Compute creds based on which file? */
+	struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file;
+
+	bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file);
+	return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file);
+}
+
+/*
  * Fill the binprm structure from the inode.
- * Check permissions, then read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes
+ * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes
  *
  * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example).
  */
-int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int retval;
 	loff_t pos = 0;
 
-	bprm_fill_uid(bprm);
-
-	/* fill in binprm security blob */
-	retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-	if (retval)
-		return retval;
-	bprm->called_set_creds = 1;
-
 	memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
 	return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos);
 }
 
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_binprm);
-
 /*
  * Arguments are '\0' separated strings found at the location bprm->p
  * points to; chop off the first by relocating brpm->p to right after
@@ -1690,15 +1697,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_arg_zero);
 /*
  * cycle the list of binary formats handler, until one recognizes the image
  */
-int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES);
 	struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
 	int retval;
 
-	/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
-	if (bprm->recursion_depth > 5)
-		return -ELOOP;
+	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		return retval;
 
 	retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
 	if (retval)
@@ -1712,19 +1719,11 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			continue;
 		read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
 
-		bprm->recursion_depth++;
 		retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
-		bprm->recursion_depth--;
 
 		read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
 		put_binfmt(fmt);
-		if (retval < 0 && bprm->called_exec_mmap) {
-			/* we got to flush_old_exec() and failed after it */
-			read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
-			force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV);
-			return retval;
-		}
-		if (retval != -ENOEXEC || !bprm->file) {
+		if (bprm->point_of_no_return || (retval != -ENOEXEC)) {
 			read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
 			return retval;
 		}
@@ -1743,12 +1742,11 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	return retval;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(search_binary_handler);
 
 static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, depth;
 
 	/* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
 	old_pid = current->pid;
@@ -1756,15 +1754,38 @@ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
-	if (ret >= 0) {
-		audit_bprm(bprm);
-		trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
-		ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
-		proc_exec_connector(current);
+	/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
+	for (depth = 0;; depth++) {
+		struct file *exec;
+		if (depth > 5)
+			return -ELOOP;
+
+		ret = search_binary_handler(bprm);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+		if (!bprm->interpreter)
+			break;
+
+		exec = bprm->file;
+		bprm->file = bprm->interpreter;
+		bprm->interpreter = NULL;
+
+		allow_write_access(exec);
+		if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) {
+			if (bprm->executable) {
+				fput(exec);
+				return -ENOEXEC;
+			}
+			bprm->executable = exec;
+		} else
+			fput(exec);
 	}
 
-	return ret;
+	audit_bprm(bprm);
+	trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
+	ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
+	proc_exec_connector(current);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1857,8 +1878,9 @@ static int __do_execve_file(int fd, struct filename *filename,
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
-	if (retval < 0)
+	/* Set the unchanging part of bprm->cred */
+	retval = security_bprm_creds_for_exec(bprm);
+	if (retval)
 		goto out;
 
 	retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm->filename, bprm);
@@ -1893,6 +1915,14 @@ static int __do_execve_file(int fd, struct filename *filename,
 	return retval;
 
 out:
+	/*
+	 * If past the point of no return ensure the the code never
+	 * returns to the userspace process.  Use an existing fatal
+	 * signal if present otherwise terminate the process with
+	 * SIGSEGV.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->point_of_no_return && !fatal_signal_pending(current))
+		force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV);
 	if (bprm->mm) {
 		acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
 		mmput(bprm->mm);
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index a345d9fed3d8..aece1b340e7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -26,35 +26,27 @@ struct linux_binprm {
 	unsigned long p; /* current top of mem */
 	unsigned long argmin; /* rlimit marker for copy_strings() */
 	unsigned int
+		/* Should an execfd be passed to userspace? */
+		have_execfd:1,
+
+		/* Use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */
+		execfd_creds:1,
 		/*
-		 * True after the bprm_set_creds hook has been called once
-		 * (multiple calls can be made via prepare_binprm() for
-		 * binfmt_script/misc).
-		 */
-		called_set_creds:1,
-		/*
-		 * True if most recent call to the commoncaps bprm_set_creds
-		 * hook (due to multiple prepare_binprm() calls from the
-		 * binfmt_script/misc handlers) resulted in elevated
-		 * privileges.
-		 */
-		cap_elevated:1,
-		/*
-		 * Set by bprm_set_creds hook to indicate a privilege-gaining
-		 * exec has happened. Used to sanitize execution environment
-		 * and to set AT_SECURE auxv for glibc.
+		 * Set by bprm_creds_for_exec hook to indicate a
+		 * privilege-gaining exec has happened. Used to set
+		 * AT_SECURE auxv for glibc.
 		 */
 		secureexec:1,
 		/*
-		 * Set by flush_old_exec, when exec_mmap has been called.
-		 * This is past the point of no return, when the
-		 * exec_update_mutex has been taken.
+		 * Set when errors can no longer be returned to the
+		 * original userspace.
 		 */
-		called_exec_mmap:1;
+		point_of_no_return:1;
 #ifdef __alpha__
 	unsigned int taso:1;
 #endif
-	unsigned int recursion_depth; /* only for search_binary_handler() */
+	struct file * executable; /* Executable to pass to the interpreter */
+	struct file * interpreter;
 	struct file * file;
 	struct cred *cred;	/* new credentials */
 	int unsafe;		/* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */
@@ -65,7 +57,7 @@ struct linux_binprm {
 				   of the time same as filename, but could be
 				   different for binfmt_{misc,script} */
 	unsigned interp_flags;
-	unsigned interp_data;
+	int execfd;		/* File descriptor of the executable */
 	unsigned long loader, exec;
 
 	struct rlimit rlim_stack; /* Saved RLIMIT_STACK used during exec. */
@@ -76,10 +68,6 @@ struct linux_binprm {
 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT 0
 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT)
 
-/* fd of the binary should be passed to the interpreter */
-#define BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD_BIT 1
-#define BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD_BIT)
-
 /* filename of the binary will be inaccessible after exec */
 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE_BIT 2
 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE_BIT)
@@ -123,10 +111,8 @@ static inline void insert_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *fmt)
 
 extern void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *);
 
-extern int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *);
 extern int __must_check remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *);
-extern int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *);
-extern int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
+extern int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
 extern void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
 extern void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *, struct file *);
@@ -146,7 +132,6 @@ extern int transfer_args_to_stack(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 extern int bprm_change_interp(const char *interp, struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int copy_strings_kernel(int argc, const char *const *argv,
 			       struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new);
 extern ssize_t read_code(struct file *, unsigned long, loff_t, size_t);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 5616b2567aa7..fb3ce6cec997 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, syslog, int type)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, settime, const struct timespec64 *ts,
 	 const struct timezone *tz)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_set_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_for_exec, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 44d5422c18e4..3e62dab77699 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -34,40 +34,48 @@
  *
  * Security hooks for program execution operations.
  *
- * @bprm_set_creds:
- *	Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
- *	on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
- *	hook.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
- *	transitions between security domains).
- *	This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
- *	interpreters.  The hook can tell whether it has already been called by
- *	checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL.  If so, then the hook
- *	may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or
- *	to replace it.  The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if a "secure
- *	exec" has happened as a result of this hook call.  The flag is used to
- *	indicate the need for a sanitized execution environment, and is also
- *	passed in the ELF auxiliary table on the initial stack to indicate
- *	whether libc should enable secure mode.
+ * @bprm_creds_for_exec:
+ *	If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security
+ *	properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of
+ *	@bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the
+ *	new program.  This hook may also optionally check permissions
+ *	(e.g. for transitions between security domains).
+ *	The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to
+ *	request libc enable secure mode.
+ *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_creds_from_file:
+ *	If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change
+ *	privilege upon exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change.
+ *	This is called after finding the binary that will be executed.
+ *	without an interpreter.  This ensures that the credentials will not
+ *	be derived from a script that the binary will need to reopen, which
+ *	when reopend may end up being a completely different file.  This
+ *	hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for transitions
+ *	between security domains).
+ *	The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to
+ *	request libc enable secure mode.
+ *	The hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that
+ * 	should be cleared from current->personality.
  *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  * @bprm_check_security:
  *	This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will
- *	begin.  It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the
- *	preceding set_creds call.  The primary difference from set_creds is
- *	that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm.  This
- *	hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each
- *	pass set_creds is called first.
+ *	begin.  It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value
+ *	which was set in the preceding creds_for_exec call.  The argv list and
+ *	envp list are reliably available in @bprm.  This hook may be called
+ *	multiple times during a single execve.
  *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
  *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  * @bprm_committing_creds:
  *	Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
  *	transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials
  *	pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by
- *	the bprm_set_creds hook.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.
- *	This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such
- *	as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be
- *	granted when the attributes are changed.  This is called immediately
- *	before commit_creds().
+ *	the bprm_creds_for_exec hook.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm
+ *	structure.  This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the
+ *	process such as closing open file descriptors to which access will no
+ *	longer be granted when the attributes are changed.  This is called
+ *	immediately before commit_creds().
  * @bprm_committed_creds:
  *	Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a
  *	process being transformed by an execve operation.  The new credentials
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6aa229b252ce..b3f2cb21b4f2 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 		      const kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		      const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		      const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-extern int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
 extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			      const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_syslog(int type);
 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
-int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -569,9 +570,15 @@ static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages));
 }
 
-static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static inline int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+						struct file *file)
+{
+	return cap_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file);
 }
 
 static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 71a792616917..421b1149c651 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -315,6 +315,9 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
 	new->process_keyring = NULL;
 #endif
 
+	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
+	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
+
 	return new;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 2e330f330303..fcfadecd3a08 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -12220,7 +12220,7 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
  * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
  *
  * Can be called with exec_update_mutex held when called from
- * install_exec_creds().
+ * setup_new_exec().
  */
 void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
 {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index a84ef030fbd7..745a1cf49003 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -854,14 +854,14 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
 }
 
 /**
- * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct
+ * apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update the new creds on the bprm struct
  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error on failure
  *
  * TODO: once the other paths are done see if we can't refactor into a fn
  */
-int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
@@ -875,9 +875,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 
-	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
-		return 0;
-
 	ctx = task_ctx(current);
 	AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
 	AA_BUG(!ctx);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index 21b875fe2d37..d14928fe1c6f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct aa_domain {
 struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 				const char **name);
 
-int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
 void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 27e371b44dad..ef6f7002af28 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
 
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 0ca31c8bc0b1..59bf3c1674c8 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -647,7 +647,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
  * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
  * constructed by execve().
  */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file,
+			 bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -657,7 +658,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f
 	if (!file_caps_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
+	if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -665,10 +666,10 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f
 	 * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
 	 * descendants.
 	 */
-	if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
+	if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		if (rc == -EINVAL)
 			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
@@ -797,26 +798,27 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
+ * cap_bprm_creds_from_file - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
  * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ * @file: The file to pull the credentials from
  *
  * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
  * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
  * which won't take effect immediately.  Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
  */
-int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
 {
+	/* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */
 	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
 	bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
 	int ret;
 	kuid_t root_uid;
 
-	new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient;
 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
+	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, file, &effective, &has_fcap);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -885,12 +887,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
-	bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
 	if (is_setid ||
 	    (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
 	     (effective ||
 	      __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
-		bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
+		bprm->secureexec = 1;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1347,7 +1348,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, cap_bprm_creds_from_file),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 51de970fbb1e..11c1a7da4fd1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -823,9 +823,14 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }
 
-int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(bprm_set_creds, 0, bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
+}
+
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
 }
 
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4c037c2545c1..7e954b555be6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2286,7 +2286,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
@@ -2297,8 +2297,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
 	 * the script interpreter */
-	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
-		return 0;
 
 	old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
 	new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
@@ -6405,7 +6403,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 	/* Permission checking based on the specified context is
 	   performed during the actual operation (execve,
 	   open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
-	   operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
+	   operation.  See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
 	   checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
 	   operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
 	tsec = selinux_cred(new);
@@ -6934,7 +6932,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
 
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6d4883a43fff..cd44b79bf1f5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -887,12 +887,12 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
+ * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
  * @bprm: the exec information
  *
  * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
  */
-static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
@@ -900,9 +900,6 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
-		return 0;
-
 	isp = smack_inode(inode);
 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 		return 0;
@@ -4584,7 +4581,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
 
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 716c92ec941a..f9adddc42ac8 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -63,21 +63,15 @@ static void tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
 /**
- * tomoyo_bprm_set_creds - Target for security_bprm_set_creds().
+ * tomoyo_bprm_for_exec - Target for security_bprm_creds_for_exec().
  *
  * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
  *
  * Returns 0.
  */
-static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int tomoyo_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
-	 * operation.
-	 */
-	if (bprm->called_set_creds)
-		return 0;
-	/*
 	 * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
 	 * for the first time.
 	 */
@@ -539,7 +533,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, tomoyo_task_alloc),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, tomoyo_task_free),
 #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_OMIT_USERSPACE_LOADER
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tomoyo_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, tomoyo_bprm_creds_for_exec),
 #endif
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl),
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
index 33339e31e365..7f4527f897c4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ CFLAGS = -Wall
 CFLAGS += -Wno-nonnull
 CFLAGS += -D_GNU_SOURCE
 
+TEST_PROGS := binfmt_script
 TEST_GEN_PROGS := execveat
 TEST_GEN_FILES := execveat.symlink execveat.denatured script subdir
 # Makefile is a run-time dependency, since it's accessed by the execveat test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_script b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_script
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..05f94a741c7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_script
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Test that truncation of bprm->buf doesn't cause unexpected execs paths, along
+# with various other pathological cases.
+import os, subprocess
+
+# Relevant commits
+#
+# b5372fe5dc84 ("exec: load_script: Do not exec truncated interpreter path")
+# 6eb3c3d0a52d ("exec: increase BINPRM_BUF_SIZE to 256")
+
+# BINPRM_BUF_SIZE
+SIZE=256
+
+NAME_MAX=int(subprocess.check_output(["getconf", "NAME_MAX", "."]))
+
+test_num=0
+
+code='''#!/usr/bin/perl
+print "Executed interpreter! Args:\n";
+print "0 : '$0'\n";
+$counter = 1;
+foreach my $a (@ARGV) {
+    print "$counter : '$a'\n";
+    $counter++;
+}
+'''
+
+##
+# test - produce a binfmt_script hashbang line for testing
+#
+# @size:     bytes for bprm->buf line, including hashbang but not newline
+# @good:     whether this script is expected to execute correctly
+# @hashbang: the special 2 bytes for running binfmt_script
+# @leading:  any leading whitespace before the executable path
+# @root:     start of executable pathname
+# @target:   end of executable pathname
+# @arg:      bytes following the executable pathname
+# @fill:     character to fill between @root and @target to reach @size bytes
+# @newline:  character to use as newline, not counted towards @size
+# ...
+def test(name, size, good=True, leading="", root="./", target="/perl",
+                     fill="A", arg="", newline="\n", hashbang="#!"):
+    global test_num, tests, NAME_MAX
+    test_num += 1
+    if test_num > tests:
+        raise ValueError("more binfmt_script tests than expected! (want %d, expected %d)"
+                         % (test_num, tests))
+
+    middle = ""
+    remaining = size - len(hashbang) - len(leading) - len(root) - len(target) - len(arg)
+    # The middle of the pathname must not exceed NAME_MAX
+    while remaining >= NAME_MAX:
+        middle += fill * (NAME_MAX - 1)
+        middle += '/'
+        remaining -= NAME_MAX
+    middle += fill * remaining
+
+    dirpath = root + middle
+    binary = dirpath + target
+    if len(target):
+        os.makedirs(dirpath, mode=0o755, exist_ok=True)
+        open(binary, "w").write(code)
+        os.chmod(binary, 0o755)
+
+    buf=hashbang + leading + root + middle + target + arg + newline
+    if len(newline) > 0:
+        buf += 'echo this is not really perl\n'
+
+    script = "binfmt_script-%s" % (name)
+    open(script, "w").write(buf)
+    os.chmod(script, 0o755)
+
+    proc = subprocess.Popen(["./%s" % (script)], shell=True,
+                            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
+    stdout = proc.communicate()[0]
+
+    if proc.returncode == 0 and b'Executed interpreter' in stdout:
+        if good:
+            print("ok %d - binfmt_script %s (successful good exec)"
+                  % (test_num, name))
+        else:
+            print("not ok %d - binfmt_script %s succeeded when it should have failed"
+                  % (test_num, name))
+    else:
+        if good:
+            print("not ok %d - binfmt_script %s failed when it should have succeeded (rc:%d)"
+                  % (test_num, name, proc.returncode))
+        else:
+            print("ok %d - binfmt_script %s (correctly failed bad exec)"
+                  % (test_num, name))
+
+    # Clean up crazy binaries
+    os.unlink(script)
+    if len(target):
+        elements = binary.split('/')
+        os.unlink(binary)
+        elements.pop()
+        while len(elements) > 1:
+            os.rmdir("/".join(elements))
+            elements.pop()
+
+tests=27
+print("TAP version 1.3")
+print("1..%d" % (tests))
+
+### FAIL (8 tests)
+
+# Entire path is well past the BINFMT_BUF_SIZE.
+test(name="too-big",        size=SIZE+80, good=False)
+# Path is right at max size, making it impossible to tell if it was truncated.
+test(name="exact",          size=SIZE,    good=False)
+# Same as above, but with leading whitespace.
+test(name="exact-space",    size=SIZE,    good=False, leading=" ")
+# Huge buffer of only whitespace.
+test(name="whitespace-too-big", size=SIZE+71, good=False, root="",
+                                              fill=" ", target="")
+# A good path, but it gets truncated due to leading whitespace.
+test(name="truncated",      size=SIZE+17, good=False, leading=" " * 19)
+# Entirely empty except for #!
+test(name="empty",          size=2,       good=False, root="",
+                                          fill="", target="", newline="")
+# Within size, but entirely spaces
+test(name="spaces",         size=SIZE-1,  good=False, root="", fill=" ",
+                                          target="", newline="")
+# Newline before binary.
+test(name="newline-prefix", size=SIZE-1,  good=False, leading="\n",
+                                          root="", fill=" ", target="")
+
+### ok (19 tests)
+
+# The original test case that was broken by commit:
+# 8099b047ecc4 ("exec: load_script: don't blindly truncate shebang string")
+test(name="test.pl",        size=439, leading=" ",
+     root="./nix/store/bwav8kz8b3y471wjsybgzw84mrh4js9-perl-5.28.1/bin",
+     arg=" -I/nix/store/x6yyav38jgr924nkna62q3pkp0dgmzlx-perl5.28.1-File-Slurp-9999.25/lib/perl5/site_perl -I/nix/store/ha8v67sl8dac92r9z07vzr4gv1y9nwqz-perl5.28.1-Net-DBus-1.1.0/lib/perl5/site_perl -I/nix/store/dcrkvnjmwh69ljsvpbdjjdnqgwx90a9d-perl5.28.1-XML-Parser-2.44/lib/perl5/site_perl -I/nix/store/rmji88k2zz7h4zg97385bygcydrf2q8h-perl5.28.1-XML-Twig-3.52/lib/perl5/site_perl")
+# One byte under size, leaving newline visible.
+test(name="one-under",           size=SIZE-1)
+# Two bytes under size, leaving newline visible.
+test(name="two-under",           size=SIZE-2)
+# Exact size, but trailing whitespace visible instead of newline
+test(name="exact-trunc-whitespace", size=SIZE, arg=" ")
+# Exact size, but trailing space and first arg char visible instead of newline.
+test(name="exact-trunc-arg",     size=SIZE, arg=" f")
+# One bute under, with confirmed non-truncated arg since newline now visible.
+test(name="one-under-full-arg",  size=SIZE-1, arg=" f")
+# Short read buffer by one byte.
+test(name="one-under-no-nl",     size=SIZE-1, newline="")
+# Short read buffer by half buffer size.
+test(name="half-under-no-nl",    size=int(SIZE/2), newline="")
+# One byte under with whitespace arg. leaving wenline visible.
+test(name="one-under-trunc-arg", size=SIZE-1, arg=" ")
+# One byte under with whitespace leading. leaving wenline visible.
+test(name="one-under-leading",   size=SIZE-1, leading=" ")
+# One byte under with whitespace leading and as arg. leaving newline visible.
+test(name="one-under-leading-trunc-arg",  size=SIZE-1, leading=" ", arg=" ")
+# Same as above, but with 2 bytes under
+test(name="two-under-no-nl",     size=SIZE-2, newline="")
+test(name="two-under-trunc-arg", size=SIZE-2, arg=" ")
+test(name="two-under-leading",   size=SIZE-2, leading=" ")
+test(name="two-under-leading-trunc-arg",   size=SIZE-2, leading=" ", arg=" ")
+# Same as above, but with buffer half filled
+test(name="two-under-no-nl",     size=int(SIZE/2), newline="")
+test(name="two-under-trunc-arg", size=int(SIZE/2), arg=" ")
+test(name="two-under-leading",   size=int(SIZE/2), leading=" ")
+test(name="two-under-lead-trunc-arg", size=int(SIZE/2), leading=" ", arg=" ")
+
+if test_num != tests:
+    raise ValueError("fewer binfmt_script tests than expected! (ran %d, expected %d"
+                     % (test_num, tests))