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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2022-05-03 13:55:00 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2022-05-08 01:33:06 -0700 |
| commit | 595b893e2087de306d0781795fb8ec47873596a6 (patch) | |
| tree | e2331cc2b11ad02e5d6cb20dca176b9ccbb819e8 /security | |
| parent | d3646589703731026ae7bcba5731fa7a7d0e5291 (diff) | |
| download | linux-595b893e2087de306d0781795fb8ec47873596a6.tar.gz | |
randstruct: Reorganize Kconfigs and attribute macros
In preparation for Clang supporting randstruct, reorganize the Kconfigs, move the attribute macros, and generalize the feature to be named CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT for on/off, CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_FULL for the full randomization mode, and CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE for the cache-line sized mode. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-4-keescook@chromium.org
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index ded4d7c0d132..364e3f8c6eea 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -266,4 +266,66 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS endmenu +choice + prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures" + default RANDSTRUCT_FULL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS + default RANDSTRUCT_NONE + help + If you enable this, the layouts of structures that are entirely + function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with + __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly + marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time. + This can introduce the requirement of an additional information + exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure + types. + + Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact, + slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic + tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel + source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation). + + The seed used for compilation is located at + scripts/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after a "make clean" + to allow for external modules to be compiled with the existing + seed and will be removed by a "make mrproper" or "make distclean". + + config RANDSTRUCT_NONE + bool "Disable structure layout randomization" + help + Build normally: no structure layout randomization. + + config RANDSTRUCT_FULL + bool "Fully randomize structure layout" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + select MODVERSIONS if MODULES + help + Fully randomize the member layout of sensitive + structures as much as possible, which may have both a + memory size and performance impact. + + config RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE + bool "Limit randomization of structure layout to cache-lines" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + select MODVERSIONS if MODULES + help + Randomization of sensitive kernel structures will make a + best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized + groups of members. It will further not randomize bitfields + in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT + at the cost of weakened randomization. +endchoice + +config RANDSTRUCT + def_bool !RANDSTRUCT_NONE + +config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT + def_bool GCC_PLUGINS && RANDSTRUCT + help + Use GCC plugin to randomize structure layout. + + This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More + information at: + * https://grsecurity.net/ + * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ + endmenu |