[NETFILTER]: Missed and reordered checks in {arp,ip,ip6}_tables

There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in
translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by
passing special-crafted table to the *_tables.

The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry
content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function
uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that
this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which
is called later, than mark_source_chains().

The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside
entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry
ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure.

And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely
inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

2 files changed, 38 insertions, 17 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index 0849f1cced13..413c2d0a1f3d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -466,7 +466,13 @@ static inline int check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned i
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct arpt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
+	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(NF_ARP, t->u.user.name,
 							t->u.user.revision),
 					 "arpt_%s", t->u.user.name);
@@ -621,20 +627,18 @@ static int translate_table(const char *name,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) {
-		duprintf("Looping hook\n");
-		return -ELOOP;
-	}
-
 	/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
 	i = 0;
 	ret = ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
 				 check_entry, name, size, &i);
 
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
-				   cleanup_entry, &i);
-		return ret;
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	ret = -ELOOP;
+	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) {
+		duprintf("Looping hook\n");
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
 	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
@@ -643,6 +647,9 @@ static int translate_table(const char *name,
 			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size);
 	}
 
+	return 0;
+cleanup:
+	ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 4b90927619b8..e2c7f6e024c5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -547,12 +547,18 @@ check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ipt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	j = 0;
 	ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, check_match, name, &e->ip, e->comefrom, &j);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto cleanup_matches;
 
 	t = ipt_get_target(e);
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+			goto cleanup_matches;
 	target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(AF_INET,
 						     t->u.user.name,
 						     t->u.user.revision),
@@ -712,19 +718,17 @@ translate_table(const char *name,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0))
-		return -ELOOP;
-
 	/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
 	i = 0;
 	ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
 				check_entry, name, size, &i);
 
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size,
-				  cleanup_entry, &i);
-		return ret;
-	}
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	ret = -ELOOP;
+	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0))
+		goto cleanup;
 
 	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
 	for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
@@ -732,6 +736,9 @@ translate_table(const char *name,
 			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size);
 	}
 
+	return 0;
+cleanup:
+	IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1463,6 +1470,10 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target) >
+								e->next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	off = 0;
 	entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
 	j = 0;
@@ -1472,6 +1483,9 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		goto cleanup_matches;
 
 	t = ipt_get_target(e);
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
+			goto cleanup_matches;
 	target = try_then_request_module(xt_find_target(AF_INET,
 						     t->u.user.name,
 						     t->u.user.revision),