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| author | Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> | 2023-02-21 12:30:15 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-02-25 11:25:41 +0100 |
| commit | 684db631a15779c8f3b2235d507efdfe6bb10278 (patch) | |
| tree | 111a1270a3160b9e20e74412b4499efa91daca73 /kernel | |
| parent | 173cadcece7601e464b29e08289a668b1ff3da73 (diff) | |
| download | linux-684db631a15779c8f3b2235d507efdfe6bb10278.tar.gz | |
uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()
commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream. The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that you can end speculatively: if (access_ok(from, size)) // Right here even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results can never be mis-speculated. But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via "copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down. "copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take something like this: if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size)) do_something_with(kernelvar); If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other) side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values. Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent mis-speculated values which happen after the copy. Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec(). This makes the macro usable in generic code. Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the BPF code can also go away. Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> # BPF bits Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 17ab3e15ac25..35201007718c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -1908,9 +1908,7 @@ out: * reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that * happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86 barrier_nospec(); -#endif CONT; #define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE) \ STX_MEM_##SIZEOP: \ |