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authorDavid Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com>2013-03-19 13:29:55 +0100
committerJohn Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>2013-04-08 13:21:20 -0700
commit51fd36f3fad8447c487137ae26b9d0b3ce77bb25 (patch)
tree737cecc049ec3b4682ffc3b4d4bc44d1cebe7f61 /kernel/hrtimer.c
parent8f294b5a139ee4b75e890ad5b443c93d1e558a8b (diff)
downloadlinux-51fd36f3fad8447c487137ae26b9d0b3ce77bb25.tar.gz
hrtimer: Fix ktime_add_ns() overflow on 32bit architectures
One can trigger an overflow when using ktime_add_ns() on a 32bit
architecture not supporting CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR.

When passing a very high value for u64 nsec, e.g. 7881299347898368000
the do_div() function converts this value to seconds (7881299347) which
is still to high to pass to the ktime_set() function as long. The result
in is a negative value.

The problem on my system occurs in the tick-sched.c,
tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() when time_delta is set to
timekeeping_max_deferment(). The check for time_delta < KTIME_MAX is
valid, thus ktime_add_ns() is called with a too large value resulting in
a negative expire value. This leads to an endless loop in the ticker code:

time_delta: 7881299347898368000
expires = ktime_add_ns(last_update, time_delta)
expires: negative value

This fix caps the value to KTIME_MAX.

This error doesn't occurs on 64bit or architectures supporting
CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR (e.g. ARM, x86-32).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com>
[jstultz: Minor tweaks to commit message & header]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/hrtimer.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/hrtimer.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/hrtimer.c b/kernel/hrtimer.c
index 071e093c4486..c0875ae0de17 100644
--- a/kernel/hrtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/hrtimer.c
@@ -286,6 +286,10 @@ ktime_t ktime_add_ns(const ktime_t kt, u64 nsec)
 	} else {
 		unsigned long rem = do_div(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC);
 
+		/* Make sure nsec fits into long */
+		if (unlikely(nsec > KTIME_SEC_MAX))
+			return (ktime_t){ .tv64 = KTIME_MAX };
+
 		tmp = ktime_set((long)nsec, rem);
 	}