summary refs log tree commit diff
path: root/fs
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-06-11 10:01:41 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-06-11 10:01:41 -0700
commit3296ca27f50ecbd71db1d808c7a72d311027f919 (patch)
tree833eaa58b2013bda86d4bd95faf6efad7a2d5ca4 /fs
parente893123c7378192c094747dadec326b7c000c190 (diff)
parent73fbad283cfbbcf02939bdbda31fc4a30e729cca (diff)
downloadlinux-3296ca27f50ecbd71db1d808c7a72d311027f919.tar.gz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
  nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
  TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
  TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
  integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
  TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
  security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
  TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
  SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
  TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
  tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
  smack: Remove redundant initialization.
  integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
  rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
  smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
  integrity: move ima_counts_get
  integrity: path_check update
  IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
  IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
  selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
  ...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/compat.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c10
-rw-r--r--fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/vfs.c14
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c6
6 files changed, 34 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c
index 681ed81e6be0..bb2a9b2e8173 100644
--- a/fs/compat.c
+++ b/fs/compat.c
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 	if (!bprm)
 		goto out_files;
 
-	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out_free;
 	current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 	/* execve succeeded */
 	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	current->in_execve = 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
 	if (displaced)
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ out_unmark:
 
 out_unlock:
 	current->in_execve = 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 
 out_free:
 	free_bprm(bprm);
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 895823d0149d..a7fcd975c6b2 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	commit_creds(bprm->cred);
 	bprm->cred = NULL;
 
-	/* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+	/* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
 	 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
 	 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */
 
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
 
 /*
  * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
- * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against
+ * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
  *   PTRACE_ATTACH
  */
 int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 	if (!bprm)
 		goto out_files;
 
-	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out_free;
 	current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 	/* execve succeeded */
 	current->fs->in_exec = 0;
 	current->in_execve = 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
 	if (displaced)
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ out_unmark:
 
 out_unlock:
 	current->in_execve = 0;
-	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
 
 out_free:
 	free_bprm(bprm);
diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
index c1462d43e721..941c8425c10b 100644
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/dnotify.h>
 #include <linux/statfs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -986,6 +987,7 @@ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size, int acctflag)
 			&hugetlbfs_file_operations);
 	if (!file)
 		goto out_dentry; /* inode is already attached */
+	ima_counts_get(file);
 
 	return file;
 
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 967c3db92724..c82805d088e1 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -853,7 +853,8 @@ static int __link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
 			err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
 					       MAY_EXEC);
 		if (!err)
-			err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
+			err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC,
+				             IMA_COUNT_UPDATE);
  		if (err)
 			break;
 
@@ -1515,7 +1516,8 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
 		return error;
 
 	error = ima_path_check(path,
-			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+			       acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+			       IMA_COUNT_UPDATE);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	/*
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index b660435978d2..bd584bcf1d9f 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4 */
 #include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -735,6 +736,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
 			    flags, cred);
 	if (IS_ERR(*filp))
 		host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
+	else
+		ima_counts_get(*filp);
 out_nfserr:
 	err = nfserrno(host_err);
 out:
@@ -2024,6 +2027,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
 					struct dentry *dentry, int acc)
 {
 	struct inode	*inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct path	path;
 	int		err;
 
 	if (acc == NFSD_MAY_NOP)
@@ -2096,7 +2100,17 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
 	if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
 	    acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE))
 		err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+	if (err)
+		goto nfsd_out;
 
+	/* Do integrity (permission) checking now, but defer incrementing
+	 * IMA counts to the actual file open.
+	 */
+	path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt;
+	path.dentry = dentry;
+	err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+			     IMA_COUNT_LEAVE);
+nfsd_out:
 	return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 3326bbf9ab95..1539e630c47d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2128,9 +2128,15 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
 		goto out_free;
 
+	/* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */
+	length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (length < 0)
+		goto out_free;
+
 	length = security_setprocattr(task,
 				      (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
 				      (void*)page, count);
+	mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex);
 out_free:
 	free_page((unsigned long) page);
 out: