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authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2022-05-02 13:49:24 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2022-05-02 13:49:24 +0200
commit35a7609639c49f76f13f206402cbf692c4ae3e4e (patch)
tree55c8cf59f8bac0754eff06a3f102d2d819dc39ed /drivers/char
parente918c10265ef2bc82ce8a6fed6d8123d09ec1db3 (diff)
parent672c0c5173427e6b3e2a9bbb7be51ceeec78093a (diff)
downloadlinux-35a7609639c49f76f13f206402cbf692c4ae3e4e.tar.gz
Merge 5.18-rc5 into char-misc-next
We need the char-misc fixes in here as well.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/random.c49
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index e15063d61460..4c9adb4f3d5d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -318,6 +318,13 @@ static void crng_reseed(bool force)
  * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
  * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
  * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+ *
+ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
+ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
+ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
+ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
+ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
+ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
  */
 static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
 				  u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
@@ -523,8 +530,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
 static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
-	ssize_t ret = 0;
-	size_t len;
+	size_t len, left, ret = 0;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
 	u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
@@ -543,37 +549,40 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 	 * the user directly.
 	 */
 	if (nbytes <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
-		ret = copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes) ? -EFAULT : nbytes;
+		ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes);
 		goto out_zero_chacha;
 	}
 
-	do {
+	for (;;) {
 		chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
 
 		len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) {
-			ret = -EFAULT;
+		left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len);
+		if (left) {
+			ret += len - left;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		nbytes -= len;
 		buf += len;
 		ret += len;
+		nbytes -= len;
+		if (!nbytes)
+			break;
 
 		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
-		if (!(ret % PAGE_SIZE) && nbytes) {
+		if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
 			if (signal_pending(current))
 				break;
 			cond_resched();
 		}
-	} while (nbytes);
+	}
 
 	memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
 out_zero_chacha:
 	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
-	return ret;
+	return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1016,7 +1025,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
  */
 void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
 {
-	cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
+	unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy();
 	unsigned long flags, now = jiffies;
 
 	if (crng_init == 0 && size)
@@ -1047,8 +1056,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state {
  */
 static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
 {
-	cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	unsigned long flags, now = jiffies;
+	unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
 	long delta, delta2, delta3;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
@@ -1337,8 +1345,7 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 {
 	enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
-	cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	unsigned long now = jiffies;
+	unsigned long cycles = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies;
 	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
 	struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
 	unsigned int new_count;
@@ -1351,16 +1358,12 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 	if (cycles == 0)
 		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
 
-	if (sizeof(cycles) == 8)
+	if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8) {
 		irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq;
-	else {
+		irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
+	} else {
 		irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq;
 		irq_data.u32[1] = now;
-	}
-
-	if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8)
-		irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
-	else {
 		irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
 		irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
 	}
@@ -1407,7 +1410,7 @@ static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
 {
 	struct {
-		cycles_t cycles;
+		unsigned long cycles;
 		struct timer_list timer;
 	} stack;