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authorWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>2020-08-06 23:18:13 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-08-07 11:33:22 -0700
commit453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88 (patch)
treee9672e7fb28f59331ff00fe6197360d703cbd9c3 /crypto
parent57c720d4144a9c2b88105c3e8f7b0e97e4b5cc93 (diff)
downloadlinux-453431a54934d917153c65211b2dabf45562ca88.tar.gz
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/adiantum.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ahash.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/api.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/deflate.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/drbg.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecc.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdh.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/gcm.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/gf128mul.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rng.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/seqiv.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/shash.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/skcipher.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/testmgr.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/zstd.c2
18 files changed, 32 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/adiantum.c b/crypto/adiantum.c
index 7fbdc3270984..ce4d5725342c 100644
--- a/crypto/adiantum.c
+++ b/crypto/adiantum.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static int adiantum_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	keyp += NHPOLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
 	WARN_ON(keyp != &data->derived_keys[ARRAY_SIZE(data->derived_keys)]);
 out:
-	kzfree(data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/ahash.c b/crypto/ahash.c
index 68a0f0cb75c4..d9d65d1cc669 100644
--- a/crypto/ahash.c
+++ b/crypto/ahash.c
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int ahash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	ret = tfm->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	kzfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void ahash_restore_req(struct ahash_request *req, int err)
 	req->priv = NULL;
 
 	/* Free the req->priv.priv from the ADJUSTED request. */
-	kzfree(priv);
+	kfree_sensitive(priv);
 }
 
 static void ahash_notify_einprogress(struct ahash_request *req)
diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c
index 5d8fe60b36c1..ed08cbd5b9d3 100644
--- a/crypto/api.c
+++ b/crypto/api.c
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ void crypto_destroy_tfm(void *mem, struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 		alg->cra_exit(tfm);
 	crypto_exit_ops(tfm);
 	crypto_mod_put(alg);
-	kzfree(mem);
+	kfree_sensitive(mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_destroy_tfm);
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index cc9dbcecaaca..7553ab18db89 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
 	}
 
 error:
-	kzfree(desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(desc);
 error_no_desc:
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 	kleave(" = %d", ret);
@@ -447,6 +447,6 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 	ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
 
 error:
-	kzfree(ctx.digest);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/deflate.c b/crypto/deflate.c
index 4c0e6c9d942a..b2a46f6dc961 100644
--- a/crypto/deflate.c
+++ b/crypto/deflate.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void __deflate_exit(void *ctx)
 static void deflate_free_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
 {
 	__deflate_exit(ctx);
-	kzfree(ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 }
 
 static void deflate_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 8d80d93cab97..e99fe34cfa00 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1218,19 +1218,19 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
 	if (!drbg)
 		return;
-	kzfree(drbg->Vbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(drbg->Vbuf);
 	drbg->Vbuf = NULL;
 	drbg->V = NULL;
-	kzfree(drbg->Cbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(drbg->Cbuf);
 	drbg->Cbuf = NULL;
 	drbg->C = NULL;
-	kzfree(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
+	kfree_sensitive(drbg->scratchpadbuf);
 	drbg->scratchpadbuf = NULL;
 	drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
 	drbg->d_ops = NULL;
 	drbg->core = NULL;
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
-		kzfree(drbg->prev);
+		kfree_sensitive(drbg->prev);
 		drbg->prev = NULL;
 		drbg->fips_primed = false;
 	}
@@ -1701,7 +1701,7 @@ static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
 	if (sdesc) {
 		crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
-		kzfree(sdesc);
+		kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	}
 	drbg->priv_data = NULL;
 	return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
index 8acf8433ca29..c80aa25994a0 100644
--- a/crypto/ecc.c
+++ b/crypto/ecc.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static u64 *ecc_alloc_digits_space(unsigned int ndigits)
 
 static void ecc_free_digits_space(u64 *space)
 {
-	kzfree(space);
+	kfree_sensitive(space);
 }
 
 static struct ecc_point *ecc_alloc_point(unsigned int ndigits)
@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ static void ecc_free_point(struct ecc_point *p)
 	if (!p)
 		return;
 
-	kzfree(p->x);
-	kzfree(p->y);
-	kzfree(p);
+	kfree_sensitive(p->x);
+	kfree_sensitive(p->y);
+	kfree_sensitive(p);
 }
 
 static void vli_clear(u64 *vli, unsigned int ndigits)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh.c b/crypto/ecdh.c
index bd599053a8c4..b0232d6ab4ce 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static int ecdh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)
 
 	/* fall through */
 free_all:
-	kzfree(shared_secret);
+	kfree_sensitive(shared_secret);
 free_pubkey:
 	kfree(public_key);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/gcm.c b/crypto/gcm.c
index 3a36a9533c96..338ee0769747 100644
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int crypto_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
 			       CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
 	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(ghash, (u8 *)&data->hash, sizeof(be128));
 out:
-	kzfree(data);
+	kfree_sensitive(data);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/gf128mul.c b/crypto/gf128mul.c
index a4b1c026aaee..a69ae3e6c16c 100644
--- a/crypto/gf128mul.c
+++ b/crypto/gf128mul.c
@@ -304,8 +304,8 @@ void gf128mul_free_64k(struct gf128mul_64k *t)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		kzfree(t->t[i]);
-	kzfree(t);
+		kfree_sensitive(t->t[i]);
+	kfree_sensitive(t);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(gf128mul_free_64k);
 
diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
index b43684c0dade..eb7d1dd506bf 100644
--- a/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void *jent_zalloc(unsigned int len)
 
 void jent_zfree(void *ptr)
 {
-	kzfree(ptr);
+	kfree_sensitive(ptr);
 }
 
 int jent_fips_enabled(void)
diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index 1490d210f1a1..a888d84b524a 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
 	err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
 	crypto_stats_rng_seed(alg, err);
 out:
-	kzfree(buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_rng_reset);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
index 4983b2b4a223..ddd3d10ffc15 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 	sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst,
 			    sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, ctx->key_size),
 			    out_buf, ctx->key_size);
-	kzfree(out_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(out_buf);
 
 out:
 	req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 				out_buf + pos, req->dst_len);
 
 done:
-	kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 		   req->dst_len) != 0)
 		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
 done:
-	kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c
index 23e22d8b63e6..0899d527c284 100644
--- a/crypto/seqiv.c
+++ b/crypto/seqiv.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err)
 	memcpy(req->iv, subreq->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
 
 out:
-	kzfree(subreq->iv);
+	kfree_sensitive(subreq->iv);
 }
 
 static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c
index e6a4b5f39b8c..2e3433ad9762 100644
--- a/crypto/shash.c
+++ b/crypto/shash.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	err = shash->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	kzfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/skcipher.c b/crypto/skcipher.c
index 467af525848a..b4dae640de9f 100644
--- a/crypto/skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/skcipher.c
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static int skcipher_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
 	alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
 	memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
 	ret = cipher->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
-	kzfree(buffer);
+	kfree_sensitive(buffer);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 6863f911fcee..23c27fc96394 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ out:
 	kfree(vec.plaintext);
 	kfree(vec.digest);
 	crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm);
-	kzfree(generic_desc);
+	kfree_sensitive(generic_desc);
 	return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
@@ -3665,7 +3665,7 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr,
 	if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for "
 		       "%s\n", driver);
-		kzfree(buf);
+		kfree_sensitive(buf);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
@@ -3712,7 +3712,7 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr,
 
 outbuf:
 	crypto_free_rng(drng);
-	kzfree(buf);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/zstd.c b/crypto/zstd.c
index 5a3ff258d8f7..1a3309f066f7 100644
--- a/crypto/zstd.c
+++ b/crypto/zstd.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void __zstd_exit(void *ctx)
 static void zstd_free_ctx(struct crypto_scomp *tfm, void *ctx)
 {
 	__zstd_exit(ctx);
-	kzfree(ctx);
+	kfree_sensitive(ctx);
 }
 
 static void zstd_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)