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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-05-21 16:01:54 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-05-21 16:01:54 -0400
commit6f6e434aa267a6030477876d89444fe3a6b7a48d (patch)
tree67755c422f1e85451aa646eae21d4c6f3f389d9f /arch/x86
parent44c752fe584d8b9f6e0756ecffa8691677471862 (diff)
parent6741c4bb389da103c0d79ad1961884628900bfe6 (diff)
downloadlinux-6f6e434aa267a6030477876d89444fe3a6b7a48d.tar.gz
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
S390 bpf_jit.S is removed in net-next and had changes in 'net',
since that code isn't used any more take the removal.

TLS data structures split the TX and RX components in 'net-next',
put the new struct members from the bug fix in 'net' into the RX
part.

The 'net-next' tree had some reworking of how the ERSPAN code works in
the GRE tunneling code, overlapping with a one-line headroom
calculation fix in 'net'.

Overlapping changes in __sock_map_ctx_update_elem(), keep the bits
that read the prog members via READ_ONCE() into local variables
before using them.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S79
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/core.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/msr.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head64.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/mmu.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c4
28 files changed, 237 insertions, 100 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
index 47d3efff6805..09f36c0d9d4f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci32(efi_pci_io_protocol_32 *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto free_struct;
 
-	memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
+	memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage,
+	       pci->romsize);
 	return status;
 
 free_struct:
@@ -269,7 +270,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci64(efi_pci_io_protocol_64 *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto free_struct;
 
-	memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
+	memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage,
+	       pci->romsize);
 	return status;
 
 free_struct:
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index fca012baba19..8169e8b7a4dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -306,6 +306,25 @@ ENTRY(startup_64)
 	leaq	boot_stack_end(%rbx), %rsp
 
 	/*
+	 * paging_prepare() and cleanup_trampoline() below can have GOT
+	 * references. Adjust the table with address we are running at.
+	 *
+	 * Zero RAX for adjust_got: the GOT was not adjusted before;
+	 * there's no adjustment to undo.
+	 */
+	xorq	%rax, %rax
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the address the binary is loaded at and use it as
+	 * a GOT adjustment.
+	 */
+	call	1f
+1:	popq	%rdi
+	subq	$1b, %rdi
+
+	call	adjust_got
+
+	/*
 	 * At this point we are in long mode with 4-level paging enabled,
 	 * but we might want to enable 5-level paging or vice versa.
 	 *
@@ -370,10 +389,14 @@ trampoline_return:
 	/*
 	 * cleanup_trampoline() would restore trampoline memory.
 	 *
+	 * RDI is address of the page table to use instead of page table
+	 * in trampoline memory (if required).
+	 *
 	 * RSI holds real mode data and needs to be preserved across
 	 * this function call.
 	 */
 	pushq	%rsi
+	leaq	top_pgtable(%rbx), %rdi
 	call	cleanup_trampoline
 	popq	%rsi
 
@@ -381,6 +404,21 @@ trampoline_return:
 	pushq	$0
 	popfq
 
+	/*
+	 * Previously we've adjusted the GOT with address the binary was
+	 * loaded at. Now we need to re-adjust for relocation address.
+	 *
+	 * Calculate the address the binary is loaded at, so that we can
+	 * undo the previous GOT adjustment.
+	 */
+	call	1f
+1:	popq	%rax
+	subq	$1b, %rax
+
+	/* The new adjustment is the relocation address */
+	movq	%rbx, %rdi
+	call	adjust_got
+
 /*
  * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer
  * where decompression in place becomes safe.
@@ -482,19 +520,6 @@ relocated:
 	rep	stosq
 
 /*
- * Adjust our own GOT
- */
-	leaq	_got(%rip), %rdx
-	leaq	_egot(%rip), %rcx
-1:
-	cmpq	%rcx, %rdx
-	jae	2f
-	addq	%rbx, (%rdx)
-	addq	$8, %rdx
-	jmp	1b
-2:
-	
-/*
  * Do the extraction, and jump to the new kernel..
  */
 	pushq	%rsi			/* Save the real mode argument */
@@ -512,6 +537,27 @@ relocated:
  */
 	jmp	*%rax
 
+/*
+ * Adjust the global offset table
+ *
+ * RAX is the previous adjustment of the table to undo (use 0 if it's the
+ * first time we touch GOT).
+ * RDI is the new adjustment to apply.
+ */
+adjust_got:
+	/* Walk through the GOT adding the address to the entries */
+	leaq	_got(%rip), %rdx
+	leaq	_egot(%rip), %rcx
+1:
+	cmpq	%rcx, %rdx
+	jae	2f
+	subq	%rax, (%rdx)	/* Undo previous adjustment */
+	addq	%rdi, (%rdx)	/* Apply the new adjustment */
+	addq	$8, %rdx
+	jmp	1b
+2:
+	ret
+
 	.code32
 /*
  * This is the 32-bit trampoline that will be copied over to low memory.
@@ -649,3 +695,10 @@ boot_stack_end:
 	.balign 4096
 pgtable:
 	.fill BOOT_PGT_SIZE, 1, 0
+
+/*
+ * The page table is going to be used instead of page table in the trampoline
+ * memory.
+ */
+top_pgtable:
+	.fill PAGE_SIZE, 1, 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
index 32af1cbcd903..a362fa0b849c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c
@@ -23,14 +23,6 @@ struct paging_config {
 static char trampoline_save[TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_SIZE];
 
 /*
- * The page table is going to be used instead of page table in the trampoline
- * memory.
- *
- * It must not be in BSS as BSS is cleared after cleanup_trampoline().
- */
-static char top_pgtable[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) __section(.data);
-
-/*
  * Trampoline address will be printed by extract_kernel() for debugging
  * purposes.
  *
@@ -134,7 +126,7 @@ out:
 	return paging_config;
 }
 
-void cleanup_trampoline(void)
+void cleanup_trampoline(void *pgtable)
 {
 	void *trampoline_pgtable;
 
@@ -145,8 +137,8 @@ void cleanup_trampoline(void)
 	 * if it's there.
 	 */
 	if ((void *)__native_read_cr3() == trampoline_pgtable) {
-		memcpy(top_pgtable, trampoline_pgtable, PAGE_SIZE);
-		native_write_cr3((unsigned long)top_pgtable);
+		memcpy(pgtable, trampoline_pgtable, PAGE_SIZE);
+		native_write_cr3((unsigned long)pgtable);
 	}
 
 	/* Restore trampoline memory */
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 541468e25265..000000000000
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-#include "../vdso-fakesections.c"
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index a6006e7bb729..45b2b1c93d04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
@@ -304,17 +305,20 @@ set_ext_hw_attr(struct hw_perf_event *hwc, struct perf_event *event)
 
 	config = attr->config;
 
-	cache_type = (config >>  0) & 0xff;
+	cache_type = (config >> 0) & 0xff;
 	if (cache_type >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	cache_type = array_index_nospec(cache_type, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX);
 
 	cache_op = (config >>  8) & 0xff;
 	if (cache_op >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	cache_op = array_index_nospec(cache_op, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX);
 
 	cache_result = (config >> 16) & 0xff;
 	if (cache_result >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	cache_result = array_index_nospec(cache_result, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX);
 
 	val = hw_cache_event_ids[cache_type][cache_op][cache_result];
 
@@ -421,6 +425,8 @@ int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (attr->config >= x86_pmu.max_events)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	attr->config = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)attr->config, x86_pmu.max_events);
+
 	/*
 	 * The generic map:
 	 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c
index 9aca448bb8e6..9f8084f18d58 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 #include "../perf_event.h"
@@ -302,6 +303,7 @@ static int cstate_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	} else if (event->pmu == &cstate_pkg_pmu) {
 		if (cfg >= PERF_CSTATE_PKG_EVENT_MAX)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		cfg = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)cfg, PERF_CSTATE_PKG_EVENT_MAX);
 		if (!pkg_msr[cfg].attr)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		event->hw.event_base = pkg_msr[cfg].msr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/msr.c b/arch/x86/events/msr.c
index e7edf19e64c2..b4771a6ddbc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/msr.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 
 enum perf_msr_id {
@@ -158,9 +159,6 @@ static int msr_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (cfg >= PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	/* unsupported modes and filters */
 	if (event->attr.exclude_user   ||
 	    event->attr.exclude_kernel ||
@@ -171,6 +169,11 @@ static int msr_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	    event->attr.sample_period) /* no sampling */
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (cfg >= PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cfg = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)cfg, PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX);
+
 	if (!msr[cfg].attr)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index b27da9602a6d..aced6c9290d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -140,6 +140,20 @@ extern void clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int bit);
 
 #define setup_force_cpu_bug(bit) setup_force_cpu_cap(bit)
 
+#if defined(__clang__) && !defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO)
+
+/*
+ * Workaround for the sake of BPF compilation which utilizes kernel
+ * headers, but clang does not support ASM GOTO and fails the build.
+ */
+#ifndef __BPF_TRACING__
+#warning "Compiler lacks ASM_GOTO support. Add -D __BPF_TRACING__ to your compiler arguments"
+#endif
+
+#define static_cpu_has(bit)            boot_cpu_has(bit)
+
+#else
+
 /*
  * Static testing of CPU features.  Used the same as boot_cpu_has().
  * These will statically patch the target code for additional
@@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ t_no:
 		boot_cpu_has(bit) :				\
 		_static_cpu_has(bit)				\
 )
+#endif
 
 #define cpu_has_bug(c, bit)		cpu_has(c, (bit))
 #define set_cpu_bug(c, bit)		set_cpu_cap(c, (bit))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
index b3e32b010ab1..c2c01f84df75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
@@ -208,4 +208,22 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn)
 	return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes;
 }
 
+#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f
+#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e
+
+/*
+ * Intel SDM Vol.3A 6.8.3 states;
+ * "Any single-step trap that would be delivered following the MOV to SS
+ * instruction or POP to SS instruction (because EFLAGS.TF is 1) is
+ * suppressed."
+ * This function returns true if @insn is MOV SS or POP SS. On these
+ * instructions, single stepping is suppressed.
+ */
+static inline int insn_masking_exception(struct insn *insn)
+{
+	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == POP_SS_OPCODE ||
+		(insn->opcode.bytes[0] == MOV_SREG_OPCODE &&
+		 X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.bytes[0]) == 2);
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 57e3785d0d26..cf9911b5a53c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
-		/* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */
+		/* pkey 0 is the default and allocated implicitly */
 		mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = 0x1;
 		/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
index a0ba1ffda0df..851c04b7a092 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 
+#define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY	0
+
 #define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
 
 extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
@@ -15,7 +17,7 @@ extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm);
 static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
-		return 0;
+		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
 
 	return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
 }
@@ -49,13 +51,21 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
 {
 	/*
 	 * "Allocated" pkeys are those that have been returned
-	 * from pkey_alloc().  pkey 0 is special, and never
-	 * returned from pkey_alloc().
+	 * from pkey_alloc() or pkey 0 which is allocated
+	 * implicitly when the mm is created.
 	 */
-	if (pkey <= 0)
+	if (pkey < 0)
 		return false;
 	if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
 		return false;
+	/*
+	 * The exec-only pkey is set in the allocation map, but
+	 * is not available to any of the user interfaces like
+	 * mprotect_pkey().
+	 */
+	if (pkey == mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
+		return false;
+
 	return mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & (1U << pkey);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
index 4c851ebb3ceb..0ede697c3961 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH	9
 #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT	10
 
-#define KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED      0
+#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME      0
 
 /* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field
  * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
index c88e0b127810..b481b95bd8f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@
 #include <asm/amd_nb.h>
 
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_ROOT	0x1450
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_ROOT	0x15d0
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F3	0x1463
 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F4	0x1464
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F3 0x15eb
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F4 0x15ec
 
 /* Protect the PCI config register pairs used for SMN and DF indirect access. */
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smn_mutex);
@@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ static u32 *flush_words;
 
 static const struct pci_device_id amd_root_ids[] = {
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_ROOT) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_ROOT) },
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ const struct pci_device_id amd_nb_misc_ids[] = {
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_NB_F3) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_M30H_NB_F3) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F3) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F3) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_CNB17H_F3) },
 	{}
 };
@@ -51,6 +56,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id amd_nb_link_ids[] = {
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_NB_F4) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_M30H_NB_F4) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F4) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F4) },
 	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_CNB17H_F4) },
 	{}
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c
index 8b04234e010b..7685444a106b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static void init_x2apic_ldr(void)
 			goto update;
 	}
 	cmsk = cluster_hotplug_mask;
+	cmsk->clusterid = cluster;
 	cluster_hotplug_mask = NULL;
 update:
 	this_cpu_write(cluster_masks, cmsk);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
index f7666eef4a87..c8e038800591 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ static struct smca_bank_name smca_names[] = {
 	[SMCA_SMU]	= { "smu",		"System Management Unit" },
 };
 
+static u32 smca_bank_addrs[MAX_NR_BANKS][NR_BLOCKS] __ro_after_init =
+{
+	[0 ... MAX_NR_BANKS - 1] = { [0 ... NR_BLOCKS - 1] = -1 }
+};
+
 const char *smca_get_name(enum smca_bank_types t)
 {
 	if (t >= N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES)
@@ -443,20 +448,26 @@ static u32 smca_get_block_address(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int bank,
 	if (!block)
 		return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank);
 
+	/* Check our cache first: */
+	if (smca_bank_addrs[bank][block] != -1)
+		return smca_bank_addrs[bank][block];
+
 	/*
 	 * For SMCA enabled processors, BLKPTR field of the first MISC register
 	 * (MCx_MISC0) indicates presence of additional MISC regs set (MISC1-4).
 	 */
 	if (rdmsr_safe_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(bank), &low, &high))
-		return addr;
+		goto out;
 
 	if (!(low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX))
-		return addr;
+		goto out;
 
 	if (!rdmsr_safe_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank), &low, &high) &&
 	    (low & MASK_BLKPTR_LO))
-		return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISCy(bank, block - 1);
+		addr = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISCy(bank, block - 1);
 
+out:
+	smca_bank_addrs[bank][block] = addr;
 	return addr;
 }
 
@@ -468,18 +479,6 @@ static u32 get_block_address(unsigned int cpu, u32 current_addr, u32 low, u32 hi
 	if ((bank >= mca_cfg.banks) || (block >= NR_BLOCKS))
 		return addr;
 
-	/* Get address from already initialized block. */
-	if (per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu)) {
-		struct threshold_bank *bankp = per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu)[bank];
-
-		if (bankp && bankp->blocks) {
-			struct threshold_block *blockp = &bankp->blocks[block];
-
-			if (blockp)
-				return blockp->address;
-		}
-	}
-
 	if (mce_flags.smca)
 		return smca_get_block_address(cpu, bank, block);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 0c408f8c4ed4..2d29e47c056e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -104,6 +104,12 @@ static bool __head check_la57_support(unsigned long physaddr)
 }
 #endif
 
+/* Code in __startup_64() can be relocated during execution, but the compiler
+ * doesn't have to generate PC-relative relocations when accessing globals from
+ * that function. Clang actually does not generate them, which leads to
+ * boot-time crashes. To work around this problem, every global pointer must
+ * be adjusted using fixup_pointer().
+ */
 unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
 				  struct boot_params *bp)
 {
@@ -113,6 +119,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
 	p4dval_t *p4d;
 	pudval_t *pud;
 	pmdval_t *pmd, pmd_entry;
+	pteval_t *mask_ptr;
 	bool la57;
 	int i;
 	unsigned int *next_pgt_ptr;
@@ -196,7 +203,8 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
 
 	pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
 	/* Filter out unsupported __PAGE_KERNEL_* bits: */
-	pmd_entry &= __supported_pte_mask;
+	mask_ptr = fixup_pointer(&__supported_pte_mask, physaddr);
+	pmd_entry &= *mask_ptr;
 	pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask();
 	pmd_entry +=  physaddr;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 0715f827607c..6f4d42377fe5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src, u8 *real, struct insn *insn)
 	if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
 		return 0;
 
+	/* We should not singlestep on the exception masking instructions */
+	if (insn_masking_exception(insn))
+		return 0;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	/* Only x86_64 has RIP relative instructions */
 	if (insn_rip_relative(insn)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 7867417cfaff..5b2300b818af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
 static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
 {
 	native_smp_prepare_cpus(max_cpus);
-	if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED))
+	if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME))
 		static_branch_disable(&virt_spin_lock_key);
 }
 
@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ static void __init kvm_guest_init(void)
 	}
 
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH) &&
-	    !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED) &&
+	    !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME) &&
 	    kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME))
 		pv_mmu_ops.flush_tlb_others = kvm_flush_tlb_others;
 
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static __init int kvm_setup_pv_tlb_flush(void)
 	int cpu;
 
 	if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH) &&
-	    !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED) &&
+	    !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME) &&
 	    kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) {
 		for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 			zalloc_cpumask_var_node(per_cpu_ptr(&__pv_tlb_mask, cpu),
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ void __init kvm_spinlock_init(void)
 	if (!kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT))
 		return;
 
-	if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED))
+	if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME))
 		return;
 
 	__pv_init_lock_hash();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
index 60cdec6628b0..d1ab07ec8c9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
@@ -57,12 +57,17 @@ static void load_segments(void)
 static void machine_kexec_free_page_tables(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pgd);
+	image->arch.pgd = NULL;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd0);
+	image->arch.pmd0 = NULL;
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd1);
+	image->arch.pmd1 = NULL;
 #endif
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte0);
+	image->arch.pte0 = NULL;
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte1);
+	image->arch.pte1 = NULL;
 }
 
 static int machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(struct kimage *image)
@@ -79,7 +84,6 @@ static int machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(struct kimage *image)
 	    !image->arch.pmd0 || !image->arch.pmd1 ||
 #endif
 	    !image->arch.pte0 || !image->arch.pte1) {
-		machine_kexec_free_page_tables(image);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index a5e55d832d0a..6010449ca6d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -39,9 +39,13 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image)
 {
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.p4d);
+	image->arch.p4d = NULL;
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pud);
+	image->arch.pud = NULL;
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd);
+	image->arch.pmd = NULL;
 	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte);
+	image->arch.pte = NULL;
 }
 
 static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
@@ -91,7 +95,6 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
 	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC));
 	return 0;
 err:
-	free_transition_pgtable(image);
 	return result;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 4b100fe0f508..12bb445fb98d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ void set_personality_64bit(void)
 	clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32);
 	/* Pretend that this comes from a 64bit execve */
 	task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_execve;
+	current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT;
 
 	/* Ensure the corresponding mm is not marked. */
 	if (current->mm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
index 85c7ef23d99f..c84bb5396958 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
@@ -299,6 +299,10 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn, bool
 	if (is_prefix_bad(insn))
 		return -ENOTSUPP;
 
+	/* We should not singlestep on the exception masking instructions */
+	if (insn_masking_exception(insn))
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+
 	if (x86_64)
 		good_insns = good_insns_64;
 	else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index 98618e397342..5708e951a5c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ static int kvm_hv_hypercall_complete_userspace(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
 
 	kvm_hv_hypercall_set_result(vcpu, run->hyperv.u.hcall.result);
-	return 1;
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
 static u16 kvm_hvcall_signal_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool fast, u64 param)
@@ -1296,8 +1296,10 @@ static u16 kvm_hvcall_signal_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool fast, u64 param)
 	if (param & ~KVM_HYPERV_CONN_ID_MASK)
 		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT;
 
-	/* conn_to_evt is protected by vcpu->kvm->srcu */
+	/* the eventfd is protected by vcpu->kvm->srcu, but conn_to_evt isn't */
+	rcu_read_lock();
 	eventfd = idr_find(&vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv.conn_to_evt, param);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	if (!eventfd)
 		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index c7668806163f..3f1696570b41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -1494,6 +1494,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc(void)
 		SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
 }
 
+static bool vmx_umip_emulated(void)
+{
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+}
+
 static inline bool report_flexpriority(void)
 {
 	return flexpriority_enabled;
@@ -4761,14 +4767,16 @@ static int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 	else
 		hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
 
-	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP)) {
-		vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
-			      SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
-		hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
-	} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
-	           !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC))
-		vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) && vmx_umip_emulated()) {
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) {
+			vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
 				SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+			hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
+		} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+			!nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC))
+			vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+	}
 
 	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) {
 		/*
@@ -9497,12 +9505,6 @@ static bool vmx_xsaves_supported(void)
 		SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
 }
 
-static bool vmx_umip_emulated(void)
-{
-	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
-		SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
-}
-
 static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
 	u32 exit_intr_info;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 51ecd381793b..59371de5d722 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ module_param(ignore_msrs, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
 static bool __read_mostly report_ignored_msrs = true;
 module_param(report_ignored_msrs, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
 
-unsigned int min_timer_period_us = 500;
+unsigned int min_timer_period_us = 200;
 module_param(min_timer_period_us, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
 
 static bool __read_mostly kvmclock_periodic_sync = true;
@@ -843,7 +843,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr4);
 int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	cr3 &= ~CR3_PCID_INVD;
+	bool pcid_enabled = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+
+	if (pcid_enabled)
+		cr3 &= ~CR3_PCID_INVD;
 #endif
 
 	if (cr3 == kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) && !pdptrs_changed(vcpu)) {
@@ -6671,12 +6674,13 @@ void kvm_vcpu_deactivate_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret;
-	int op_64_bit, r;
-
-	r = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	int op_64_bit;
 
-	if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
-		return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
+	if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		if (!kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu))
+			return 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	nr = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
 	a0 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
@@ -6697,7 +6701,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0) {
 		ret = -KVM_EPERM;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_error;
 	}
 
 	switch (nr) {
@@ -6717,12 +6721,14 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
 		break;
 	}
-out:
+out_error:
 	if (!op_64_bit)
 		ret = (u32)ret;
 	kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, ret);
+
+out:
 	++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
-	return r;
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_hypercall);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
index d7bc0eea20a5..6e98e0a7c923 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -94,26 +94,27 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey
 	 */
 	if (pkey != -1)
 		return pkey;
-	/*
-	 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
-	 * which is now being given permissions that are not
-	 * execute-only.  Move it back to the default pkey.
-	 */
-	if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
-	    (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
-		return 0;
-	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the
 	 * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that,
 	 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
-	 * support.
+	 * support in this mm.
 	 */
 	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
 		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
 		if (pkey > 0)
 			return pkey;
+	} else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) {
+		/*
+		 * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping
+		 * is using the exec-only pkey.  This mapping was
+		 * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be.  Move back to
+		 * the default pkey.
+		 */
+		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
 	}
+
 	/*
 	 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
 	 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
index d33e7dbe3129..2d76106788a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
@@ -42,13 +42,11 @@ xmaddr_t arbitrary_virt_to_machine(void *vaddr)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arbitrary_virt_to_machine);
 
-static void xen_flush_tlb_all(void)
+static noinline void xen_flush_tlb_all(void)
 {
 	struct mmuext_op *op;
 	struct multicall_space mcs;
 
-	trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb_all(0);
-
 	preempt_disable();
 
 	mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
index 486c0a34d00b..2c30cabfda90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
@@ -1310,13 +1310,11 @@ unsigned long xen_read_cr2_direct(void)
 	return this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu_info.arch.cr2);
 }
 
-static void xen_flush_tlb(void)
+static noinline void xen_flush_tlb(void)
 {
 	struct mmuext_op *op;
 	struct multicall_space mcs;
 
-	trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb(0);
-
 	preempt_disable();
 
 	mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));