x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

    /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

4 files changed, 135 insertions, 19 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index f54867cadb0f..13c01b641dc7 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -513,17 +513,18 @@ Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 		cpu_capacity: capacity of cpuX.
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
-		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..74dab6af7fe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+GDS - Gather Data Sampling
+==========================
+
+Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
+
+Problem
+-------
+When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
+are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
+instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
+architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
+destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
+infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
+attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
+
+The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
+registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
+vulnerable.
+
+Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
+are possible.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
+permission boundaries:
+
+	Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
+	Userspace can infer kernel data
+	Guests can infer data from hosts
+	Guest can infer guest from other guests
+	Users can infer data from other users
+
+Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
+lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
+
+The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should  ensure
+that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
+allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
+attack, and re-enable it.
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
+bits:
+
+ ================================   ===   ============================
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL]   R/O   Enumerates GDS vulnerability
+                                          and mitigation support.
+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO]     R/O   Processor is not vulnerable.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS]    R/W   Disables the mitigation
+                                          0 by default.
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK]   R/W   Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
+                                          to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
+                                          Can't be cleared once set.
+ ================================   ===   ============================
+
+GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel
+command-line.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will
+default to the mitigation being enabled.
+
+GDS System Information
+------------------------
+The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
+GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable.
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation.
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect and cannot be disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on a virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+GDS Default mitigation
+----------------------
+The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
+default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index e0614760a99e..436fac0bd9c3 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    l1d_flush.rst
    processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
    cross-thread-rsb.rst
+   gather_data_sampling.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6b838869554b..4f946c7be54c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1593,6 +1593,20 @@
 			Format: off | on
 			default: on
 
+	gather_data_sampling=
+			[X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS)
+			mitigation.
+
+			Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which
+			allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was
+			previously stored in vector registers.
+
+			This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode.
+			The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be
+			disabled.
+
+			off:	Disable GDS mitigation.
+
 	gcov_persist=	[GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for
 			kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via
 			debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded.
@@ -3228,24 +3242,25 @@
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
-				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
-					       if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64]
-					       nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
-					       nobp=0 [S390]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
-					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
-					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
-					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
-					       nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
+				Equivalent to: if nokaslr then kpti=0 [ARM64]
+					       gather_data_sampling=off [X86]
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
-					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
-					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
-					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
+					       mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
 					       no_entry_flush [PPC]
 					       no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
-					       mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_bhb [ARM64]
+					       nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
 
 				Exceptions:
 					       This does not have any effect on