Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
index e105ae97a4f5..324ddf5223b3 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
@@ -27,17 +27,26 @@ Usage:
     keyctl print keyid
 
     options:
-       keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK)
-       keyauth=	  ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
-		  (40 ascii zeros)
-       blobauth=  ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
-		  (40 ascii zeros)
-       blobauth=  ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
-		  (40 ascii zeros)
-       pcrinfo=	  ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
-       pcrlock=	  pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
-       migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
-                   default 1 (resealing allowed)
+       keyhandle=    ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK)
+       keyauth=	     ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i
+                     (40 ascii zeros)
+       blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
+                     (40 ascii zeros)
+       blobauth=     ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00...
+                     (40 ascii zeros)
+       pcrinfo=	     ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default)
+       pcrlock=	     pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
+       migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
+                     default 1 (resealing allowed)
+       hash=         hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only
+                     allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values
+                     are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256.
+       policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated
+                     with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash='
+                     option.
+       policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
+                     same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
+                     seal the key.
 
 "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
 TPM_STORED_DATA format.  The key length for new keys are always in bytes.