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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-02-27 23:03:04 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-02-27 23:03:04 -0800
commit3f5595e3d0180305cfef9a9c7c6265d7ade85dea (patch)
treeaaeca311f61794ff26be9bcdc3491e0c44ff0d67
parent12dfdfedbf8ce3b1464e2cea80014fa0a92ed3e2 (diff)
parentfb94a687d96c570d46332a4a890f1dcb7310e643 (diff)
downloadlinux-3f5595e3d0180305cfef9a9c7c6265d7ade85dea.tar.gz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux
Pull more s390 updates from Martin Schwidefsky:
 "Next to the usual bug fixes (including the TASK_SIZE fix), there is
  one larger crypto item. It allows to use protected keys with the
  in-kernel crypto API

  The protected key support has two parts, the pkey user space API to
  convert key formats and the paes crypto module that uses a protected
  key instead of a standard AES key"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
  s390: TASK_SIZE for kernel threads
  s390/crypt: Add protected key AES module
  s390/dasd: fix spelling mistake: "supportet" -> "supported"
  s390/pkey: Introduce pkey kernel module
  s390/zcrypt: export additional symbols
  s390/zcrypt: Rework CONFIG_ZCRYPT Kconfig text.
  s390/zcrypt: Cleanup leftover module code.
  s390/nmi: purge tlbs after control register validation
  s390/nmi: fix order of register validation
  s390/crypto: Add PCKMO inline function
  s390/zcrypt: Enable request count reset for cards and queues.
  s390/mm: use _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY in the code
  s390/chsc: Add exception handler for CHSC instruction
  s390: opt into HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
  s390: restore address space when returning to user space
  s390: rename CIF_ASCE to CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/configs/default_defconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c619
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/defconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h46
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h90
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h19
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h23
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h112
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/entry.S33
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/entry.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c25
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/process.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/mm/gmap.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/crypto/Kconfig32
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/cio/ioasm.c8
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c10
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/ap_card.c24
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/ap_queue.c21
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c1148
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c5
-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h2
30 files changed, 2182 insertions, 93 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index d5c1073a2584..a2dcef0aacc7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ config S390
 	select HAVE_EBPF_JIT if PACK_STACK && HAVE_MARCH_Z196_FEATURES
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
+	select HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
 	select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
 	select HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
 	select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/default_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/default_defconfig
index e00975361fec..143b1e00b818 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/default_defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/default_defconfig
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m
 CONFIG_ZCRYPT=m
+CONFIG_PKEY=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390=m
diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig
index 2cf87343b590..2358bf33c5ef 100644
--- a/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig
@@ -628,6 +628,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m
 CONFIG_ZCRYPT=m
+CONFIG_PKEY=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390=m
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
index d1033de4c4ee..402c530c6da5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390) += sha1_s390.o sha_common.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390) += sha256_s390.o sha_common.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390) += sha512_s390.o sha_common.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390) += des_s390.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390) += aes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390) += aes_s390.o paes_s390.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d69ea495c4d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm with protected keys.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2017
+ *   Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
+ *		Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License (version 2 only)
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "paes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include <asm/pkey.h>
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct s390_paes_ctx {
+	struct pkey_seckey sk;
+	struct pkey_protkey pk;
+	unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+struct s390_pxts_ctx {
+	struct pkey_seckey sk[2];
+	struct pkey_protkey pk[2];
+	unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct pkey_seckey *sk,
+				     struct pkey_protkey *pk)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+
+	/* try three times in case of failure */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		ret = pkey_skey2pkey(sk, pk);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (key_len != SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	if (__paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			  unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey,
+			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_ENCRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ecb_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ecb(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: aes + ecb */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ecb_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.setkey			=	ecb_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	ecb_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ecb_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+	} param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_kmc(ctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+			      walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (n < k) {
+			if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+			memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+		}
+	}
+	memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return cbc_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"cbc(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"cbc-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: aes + cbc */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(cbc_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	cbc_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	cbc_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	cbc_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk[0], &ctx->pk[0]) ||
+	    __paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk[1], &ctx->pk[1]))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ctx->pk[0].type != ctx->pk[1].type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PXTS_128 :
+		(ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+		CPACF_KM_PXTS_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	u8 ckey[2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+	unsigned int ckey_len;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk[0].seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	memcpy(ctx->sk[1].seckey, in_key + SECKEYBLOBSIZE, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * xts_check_key verifies the key length is not odd and makes
+	 * sure that the two keys are not the same. This can be done
+	 * on the two protected keys as well
+	 */
+	ckey_len = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ?
+		AES_KEYSIZE_128 : AES_KEYSIZE_256;
+	memcpy(ckey, ctx->pk[0].protkey, ckey_len);
+	memcpy(ckey + ckey_len, ctx->pk[1].protkey, ckey_len);
+	return xts_check_key(tfm, ckey, 2*ckey_len);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	unsigned int keylen, offset, nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	/* key + verification pattern */
+		u8 tweak[16];
+		u8 block[16];
+		u8 bit[16];
+		u8 xts[16];
+	} pcc_param;
+	struct {
+		u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	/* key + verification pattern */
+		u8 init[16];
+	} xts_param;
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+	keylen = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 48 : 64;
+	offset = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 16 : 0;
+retry:
+	memset(&pcc_param, 0, sizeof(pcc_param));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+	memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[1].protkey, keylen);
+	cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+
+	memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen);
+	memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		/* only use complete blocks */
+		n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+		k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+			     walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+		if (k)
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+			goto retry;
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return xts_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return xts_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg xts_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"xts(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"xts-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: aes + xts */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_pxts_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(xts_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	2 * SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	2 * SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	xts_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	xts_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	xts_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long fc;
+
+	if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+	fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192 :
+		(ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+		CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+	/* Check if the function code is available */
+	ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+	return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, key_len);
+	if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+		tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int i, n;
+
+	/* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+	memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+	for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+			  struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+	unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+	int ret, locked;
+
+	locked = spin_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+	ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+			n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+		ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+		k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey,
+				walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				n, ctrptr);
+		if (k) {
+			if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+				memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + k - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				       AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+			ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+		}
+		if (k < n) {
+			if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+		}
+	}
+	if (locked)
+		spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+	 */
+	if (nbytes) {
+		while (1) {
+			if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc | modifier,
+					ctx->pk.protkey, buf,
+					walk->src.virt.addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+					walk->iv) == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+				break;
+			if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+				return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+		}
+		memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+		crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+			    struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+			    unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	return ctr_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_paes_alg = {
+	.cra_name		=	"ctr(paes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	=	"ctr-paes-s390",
+	.cra_priority		=	400,	/* combo: aes + ctr */
+	.cra_flags		=	CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		=	1,
+	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ctr_paes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u			=	{
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.max_keysize		=	SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+			.ivsize			=	AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey			=	ctr_paes_set_key,
+			.encrypt		=	ctr_paes_encrypt,
+			.decrypt		=	ctr_paes_decrypt,
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static inline void __crypto_unregister_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+	if (!list_empty(&alg->cra_list))
+		crypto_unregister_alg(alg);
+}
+
+static void paes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+	if (ctrblk)
+		free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&xts_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_paes_alg);
+	__crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_paes_alg);
+}
+
+static int __init paes_s390_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+	cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&ecb_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&cbc_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&xts_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+	}
+
+	if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192) ||
+	    cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256)) {
+		ret = crypto_register_alg(&ctr_paes_alg);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out_err;
+		ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctrblk) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	paes_s390_fini();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+module_init(paes_s390_init);
+module_exit(paes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes-all");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm with protected keys");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/s390/defconfig b/arch/s390/defconfig
index d00e368fb5e6..68bfd09f1b02 100644
--- a/arch/s390/defconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/defconfig
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG=m
 CONFIG_ZCRYPT=m
+CONFIG_PKEY=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390=m
 CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390=m
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h
index 2c680db7e5c1..e2dfbf280d12 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/cpacf.h
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@
 #define CPACF_PPNO		0xb93c		/* MSA5 */
 
 /*
- * Decryption modifier bit
+ * En/decryption modifier bits
  */
+#define CPACF_ENCRYPT		0x00
 #define CPACF_DECRYPT		0x80
 
 /*
@@ -42,8 +43,13 @@
 #define CPACF_KM_AES_128	0x12
 #define CPACF_KM_AES_192	0x13
 #define CPACF_KM_AES_256	0x14
+#define CPACF_KM_PAES_128	0x1a
+#define CPACF_KM_PAES_192	0x1b
+#define CPACF_KM_PAES_256	0x1c
 #define CPACF_KM_XTS_128	0x32
 #define CPACF_KM_XTS_256	0x34
+#define CPACF_KM_PXTS_128	0x3a
+#define CPACF_KM_PXTS_256	0x3c
 
 /*
  * Function codes for the KMC (CIPHER MESSAGE WITH CHAINING)
@@ -56,6 +62,9 @@
 #define CPACF_KMC_AES_128	0x12
 #define CPACF_KMC_AES_192	0x13
 #define CPACF_KMC_AES_256	0x14
+#define CPACF_KMC_PAES_128	0x1a
+#define CPACF_KMC_PAES_192	0x1b
+#define CPACF_KMC_PAES_256	0x1c
 #define CPACF_KMC_PRNG		0x43
 
 /*
@@ -69,6 +78,9 @@
 #define CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128	0x12
 #define CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192	0x13
 #define CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256	0x14
+#define CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128	0x1a
+#define CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192	0x1b
+#define CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256	0x1c
 
 /*
  * Function codes for the KIMD (COMPUTE INTERMEDIATE MESSAGE DIGEST)
@@ -99,6 +111,18 @@
 #define CPACF_KMAC_TDEA_192	0x03
 
 /*
+ * Function codes for the PCKMO (PERFORM CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT)
+ * instruction
+ */
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_QUERY		0x00
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_DES_KEY		0x01
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_TDES_128_KEY	0x02
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_TDES_192_KEY	0x03
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_128_KEY	0x12
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_192_KEY	0x13
+#define CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_256_KEY	0x14
+
+/*
  * Function codes for the PPNO (PERFORM PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER OPERATION)
  * instruction
  */
@@ -397,4 +421,24 @@ static inline void cpacf_pcc(unsigned long func, void *param)
 		: "cc", "memory");
 }
 
+/**
+ * cpacf_pckmo() - executes the PCKMO (PERFORM CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY
+ *		  MANAGEMENT) instruction
+ * @func: the function code passed to PCKMO; see CPACF_PCKMO_xxx defines
+ * @param: address of parameter block; see POP for details on each func
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static inline void cpacf_pckmo(long func, void *param)
+{
+	register unsigned long r0 asm("0") = (unsigned long) func;
+	register unsigned long r1 asm("1") = (unsigned long) param;
+
+	asm volatile(
+		"       .insn   rre,%[opc] << 16,0,0\n" /* PCKMO opcode */
+		:
+		: [fc] "d" (r0), [pba] "a" (r1), [opc] "i" (CPACF_PCKMO)
+		: "cc", "memory");
+}
+
 #endif	/* _ASM_S390_CPACF_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 67f7a991c929..9b828c073176 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static inline void set_user_asce(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	S390_lowcore.user_asce = mm->context.asce;
 	if (current->thread.mm_segment.ar4)
 		__ctl_load(S390_lowcore.user_asce, 7, 7);
-	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE);
+	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY);
 }
 
 static inline void clear_user_asce(void)
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static inline void load_kernel_asce(void)
 	__ctl_store(asce, 1, 1);
 	if (asce != S390_lowcore.kernel_asce)
 		__ctl_load(S390_lowcore.kernel_asce, 1, 1);
-	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE);
+	set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY);
 }
 
 static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 52511866fb14..7ed1972b1920 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -640,12 +640,12 @@ static inline int pud_bad(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline int pmd_present(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_val(pmd) != _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
+	return pmd_val(pmd) != _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY;
 }
 
 static inline int pmd_none(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_val(pmd) == _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
+	return pmd_val(pmd) == _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long pmd_pfn(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static inline void pud_clear(pud_t *pud)
 
 static inline void pmd_clear(pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
-	pmd_val(*pmdp) = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
+	pmd_val(*pmdp) = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY;
 }
 
 static inline void pte_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkhuge(pmd_t pmd)
 static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					    unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
-	return pmdp_xchg_direct(mm, addr, pmdp, __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID));
+	return pmdp_xchg_direct(mm, addr, pmdp, __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY));
 }
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR_FULL
@@ -1367,10 +1367,10 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
 {
 	if (full) {
 		pmd_t pmd = *pmdp;
-		*pmdp = __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID);
+		*pmdp = __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY);
 		return pmd;
 	}
-	return pmdp_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, pmdp, __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID));
+	return pmdp_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, pmdp, __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY));
 }
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_CLEAR_FLUSH
@@ -1384,7 +1384,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 static inline void pmdp_invalidate(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				   unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
-	pmdp_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, pmdp, __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID));
+	pmdp_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, pmdp, __pmd(_SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY));
 }
 
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_SET_WRPROTECT
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b48aef4188f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*
+ * Kernelspace interface to the pkey device driver
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2016
+ *
+ * Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KAPI_PKEY_H
+#define _KAPI_PKEY_H
+
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/pkey.h>
+
+/*
+ * Generate (AES) random secure key.
+ * @param cardnr may be -1 (use default card)
+ * @param domain may be -1 (use default domain)
+ * @param keytype one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values
+ * @param seckey pointer to buffer receiving the secure key
+ * @return 0 on success, negative errno value on failure
+ */
+int pkey_genseckey(__u16 cardnr, __u16 domain,
+		   __u32 keytype, struct pkey_seckey *seckey);
+
+/*
+ * Generate (AES) secure key with given key value.
+ * @param cardnr may be -1 (use default card)
+ * @param domain may be -1 (use default domain)
+ * @param keytype one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values
+ * @param clrkey pointer to buffer with clear key data
+ * @param seckey pointer to buffer receiving the secure key
+ * @return 0 on success, negative errno value on failure
+ */
+int pkey_clr2seckey(__u16 cardnr, __u16 domain, __u32 keytype,
+		    const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey,
+		    struct pkey_seckey *seckey);
+
+/*
+ * Derive (AES) proteced key from the (AES) secure key blob.
+ * @param cardnr may be -1 (use default card)
+ * @param domain may be -1 (use default domain)
+ * @param seckey pointer to buffer with the input secure key
+ * @param protkey pointer to buffer receiving the protected key and
+ *	  additional info (type, length)
+ * @return 0 on success, negative errno value on failure
+ */
+int pkey_sec2protkey(__u16 cardnr, __u16 domain,
+		     const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+		     struct pkey_protkey *protkey);
+
+/*
+ * Derive (AES) protected key from a given clear key value.
+ * @param keytype one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values
+ * @param clrkey pointer to buffer with clear key data
+ * @param protkey pointer to buffer receiving the protected key and
+ *	  additional info (type, length)
+ * @return 0 on success, negative errno value on failure
+ */
+int pkey_clr2protkey(__u32 keytype,
+		     const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey,
+		     struct pkey_protkey *protkey);
+
+/*
+ * Search for a matching crypto card based on the Master Key
+ * Verification Pattern provided inside a secure key.
+ * @param seckey pointer to buffer with the input secure key
+ * @param cardnr pointer to cardnr, receives the card number on success
+ * @param domain pointer to domain, receives the domain number on success
+ * @param verify if set, always verify by fetching verification pattern
+ *	  from card
+ * @return 0 on success, negative errno value on failure. If no card could be
+ *	   found, -ENODEV is returned.
+ */
+int pkey_findcard(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+		  __u16 *cardnr, __u16 *domain, int verify);
+
+/*
+ * Find card and transform secure key to protected key.
+ * @param seckey pointer to buffer with the input secure key
+ * @param protkey pointer to buffer receiving the protected key and
+ *	  additional info (type, length)
+ * @return 0 on success, negative errno value on failure
+ */
+int pkey_skey2pkey(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+		   struct pkey_protkey *protkey);
+
+#endif /* _KAPI_PKEY_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h
index dacba341e475..e4988710aa86 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -14,14 +14,16 @@
 #include <linux/const.h>
 
 #define CIF_MCCK_PENDING	0	/* machine check handling is pending */
-#define CIF_ASCE		1	/* user asce needs fixup / uaccess */
-#define CIF_NOHZ_DELAY		2	/* delay HZ disable for a tick */
-#define CIF_FPU			3	/* restore FPU registers */
-#define CIF_IGNORE_IRQ		4	/* ignore interrupt (for udelay) */
-#define CIF_ENABLED_WAIT	5	/* in enabled wait state */
+#define CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY	1	/* primary asce needs fixup / uaccess */
+#define CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY	2	/* secondary asce needs fixup / uaccess */
+#define CIF_NOHZ_DELAY		3	/* delay HZ disable for a tick */
+#define CIF_FPU			4	/* restore FPU registers */
+#define CIF_IGNORE_IRQ		5	/* ignore interrupt (for udelay) */
+#define CIF_ENABLED_WAIT	6	/* in enabled wait state */
 
 #define _CIF_MCCK_PENDING	_BITUL(CIF_MCCK_PENDING)
-#define _CIF_ASCE		_BITUL(CIF_ASCE)
+#define _CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY	_BITUL(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY)
+#define _CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY	_BITUL(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY)
 #define _CIF_NOHZ_DELAY		_BITUL(CIF_NOHZ_DELAY)
 #define _CIF_FPU		_BITUL(CIF_FPU)
 #define _CIF_IGNORE_IRQ		_BITUL(CIF_IGNORE_IRQ)
@@ -89,7 +91,8 @@ extern void execve_tail(void);
  * User space process size: 2GB for 31 bit, 4TB or 8PT for 64 bit.
  */
 
-#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk)	((tsk)->mm->context.asce_limit)
+#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk)	((tsk)->mm ? \
+				 (tsk)->mm->context.asce_limit : TASK_MAX_SIZE)
 #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT) ? \
 					(1UL << 30) : (1UL << 41))
 #define TASK_SIZE		TASK_SIZE_OF(current)
@@ -200,10 +203,12 @@ struct stack_frame {
 struct task_struct;
 struct mm_struct;
 struct seq_file;
+struct pt_regs;
 
 typedef int (*dump_trace_func_t)(void *data, unsigned long address, int reliable);
 void dump_trace(dump_trace_func_t func, void *data,
 		struct task_struct *task, unsigned long sp);
+void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
 void show_cacheinfo(struct seq_file *m);
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
index b2988fc60f65..136932ff4250 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/ctl_reg.h>
 
 #define VERIFY_READ     0
@@ -36,18 +37,20 @@
 
 #define get_ds()        (KERNEL_DS)
 #define get_fs()        (current->thread.mm_segment)
-
-#define set_fs(x)							\
-do {									\
-	unsigned long __pto;						\
-	current->thread.mm_segment = (x);				\
-	__pto = current->thread.mm_segment.ar4 ?			\
-		S390_lowcore.user_asce : S390_lowcore.kernel_asce;	\
-	__ctl_load(__pto, 7, 7);					\
-} while (0)
-
 #define segment_eq(a,b) ((a).ar4 == (b).ar4)
 
+static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
+{
+	current->thread.mm_segment = fs;
+	if (segment_eq(fs, KERNEL_DS)) {
+		set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY);
+		__ctl_load(S390_lowcore.kernel_asce, 7, 7);
+	} else {
+		clear_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY);
+		__ctl_load(S390_lowcore.user_asce, 7, 7);
+	}
+}
+
 static inline int __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
 	return 1;
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild
index bf736e764cb4..6848ba5c1454 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild
+++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/Kbuild
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ header-y += mman.h
 header-y += monwriter.h
 header-y += msgbuf.h
 header-y += param.h
+header-y += pkey.h
 header-y += poll.h
 header-y += posix_types.h
 header-y += ptrace.h
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ed7f19c27ce5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/pkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Userspace interface to the pkey device driver
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017
+ *
+ * Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _UAPI_PKEY_H
+#define _UAPI_PKEY_H
+
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Ioctl calls supported by the pkey device driver
+ */
+
+#define PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC 'p'
+
+#define SECKEYBLOBSIZE	64     /* secure key blob size is always 64 bytes */
+#define MAXPROTKEYSIZE	64  /* a protected key blob may be up to 64 bytes */
+#define MAXCLRKEYSIZE	32     /* a clear key value may be up to 32 bytes */
+
+/* defines for the type field within the pkey_protkey struct */
+#define PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128  1
+#define PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192  2
+#define PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256  3
+
+/* Struct to hold a secure key blob */
+struct pkey_seckey {
+	__u8  seckey[SECKEYBLOBSIZE];		  /* the secure key blob */
+};
+
+/* Struct to hold protected key and length info */
+struct pkey_protkey {
+	__u32 type;	     /* key type, one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values */
+	__u32 len;		/* bytes actually stored in protkey[]	 */
+	__u8  protkey[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];	       /* the protected key blob */
+};
+
+/* Struct to hold a clear key value */
+struct pkey_clrkey {
+	__u8  clrkey[MAXCLRKEYSIZE]; /* 16, 24, or 32 byte clear key value */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Generate secure key
+ */
+struct pkey_genseck {
+	__u16 cardnr;		    /* in: card to use or FFFF for any	 */
+	__u16 domain;		    /* in: domain or FFFF for any	 */
+	__u32 keytype;		    /* in: key type to generate		 */
+	struct pkey_seckey seckey;  /* out: the secure key blob		 */
+};
+#define PKEY_GENSECK _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x01, struct pkey_genseck)
+
+/*
+ * Construct secure key from clear key value
+ */
+struct pkey_clr2seck {
+	__u16 cardnr;		    /* in: card to use or FFFF for any	 */
+	__u16 domain;		    /* in: domain or FFFF for any	 */
+	__u32 keytype;		    /* in: key type to generate		 */
+	struct pkey_clrkey clrkey;  /* in: the clear key value		 */
+	struct pkey_seckey seckey;  /* out: the secure key blob		 */
+};
+#define PKEY_CLR2SECK _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x02, struct pkey_clr2seck)
+
+/*
+ * Fabricate protected key from a secure key
+ */
+struct pkey_sec2protk {
+	__u16 cardnr;		     /* in: card to use or FFFF for any   */
+	__u16 domain;		     /* in: domain or FFFF for any	  */
+	struct pkey_seckey seckey;   /* in: the secure key blob		  */
+	struct pkey_protkey protkey; /* out: the protected key		  */
+};
+#define PKEY_SEC2PROTK _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x03, struct pkey_sec2protk)
+
+/*
+ * Fabricate protected key from an clear key value
+ */
+struct pkey_clr2protk {
+	__u32 keytype;		     /* in: key type to generate	  */
+	struct pkey_clrkey clrkey;   /* in: the clear key value		  */
+	struct pkey_protkey protkey; /* out: the protected key		  */
+};
+#define PKEY_CLR2PROTK _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x04, struct pkey_clr2protk)
+
+/*
+ * Search for matching crypto card based on the Master Key
+ * Verification Pattern provided inside a secure key.
+ */
+struct pkey_findcard {
+	struct pkey_seckey seckey;	       /* in: the secure key blob */
+	__u16  cardnr;			       /* out: card number	  */
+	__u16  domain;			       /* out: domain number	  */
+};
+#define PKEY_FINDCARD _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x05, struct pkey_findcard)
+
+/*
+ * Combined together: findcard + sec2prot
+ */
+struct pkey_skey2pkey {
+	struct pkey_seckey seckey;   /* in: the secure key blob		  */
+	struct pkey_protkey protkey; /* out: the protected key		  */
+};
+#define PKEY_SKEY2PKEY _IOWR(PKEY_IOCTL_MAGIC, 0x06, struct pkey_skey2pkey)
+
+#endif /* _UAPI_PKEY_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
index db469fa11462..dff2152350a7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ _TIF_WORK	= (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | \
 		   _TIF_UPROBE)
 _TIF_TRACE	= (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | _TIF_SECCOMP | \
 		   _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
-_CIF_WORK	= (_CIF_MCCK_PENDING | _CIF_ASCE | _CIF_FPU)
+_CIF_WORK	= (_CIF_MCCK_PENDING | _CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY | \
+		   _CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY | _CIF_FPU)
 _PIF_WORK	= (_PIF_PER_TRAP)
 
 #define BASED(name) name-cleanup_critical(%r13)
@@ -339,8 +340,8 @@ ENTRY(system_call)
 	jo	.Lsysc_notify_resume
 	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,_CIF_FPU
 	jo	.Lsysc_vxrs
-	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,_CIF_ASCE
-	jo	.Lsysc_uaccess
+	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,(_CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY|_CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY)
+	jnz	.Lsysc_asce
 	j	.Lsysc_return		# beware of critical section cleanup
 
 #
@@ -358,12 +359,15 @@ ENTRY(system_call)
 	jg	s390_handle_mcck	# TIF bit will be cleared by handler
 
 #
-# _CIF_ASCE is set, load user space asce
+# _CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY and/or CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY set, load user space asce
 #
-.Lsysc_uaccess:
-	ni	__LC_CPU_FLAGS+7,255-_CIF_ASCE
+.Lsysc_asce:
+	ni	__LC_CPU_FLAGS+7,255-_CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY
 	lctlg	%c1,%c1,__LC_USER_ASCE		# load primary asce
-	j	.Lsysc_return
+	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,_CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY
+	jz	.Lsysc_return
+	larl	%r14,.Lsysc_return
+	jg	set_fs_fixup
 
 #
 # CIF_FPU is set, restore floating-point controls and floating-point registers.
@@ -661,8 +665,8 @@ ENTRY(io_int_handler)
 	jo	.Lio_notify_resume
 	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,_CIF_FPU
 	jo	.Lio_vxrs
-	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,_CIF_ASCE
-	jo	.Lio_uaccess
+	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,(_CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY|_CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY)
+	jnz	.Lio_asce
 	j	.Lio_return		# beware of critical section cleanup
 
 #
@@ -675,12 +679,15 @@ ENTRY(io_int_handler)
 	j	.Lio_return
 
 #
-# _CIF_ASCE is set, load user space asce
+# _CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY and/or CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY set, load user space asce
 #
-.Lio_uaccess:
-	ni	__LC_CPU_FLAGS+7,255-_CIF_ASCE
+.Lio_asce:
+	ni	__LC_CPU_FLAGS+7,255-_CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY
 	lctlg	%c1,%c1,__LC_USER_ASCE		# load primary asce
-	j	.Lio_return
+	TSTMSK	__LC_CPU_FLAGS,_CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY
+	jz	.Lio_return
+	larl	%r14,.Lio_return
+	jg	set_fs_fixup
 
 #
 # CIF_FPU is set, restore floating-point controls and floating-point registers.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.h b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.h
index e79f030dd276..33f901865326 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.h
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.h
@@ -80,5 +80,6 @@ long sys_s390_pci_mmio_read(unsigned long, void __user *, size_t);
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, mt_cycles[8]);
 
 void verify_facilities(void);
+void set_fs_fixup(void);
 
 #endif /* _ENTRY_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
index 56e14d073167..80c093e0c6f1 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -116,6 +116,19 @@ static int notrace s390_validate_registers(union mci mci, int umode)
 			s390_handle_damage();
 		kill_task = 1;
 	}
+	/* Validate control registers */
+	if (!mci.cr) {
+		/*
+		 * Control registers have unknown contents.
+		 * Can't recover and therefore stopping machine.
+		 */
+		s390_handle_damage();
+	} else {
+		asm volatile(
+			"	lctlg	0,15,0(%0)\n"
+			"	ptlb\n"
+			: : "a" (&S390_lowcore.cregs_save_area) : "memory");
+	}
 	if (!mci.fp) {
 		/*
 		 * Floating point registers can't be restored. If the
@@ -208,18 +221,6 @@ static int notrace s390_validate_registers(union mci mci, int umode)
 		 */
 		kill_task = 1;
 	}
-	/* Validate control registers */
-	if (!mci.cr) {
-		/*
-		 * Control registers have unknown contents.
-		 * Can't recover and therefore stopping machine.
-		 */
-		s390_handle_damage();
-	} else {
-		asm volatile(
-			"	lctlg	0,15,0(%0)"
-			: : "a" (&S390_lowcore.cregs_save_area) : "memory");
-	}
 	/*
 	 * We don't even try to validate the TOD register, since we simply
 	 * can't write something sensible into that register.
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
index c5b86b4a1a8b..54281660582c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/process.c
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long new_stackp,
-		unsigned long arg, struct task_struct *p)
+int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long new_stackp,
+		    unsigned long arg, struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)
 {
 	struct fake_frame
 	{
@@ -156,7 +156,6 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long new_stackp,
 
 	/* Set a new TLS ?  */
 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS) {
-		unsigned long tls = frame->childregs.gprs[6];
 		if (is_compat_task()) {
 			p->thread.acrs[0] = (unsigned int)tls;
 		} else {
@@ -234,3 +233,16 @@ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	ret = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk + brk_rnd());
 	return (ret > mm->brk) ? ret : mm->brk;
 }
+
+void set_fs_fixup(void)
+{
+	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
+	static bool warned;
+
+	set_fs(USER_DS);
+	if (warned)
+		return;
+	WARN(1, "Unbalanced set_fs - int code: 0x%x\n", regs->int_code);
+	show_registers(regs);
+	warned = true;
+}
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
index 59ac93714fa4..a07b1ec1391d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
@@ -359,8 +359,8 @@ static int __gmap_unlink_by_vmaddr(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long vmaddr)
 	spin_lock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
 	entry = radix_tree_delete(&gmap->host_to_guest, vmaddr >> PMD_SHIFT);
 	if (entry) {
-		flush = (*entry != _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID);
-		*entry = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
+		flush = (*entry != _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY);
+		*entry = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
 	return flush;
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ int __gmap_link(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, unsigned long vmaddr)
 		return rc;
 	ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
 	spin_lock(&gmap->guest_table_lock);
-	if (*table == _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID) {
+	if (*table == _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY) {
 		rc = radix_tree_insert(&gmap->host_to_guest,
 				       vmaddr >> PMD_SHIFT, table);
 		if (!rc)
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c
index a03816227719..9b4050caa4e9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __pte_to_rste(pte_t pte)
 		rste |= move_set_bit(pte_val(pte), _PAGE_NOEXEC,
 				     _SEGMENT_ENTRY_NOEXEC);
 	} else
-		rste = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID;
+		rste = _SEGMENT_ENTRY_EMPTY;
 	return rste;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
index 2cac445b02fd..0b49dbc423e2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -62,19 +62,32 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_GEODE
 	  will be called geode-aes.
 
 config ZCRYPT
-	tristate "Support for PCI-attached cryptographic adapters"
+	tristate "Support for s390 cryptographic adapters"
 	depends on S390
 	select HW_RANDOM
 	help
-	  Select this option if you want to use a PCI-attached cryptographic
-	  adapter like:
-	  + PCI Cryptographic Accelerator (PCICA)
-	  + PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor (PCICC)
+	  Select this option if you want to enable support for
+	  s390 cryptographic adapters like:
 	  + PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor (PCIXCC)
-	  + Crypto Express2 Coprocessor (CEX2C)
-	  + Crypto Express2 Accelerator (CEX2A)
-	  + Crypto Express3 Coprocessor (CEX3C)
-	  + Crypto Express3 Accelerator (CEX3A)
+	  + Crypto Express 2,3,4 or 5 Coprocessor (CEXxC)
+	  + Crypto Express 2,3,4 or 5 Accelerator (CEXxA)
+	  + Crypto Express 4 or 5 EP11 Coprocessor (CEXxP)
+
+config PKEY
+	tristate "Kernel API for protected key handling"
+	depends on S390
+	depends on ZCRYPT
+	help
+	  With this option enabled the pkey kernel module provides an API
+	  for creation and handling of protected keys. Other parts of the
+	  kernel or userspace applications may use these functions.
+
+	  Select this option if you want to enable the kernel and userspace
+	  API for proteced key handling.
+
+	  Please note that creation of protected keys from secure keys
+	  requires to have at least one CEX card in coprocessor mode
+	  available at runtime.
 
 config CRYPTO_SHA1_S390
 	tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm"
@@ -124,6 +137,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_S390
 	depends on S390
 	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
 	select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+	select PKEY
 	help
 	  This is the s390 hardware accelerated implementation of the
 	  AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197).
diff --git a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c
index 0f1713727d4c..0b38217f8147 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c
@@ -4864,7 +4864,7 @@ static void dasd_eckd_dump_sense_tcw(struct dasd_device *device,
 			break;
 		case 3: /* tsa_intrg */
 			len += sprintf(page + len, PRINTK_HEADER
-				      " tsb->tsa.intrg.: not supportet yet\n");
+				      " tsb->tsa.intrg.: not supported yet\n");
 			break;
 		}
 
diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/ioasm.c b/drivers/s390/cio/ioasm.c
index 8225da619014..4182f60124da 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/cio/ioasm.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/cio/ioasm.c
@@ -165,13 +165,15 @@ int tpi(struct tpi_info *addr)
 int chsc(void *chsc_area)
 {
 	typedef struct { char _[4096]; } addr_type;
-	int cc;
+	int cc = -EIO;
 
 	asm volatile(
 		"	.insn	rre,0xb25f0000,%2,0\n"
-		"	ipm	%0\n"
+		"0:	ipm	%0\n"
 		"	srl	%0,28\n"
-		: "=d" (cc), "=m" (*(addr_type *) chsc_area)
+		"1:\n"
+		EX_TABLE(0b, 1b)
+		: "+d" (cc), "=m" (*(addr_type *) chsc_area)
 		: "d" (chsc_area), "m" (*(addr_type *) chsc_area)
 		: "cc");
 	trace_s390_cio_chsc(chsc_area, cc);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile b/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile
index 0a7fb83f35e5..be36f1010d75 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/Makefile
@@ -10,3 +10,7 @@ zcrypt-objs += zcrypt_msgtype6.o zcrypt_msgtype50.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ZCRYPT) += zcrypt.o
 # adapter drivers depend on ap.o and zcrypt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ZCRYPT) += zcrypt_pcixcc.o zcrypt_cex2a.o zcrypt_cex4.o
+
+# pkey kernel module
+pkey-objs := pkey_api.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PKEY) += pkey.o
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c
index 56db76c05775..9be4596d8a08 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c
@@ -1107,16 +1107,6 @@ static void ap_config_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
 	queue_work(system_long_wq, &ap_scan_work);
 }
 
-static void ap_reset_domain(void)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (ap_domain_index == -1 || !ap_test_config_domain(ap_domain_index))
-		return;
-	for (i = 0; i < AP_DEVICES; i++)
-		ap_rapq(AP_MKQID(i, ap_domain_index));
-}
-
 static void ap_reset_all(void)
 {
 	int i, j;
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_card.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_card.c
index 1cd9128593e4..cfa161ccc74e 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_card.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_card.c
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ static ssize_t ap_functions_show(struct device *dev,
 
 static DEVICE_ATTR(ap_functions, 0444, ap_functions_show, NULL);
 
-static ssize_t ap_request_count_show(struct device *dev,
-				     struct device_attribute *attr,
-				     char *buf)
+static ssize_t ap_req_count_show(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr,
+				 char *buf)
 {
 	struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev);
 	unsigned int req_cnt;
@@ -72,7 +72,23 @@ static ssize_t ap_request_count_show(struct device *dev,
 	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", req_cnt);
 }
 
-static DEVICE_ATTR(request_count, 0444, ap_request_count_show, NULL);
+static ssize_t ap_req_count_store(struct device *dev,
+				  struct device_attribute *attr,
+				  const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct ap_card *ac = to_ap_card(dev);
+	struct ap_queue *aq;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ap_list_lock);
+	for_each_ap_queue(aq, ac)
+		aq->total_request_count = 0;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ap_list_lock);
+	atomic_set(&ac->total_request_count, 0);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(request_count, 0644, ap_req_count_show, ap_req_count_store);
 
 static ssize_t ap_requestq_count_show(struct device *dev,
 				      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_queue.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_queue.c
index 7be67fa9f224..480c58a63769 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_queue.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/ap_queue.c
@@ -459,9 +459,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ap_queue_resume);
 /*
  * AP queue related attributes.
  */
-static ssize_t ap_request_count_show(struct device *dev,
-				     struct device_attribute *attr,
-				     char *buf)
+static ssize_t ap_req_count_show(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr,
+				 char *buf)
 {
 	struct ap_queue *aq = to_ap_queue(dev);
 	unsigned int req_cnt;
@@ -472,7 +472,20 @@ static ssize_t ap_request_count_show(struct device *dev,
 	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", req_cnt);
 }
 
-static DEVICE_ATTR(request_count, 0444, ap_request_count_show, NULL);
+static ssize_t ap_req_count_store(struct device *dev,
+				  struct device_attribute *attr,
+				  const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	struct ap_queue *aq = to_ap_queue(dev);
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&aq->lock);
+	aq->total_request_count = 0;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&aq->lock);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(request_count, 0644, ap_req_count_show, ap_req_count_store);
 
 static ssize_t ap_requestq_count_show(struct device *dev,
 				      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..40f1136f5568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1148 @@
+/*
+ *  pkey device driver
+ *
+ *  Copyright IBM Corp. 2017
+ *  Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License (version 2 only)
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "pkey"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include <asm/pkey.h>
+
+#include "zcrypt_api.h"
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 protected key interface");
+
+/* Size of parameter block used for all cca requests/replies */
+#define PARMBSIZE 512
+
+/* Size of vardata block used for some of the cca requests/replies */
+#define VARDATASIZE 4096
+
+/*
+ * debug feature data and functions
+ */
+
+static debug_info_t *debug_info;
+
+#define DEBUG_DBG(...)	debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 6, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define DEBUG_INFO(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 5, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define DEBUG_WARN(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 4, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define DEBUG_ERR(...)	debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 3, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+static void __init pkey_debug_init(void)
+{
+	debug_info = debug_register("pkey", 1, 1, 4 * sizeof(long));
+	debug_register_view(debug_info, &debug_sprintf_view);
+	debug_set_level(debug_info, 3);
+}
+
+static void __exit pkey_debug_exit(void)
+{
+	debug_unregister(debug_info);
+}
+
+/* inside view of a secure key token (only type 0x01 version 0x04) */
+struct secaeskeytoken {
+	u8  type;     /* 0x01 for internal key token */
+	u8  res0[3];
+	u8  version;  /* should be 0x04 */
+	u8  res1[1];
+	u8  flag;     /* key flags */
+	u8  res2[1];
+	u64 mkvp;     /* master key verification pattern */
+	u8  key[32];  /* key value (encrypted) */
+	u8  cv[8];    /* control vector */
+	u16 bitsize;  /* key bit size */
+	u16 keysize;  /* key byte size */
+	u8  tvv[4];   /* token validation value */
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * Simple check if the token is a valid CCA secure AES key
+ * token. If keybitsize is given, the bitsize of the key is
+ * also checked. Returns 0 on success or errno value on failure.
+ */
+static int check_secaeskeytoken(u8 *token, int keybitsize)
+{
+	struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *) token;
+
+	if (t->type != 0x01) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"check_secaeskeytoken secure token check failed, type mismatch 0x%02x != 0x01\n",
+			(int) t->type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (t->version != 0x04) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"check_secaeskeytoken secure token check failed, version mismatch 0x%02x != 0x04\n",
+			(int) t->version);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (keybitsize > 0 && t->bitsize != keybitsize) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"check_secaeskeytoken secure token check failed, bitsize mismatch %d != %d\n",
+			(int) t->bitsize, keybitsize);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate consecutive memory for request CPRB, request param
+ * block, reply CPRB and reply param block and fill in values
+ * for the common fields. Returns 0 on success or errno value
+ * on failure.
+ */
+static int alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(size_t paramblen,
+				  u8 **pcprbmem,
+				  struct CPRBX **preqCPRB,
+				  struct CPRBX **prepCPRB)
+{
+	u8 *cprbmem;
+	size_t cprbplusparamblen = sizeof(struct CPRBX) + paramblen;
+	struct CPRBX *preqcblk, *prepcblk;
+
+	/*
+	 * allocate consecutive memory for request CPRB, request param
+	 * block, reply CPRB and reply param block
+	 */
+	cprbmem = kmalloc(2 * cprbplusparamblen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cprbmem)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(cprbmem, 0, 2 * cprbplusparamblen);
+
+	preqcblk = (struct CPRBX *) cprbmem;
+	prepcblk = (struct CPRBX *) (cprbmem + cprbplusparamblen);
+
+	/* fill request cprb struct */
+	preqcblk->cprb_len = sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+	preqcblk->cprb_ver_id = 0x02;
+	memcpy(preqcblk->func_id, "T2", 2);
+	preqcblk->rpl_msgbl = cprbplusparamblen;
+	if (paramblen) {
+		preqcblk->req_parmb =
+			((u8 *) preqcblk) + sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+		preqcblk->rpl_parmb =
+			((u8 *) prepcblk) + sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+	}
+
+	*pcprbmem = cprbmem;
+	*preqCPRB = preqcblk;
+	*prepCPRB = prepcblk;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the cprb memory allocated with the function above.
+ * If the scrub value is not zero, the memory is filled
+ * with zeros before freeing (useful if there was some
+ * clear key material in there).
+ */
+static void free_cprbmem(void *mem, size_t paramblen, int scrub)
+{
+	if (scrub)
+		memzero_explicit(mem, 2 * (sizeof(struct CPRBX) + paramblen));
+	kfree(mem);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to prepare the xcrb struct
+ */
+static inline void prep_xcrb(struct ica_xcRB *pxcrb,
+			     u16 cardnr,
+			     struct CPRBX *preqcblk,
+			     struct CPRBX *prepcblk)
+{
+	memset(pxcrb, 0, sizeof(*pxcrb));
+	pxcrb->agent_ID = 0x4341; /* 'CA' */
+	pxcrb->user_defined = (cardnr == 0xFFFF ? AUTOSELECT : cardnr);
+	pxcrb->request_control_blk_length =
+		preqcblk->cprb_len + preqcblk->req_parml;
+	pxcrb->request_control_blk_addr = (void *) preqcblk;
+	pxcrb->reply_control_blk_length = preqcblk->rpl_msgbl;
+	pxcrb->reply_control_blk_addr = (void *) prepcblk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function which calls zcrypt_send_cprb with
+ * memory management segment adjusted to kernel space
+ * so that the copy_from_user called within this
+ * function do in fact copy from kernel space.
+ */
+static inline int _zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ica_xcRB *xcrb)
+{
+	int rc;
+	mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
+
+	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
+	rc = zcrypt_send_cprb(xcrb);
+	set_fs(old_fs);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate (random) AES secure key.
+ */
+int pkey_genseckey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
+		   u32 keytype, struct pkey_seckey *seckey)
+{
+	int i, rc, keysize;
+	int seckeysize;
+	u8 *mem;
+	struct CPRBX *preqcblk, *prepcblk;
+	struct ica_xcRB xcrb;
+	struct kgreqparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		struct lv1 {
+			u16 len;
+			char  key_form[8];
+			char  key_length[8];
+			char  key_type1[8];
+			char  key_type2[8];
+		} lv1;
+		struct lv2 {
+			u16 len;
+			struct keyid {
+				u16 len;
+				u16 attr;
+				u8  data[SECKEYBLOBSIZE];
+			} keyid[6];
+		} lv2;
+	} *preqparm;
+	struct kgrepparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		struct lv3 {
+			u16 len;
+			u16 keyblocklen;
+			struct {
+				u16 toklen;
+				u16 tokattr;
+				u8  tok[0];
+				/* ... some more data ... */
+			} keyblock;
+		} lv3;
+	} *prepparm;
+
+	/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
+	rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* fill request cprb struct */
+	preqcblk->domain = domain;
+
+	/* fill request cprb param block with KG request */
+	preqparm = (struct kgreqparm *) preqcblk->req_parmb;
+	memcpy(preqparm->subfunc_code, "KG", 2);
+	preqparm->rule_array_len = sizeof(preqparm->rule_array_len);
+	preqparm->lv1.len = sizeof(struct lv1);
+	memcpy(preqparm->lv1.key_form,	 "OP      ", 8);
+	switch (keytype) {
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
+		keysize = 16;
+		memcpy(preqparm->lv1.key_length, "KEYLN16 ", 8);
+		break;
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
+		keysize = 24;
+		memcpy(preqparm->lv1.key_length, "KEYLN24 ", 8);
+		break;
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
+		keysize = 32;
+		memcpy(preqparm->lv1.key_length, "KEYLN32 ", 8);
+		break;
+	default:
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_genseckey unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n",
+			keytype);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(preqparm->lv1.key_type1,  "AESDATA ", 8);
+	preqparm->lv2.len = sizeof(struct lv2);
+	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+		preqparm->lv2.keyid[i].len = sizeof(struct keyid);
+		preqparm->lv2.keyid[i].attr = (i == 2 ? 0x30 : 0x10);
+	}
+	preqcblk->req_parml = sizeof(struct kgreqparm);
+
+	/* fill xcrb struct */
+	prep_xcrb(&xcrb, cardnr, preqcblk, prepcblk);
+
+	/* forward xcrb with request CPRB and reply CPRB to zcrypt dd */
+	rc = _zcrypt_send_cprb(&xcrb);
+	if (rc) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_genseckey zcrypt_send_cprb (cardnr=%d domain=%d) failed with errno %d\n",
+			(int) cardnr, (int) domain, rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check response returncode and reasoncode */
+	if (prepcblk->ccp_rtcode != 0) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_genseckey secure key generate failure, card response %d/%d\n",
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rtcode,
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rscode);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* process response cprb param block */
+	prepcblk->rpl_parmb = ((u8 *) prepcblk) + sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+	prepparm = (struct kgrepparm *) prepcblk->rpl_parmb;
+
+	/* check length of the returned secure key token */
+	seckeysize = prepparm->lv3.keyblock.toklen
+		- sizeof(prepparm->lv3.keyblock.toklen)
+		- sizeof(prepparm->lv3.keyblock.tokattr);
+	if (seckeysize != SECKEYBLOBSIZE) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_genseckey secure token size mismatch %d != %d bytes\n",
+			seckeysize, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check secure key token */
+	rc = check_secaeskeytoken(prepparm->lv3.keyblock.tok, 8*keysize);
+	if (rc) {
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* copy the generated secure key token */
+	memcpy(seckey->seckey, prepparm->lv3.keyblock.tok, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+
+out:
+	free_cprbmem(mem, PARMBSIZE, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_genseckey);
+
+/*
+ * Generate an AES secure key with given key value.
+ */
+int pkey_clr2seckey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u32 keytype,
+		    const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey,
+		    struct pkey_seckey *seckey)
+{
+	int rc, keysize, seckeysize;
+	u8 *mem;
+	struct CPRBX *preqcblk, *prepcblk;
+	struct ica_xcRB xcrb;
+	struct cmreqparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		char  rule_array[8];
+		struct lv1 {
+			u16 len;
+			u8  clrkey[0];
+		} lv1;
+		struct lv2 {
+			u16 len;
+			struct keyid {
+				u16 len;
+				u16 attr;
+				u8  data[SECKEYBLOBSIZE];
+			} keyid;
+		} lv2;
+	} *preqparm;
+	struct lv2 *plv2;
+	struct cmrepparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		struct lv3 {
+			u16 len;
+			u16 keyblocklen;
+			struct {
+				u16 toklen;
+				u16 tokattr;
+				u8  tok[0];
+				/* ... some more data ... */
+			} keyblock;
+		} lv3;
+	} *prepparm;
+
+	/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
+	rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* fill request cprb struct */
+	preqcblk->domain = domain;
+
+	/* fill request cprb param block with CM request */
+	preqparm = (struct cmreqparm *) preqcblk->req_parmb;
+	memcpy(preqparm->subfunc_code, "CM", 2);
+	memcpy(preqparm->rule_array, "AES     ", 8);
+	preqparm->rule_array_len =
+		sizeof(preqparm->rule_array_len) + sizeof(preqparm->rule_array);
+	switch (keytype) {
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
+		keysize = 16;
+		break;
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
+		keysize = 24;
+		break;
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
+		keysize = 32;
+		break;
+	default:
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_clr2seckey unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n",
+			keytype);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	preqparm->lv1.len = sizeof(struct lv1) + keysize;
+	memcpy(preqparm->lv1.clrkey, clrkey->clrkey, keysize);
+	plv2 = (struct lv2 *) (((u8 *) &preqparm->lv2) + keysize);
+	plv2->len = sizeof(struct lv2);
+	plv2->keyid.len = sizeof(struct keyid);
+	plv2->keyid.attr = 0x30;
+	preqcblk->req_parml = sizeof(struct cmreqparm) + keysize;
+
+	/* fill xcrb struct */
+	prep_xcrb(&xcrb, cardnr, preqcblk, prepcblk);
+
+	/* forward xcrb with request CPRB and reply CPRB to zcrypt dd */
+	rc = _zcrypt_send_cprb(&xcrb);
+	if (rc) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_clr2seckey zcrypt_send_cprb (cardnr=%d domain=%d) failed with errno %d\n",
+			(int) cardnr, (int) domain, rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check response returncode and reasoncode */
+	if (prepcblk->ccp_rtcode != 0) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_clr2seckey clear key import failure, card response %d/%d\n",
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rtcode,
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rscode);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* process response cprb param block */
+	prepcblk->rpl_parmb = ((u8 *) prepcblk) + sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+	prepparm = (struct cmrepparm *) prepcblk->rpl_parmb;
+
+	/* check length of the returned secure key token */
+	seckeysize = prepparm->lv3.keyblock.toklen
+		- sizeof(prepparm->lv3.keyblock.toklen)
+		- sizeof(prepparm->lv3.keyblock.tokattr);
+	if (seckeysize != SECKEYBLOBSIZE) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_clr2seckey secure token size mismatch %d != %d bytes\n",
+			seckeysize, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check secure key token */
+	rc = check_secaeskeytoken(prepparm->lv3.keyblock.tok, 8*keysize);
+	if (rc) {
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* copy the generated secure key token */
+	memcpy(seckey->seckey, prepparm->lv3.keyblock.tok, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+
+out:
+	free_cprbmem(mem, PARMBSIZE, 1);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_clr2seckey);
+
+/*
+ * Derive a proteced key from the secure key blob.
+ */
+int pkey_sec2protkey(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
+		     const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+		     struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u8 *mem;
+	struct CPRBX *preqcblk, *prepcblk;
+	struct ica_xcRB xcrb;
+	struct uskreqparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		struct lv1 {
+			u16 len;
+			u16 attr_len;
+			u16 attr_flags;
+		} lv1;
+		struct lv2 {
+			u16 len;
+			u16 attr_len;
+			u16 attr_flags;
+			u8  token[0];	      /* cca secure key token */
+		} lv2 __packed;
+	} *preqparm;
+	struct uskrepparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		struct lv3 {
+			u16 len;
+			u16 attr_len;
+			u16 attr_flags;
+			struct cpacfkeyblock {
+				u8  version;  /* version of this struct */
+				u8  flags[2];
+				u8  algo;
+				u8  form;
+				u8  pad1[3];
+				u16 keylen;
+				u8  key[64];  /* the key (keylen bytes) */
+				u16 keyattrlen;
+				u8  keyattr[32];
+				u8  pad2[1];
+				u8  vptype;
+				u8  vp[32];  /* verification pattern */
+			} keyblock;
+		} lv3 __packed;
+	} *prepparm;
+
+	/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
+	rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(PARMBSIZE, &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* fill request cprb struct */
+	preqcblk->domain = domain;
+
+	/* fill request cprb param block with USK request */
+	preqparm = (struct uskreqparm *) preqcblk->req_parmb;
+	memcpy(preqparm->subfunc_code, "US", 2);
+	preqparm->rule_array_len = sizeof(preqparm->rule_array_len);
+	preqparm->lv1.len = sizeof(struct lv1);
+	preqparm->lv1.attr_len = sizeof(struct lv1) - sizeof(preqparm->lv1.len);
+	preqparm->lv1.attr_flags = 0x0001;
+	preqparm->lv2.len = sizeof(struct lv2) + SECKEYBLOBSIZE;
+	preqparm->lv2.attr_len = sizeof(struct lv2)
+		- sizeof(preqparm->lv2.len) + SECKEYBLOBSIZE;
+	preqparm->lv2.attr_flags = 0x0000;
+	memcpy(preqparm->lv2.token, seckey->seckey, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+	preqcblk->req_parml = sizeof(struct uskreqparm) + SECKEYBLOBSIZE;
+
+	/* fill xcrb struct */
+	prep_xcrb(&xcrb, cardnr, preqcblk, prepcblk);
+
+	/* forward xcrb with request CPRB and reply CPRB to zcrypt dd */
+	rc = _zcrypt_send_cprb(&xcrb);
+	if (rc) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_sec2protkey zcrypt_send_cprb (cardnr=%d domain=%d) failed with errno %d\n",
+			(int) cardnr, (int) domain, rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check response returncode and reasoncode */
+	if (prepcblk->ccp_rtcode != 0) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_sec2protkey unwrap secure key failure, card response %d/%d\n",
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rtcode,
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rscode);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* process response cprb param block */
+	prepcblk->rpl_parmb = ((u8 *) prepcblk) + sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+	prepparm = (struct uskrepparm *) prepcblk->rpl_parmb;
+
+	/* check the returned keyblock */
+	if (prepparm->lv3.keyblock.version != 0x01) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"pkey_sec2protkey reply param keyblock version mismatch 0x%02x != 0x01\n",
+			(int) prepparm->lv3.keyblock.version);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* copy the tanslated protected key */
+	switch (prepparm->lv3.keyblock.keylen) {
+	case 16+32:
+		protkey->type = PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128;
+		break;
+	case 24+32:
+		protkey->type = PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192;
+		break;
+	case 32+32:
+		protkey->type = PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256;
+		break;
+	default:
+		DEBUG_ERR("pkey_sec2protkey unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n",
+			  prepparm->lv3.keyblock.keylen);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	protkey->len = prepparm->lv3.keyblock.keylen;
+	memcpy(protkey->protkey, prepparm->lv3.keyblock.key, protkey->len);
+
+out:
+	free_cprbmem(mem, PARMBSIZE, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_sec2protkey);
+
+/*
+ * Create a protected key from a clear key value.
+ */
+int pkey_clr2protkey(u32 keytype,
+		     const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey,
+		     struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+	long fc;
+	int keysize;
+	u8 paramblock[64];
+
+	switch (keytype) {
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
+		keysize = 16;
+		fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_128_KEY;
+		break;
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
+		keysize = 24;
+		fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_192_KEY;
+		break;
+	case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
+		keysize = 32;
+		fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_256_KEY;
+		break;
+	default:
+		DEBUG_ERR("pkey_clr2protkey unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n",
+			  keytype);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* prepare param block */
+	memset(paramblock, 0, sizeof(paramblock));
+	memcpy(paramblock, clrkey->clrkey, keysize);
+
+	/* call the pckmo instruction */
+	cpacf_pckmo(fc, paramblock);
+
+	/* copy created protected key */
+	protkey->type = keytype;
+	protkey->len = keysize + 32;
+	memcpy(protkey->protkey, paramblock, keysize + 32);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_clr2protkey);
+
+/*
+ * query cryptographic facility from adapter
+ */
+static int query_crypto_facility(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
+				 const char *keyword,
+				 u8 *rarray, size_t *rarraylen,
+				 u8 *varray, size_t *varraylen)
+{
+	int rc;
+	u16 len;
+	u8 *mem, *ptr;
+	struct CPRBX *preqcblk, *prepcblk;
+	struct ica_xcRB xcrb;
+	struct fqreqparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u16 rule_array_len;
+		char  rule_array[8];
+		struct lv1 {
+			u16 len;
+			u8  data[VARDATASIZE];
+		} lv1;
+		u16 dummylen;
+	} *preqparm;
+	size_t parmbsize = sizeof(struct fqreqparm);
+	struct fqrepparm {
+		u8  subfunc_code[2];
+		u8  lvdata[0];
+	} *prepparm;
+
+	/* get already prepared memory for 2 cprbs with param block each */
+	rc = alloc_and_prep_cprbmem(parmbsize, &mem, &preqcblk, &prepcblk);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* fill request cprb struct */
+	preqcblk->domain = domain;
+
+	/* fill request cprb param block with FQ request */
+	preqparm = (struct fqreqparm *) preqcblk->req_parmb;
+	memcpy(preqparm->subfunc_code, "FQ", 2);
+	strncpy(preqparm->rule_array, keyword, sizeof(preqparm->rule_array));
+	preqparm->rule_array_len =
+		sizeof(preqparm->rule_array_len) + sizeof(preqparm->rule_array);
+	preqparm->lv1.len = sizeof(preqparm->lv1);
+	preqparm->dummylen = sizeof(preqparm->dummylen);
+	preqcblk->req_parml = parmbsize;
+
+	/* fill xcrb struct */
+	prep_xcrb(&xcrb, cardnr, preqcblk, prepcblk);
+
+	/* forward xcrb with request CPRB and reply CPRB to zcrypt dd */
+	rc = _zcrypt_send_cprb(&xcrb);
+	if (rc) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"query_crypto_facility zcrypt_send_cprb (cardnr=%d domain=%d) failed with errno %d\n",
+			(int) cardnr, (int) domain, rc);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check response returncode and reasoncode */
+	if (prepcblk->ccp_rtcode != 0) {
+		DEBUG_ERR(
+			"query_crypto_facility unwrap secure key failure, card response %d/%d\n",
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rtcode,
+			(int) prepcblk->ccp_rscode);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* process response cprb param block */
+	prepcblk->rpl_parmb = ((u8 *) prepcblk) + sizeof(struct CPRBX);
+	prepparm = (struct fqrepparm *) prepcblk->rpl_parmb;
+	ptr = prepparm->lvdata;
+
+	/* check and possibly copy reply rule array */
+	len = *((u16 *) ptr);
+	if (len > sizeof(u16)) {
+		ptr += sizeof(u16);
+		len -= sizeof(u16);
+		if (rarray && rarraylen && *rarraylen > 0) {
+			*rarraylen = (len > *rarraylen ? *rarraylen : len);
+			memcpy(rarray, ptr, *rarraylen);
+		}
+		ptr += len;
+	}
+	/* check and possible copy reply var array */
+	len = *((u16 *) ptr);
+	if (len > sizeof(u16)) {
+		ptr += sizeof(u16);
+		len -= sizeof(u16);
+		if (varray && varraylen && *varraylen > 0) {
+			*varraylen = (len > *varraylen ? *varraylen : len);
+			memcpy(varray, ptr, *varraylen);
+		}
+		ptr += len;
+	}
+
+out:
+	free_cprbmem(mem, parmbsize, 0);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch just the mkvp value via query_crypto_facility from adapter.
+ */
+static int fetch_mkvp(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u64 *mkvp)
+{
+	int rc, found = 0;
+	size_t rlen, vlen;
+	u8 *rarray, *varray, *pg;
+
+	pg = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	rarray = pg;
+	varray = pg + PAGE_SIZE/2;
+	rlen = vlen = PAGE_SIZE/2;
+
+	rc = query_crypto_facility(cardnr, domain, "STATICSA",
+				   rarray, &rlen, varray, &vlen);
+	if (rc == 0 && rlen > 8*8 && vlen > 184+8) {
+		if (rarray[64] == '2') {
+			/* current master key state is valid */
+			*mkvp = *((u64 *)(varray + 184));
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	free_page((unsigned long) pg);
+
+	return found ? 0 : -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/* struct to hold cached mkvp info for each card/domain */
+struct mkvp_info {
+	struct list_head list;
+	u16 cardnr;
+	u16 domain;
+	u64 mkvp;
+};
+
+/* a list with mkvp_info entries */
+static LIST_HEAD(mkvp_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mkvp_list_lock);
+
+static int mkvp_cache_fetch(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u64 *mkvp)
+{
+	int rc = -ENOENT;
+	struct mkvp_info *ptr;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &mkvp_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->cardnr == cardnr &&
+		    ptr->domain == domain) {
+			*mkvp = ptr->mkvp;
+			rc = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void mkvp_cache_update(u16 cardnr, u16 domain, u64 mkvp)
+{
+	int found = 0;
+	struct mkvp_info *ptr;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &mkvp_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->cardnr == cardnr &&
+		    ptr->domain == domain) {
+			ptr->mkvp = mkvp;
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!ptr) {
+			spin_unlock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+			return;
+		}
+		ptr->cardnr = cardnr;
+		ptr->domain = domain;
+		ptr->mkvp = mkvp;
+		list_add(&ptr->list, &mkvp_list);
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+}
+
+static void mkvp_cache_scrub(u16 cardnr, u16 domain)
+{
+	struct mkvp_info *ptr;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &mkvp_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->cardnr == cardnr &&
+		    ptr->domain == domain) {
+			list_del(&ptr->list);
+			kfree(ptr);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+}
+
+static void __exit mkvp_cache_free(void)
+{
+	struct mkvp_info *ptr, *pnext;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ptr, pnext, &mkvp_list, list) {
+		list_del(&ptr->list);
+		kfree(ptr);
+	}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&mkvp_list_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search for a matching crypto card based on the Master Key
+ * Verification Pattern provided inside a secure key.
+ */
+int pkey_findcard(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+		  u16 *pcardnr, u16 *pdomain, int verify)
+{
+	struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *) seckey;
+	struct zcrypt_device_matrix *device_matrix;
+	u16 card, dom;
+	u64 mkvp;
+	int i, rc;
+
+	/* mkvp must not be zero */
+	if (t->mkvp == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* fetch status of all crypto cards */
+	device_matrix = kmalloc(sizeof(struct zcrypt_device_matrix),
+				GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!device_matrix)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	zcrypt_device_status_mask(device_matrix);
+
+	/* walk through all crypto cards */
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES; i++) {
+		card = AP_QID_CARD(device_matrix->device[i].qid);
+		dom = AP_QID_QUEUE(device_matrix->device[i].qid);
+		if (device_matrix->device[i].online &&
+		    device_matrix->device[i].functions & 0x04) {
+			/* an enabled CCA Coprocessor card */
+			/* try cached mkvp */
+			if (mkvp_cache_fetch(card, dom, &mkvp) == 0 &&
+			    t->mkvp == mkvp) {
+				if (!verify)
+					break;
+				/* verify: fetch mkvp from adapter */
+				if (fetch_mkvp(card, dom, &mkvp) == 0) {
+					mkvp_cache_update(card, dom, mkvp);
+					if (t->mkvp == mkvp)
+						break;
+				}
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* Card is offline and/or not a CCA card. */
+			/* del mkvp entry from cache if it exists */
+			mkvp_cache_scrub(card, dom);
+		}
+	}
+	if (i >= MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES) {
+		/* nothing found, so this time without cache */
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES; i++) {
+			if (!(device_matrix->device[i].online &&
+			      device_matrix->device[i].functions & 0x04))
+				continue;
+			card = AP_QID_CARD(device_matrix->device[i].qid);
+			dom = AP_QID_QUEUE(device_matrix->device[i].qid);
+			/* fresh fetch mkvp from adapter */
+			if (fetch_mkvp(card, dom, &mkvp) == 0) {
+				mkvp_cache_update(card, dom, mkvp);
+				if (t->mkvp == mkvp)
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (i < MAX_ZDEV_ENTRIES) {
+		if (pcardnr)
+			*pcardnr = card;
+		if (pdomain)
+			*pdomain = dom;
+		rc = 0;
+	} else
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+
+	kfree(device_matrix);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_findcard);
+
+/*
+ * Find card and transform secure key into protected key.
+ */
+int pkey_skey2pkey(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
+		   struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
+{
+	u16 cardnr, domain;
+	int rc, verify;
+
+	/*
+	 * The pkey_sec2protkey call may fail when a card has been
+	 * addressed where the master key was changed after last fetch
+	 * of the mkvp into the cache. So first try without verify then
+	 * with verify enabled (thus refreshing the mkvp for each card).
+	 */
+	for (verify = 0; verify < 2; verify++) {
+		rc = pkey_findcard(seckey, &cardnr, &domain, verify);
+		if (rc)
+			continue;
+		rc = pkey_sec2protkey(cardnr, domain, seckey, protkey);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (rc)
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_skey2pkey failed rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_skey2pkey);
+
+/*
+ * File io functions
+ */
+
+static long pkey_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
+				unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case PKEY_GENSECK: {
+		struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg;
+		struct pkey_genseck kgs;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		rc = pkey_genseckey(kgs.cardnr, kgs.domain,
+				    kgs.keytype, &kgs.seckey);
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_ioctl pkey_genseckey()=%d\n", rc);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	case PKEY_CLR2SECK: {
+		struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg;
+		struct pkey_clr2seck kcs;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		rc = pkey_clr2seckey(kcs.cardnr, kcs.domain, kcs.keytype,
+				     &kcs.clrkey, &kcs.seckey);
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_ioctl pkey_clr2seckey()=%d\n", rc);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs));
+		break;
+	}
+	case PKEY_SEC2PROTK: {
+		struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp = (void __user *) arg;
+		struct pkey_sec2protk ksp;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		rc = pkey_sec2protkey(ksp.cardnr, ksp.domain,
+				      &ksp.seckey, &ksp.protkey);
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_ioctl pkey_sec2protkey()=%d\n", rc);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	case PKEY_CLR2PROTK: {
+		struct pkey_clr2protk __user *ucp = (void __user *) arg;
+		struct pkey_clr2protk kcp;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&kcp, ucp, sizeof(kcp)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		rc = pkey_clr2protkey(kcp.keytype,
+				      &kcp.clrkey, &kcp.protkey);
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_ioctl pkey_clr2protkey()=%d\n", rc);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		if (copy_to_user(ucp, &kcp, sizeof(kcp)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		memzero_explicit(&kcp, sizeof(kcp));
+		break;
+	}
+	case PKEY_FINDCARD: {
+		struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc = (void __user *) arg;
+		struct pkey_findcard kfc;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&kfc, ufc, sizeof(kfc)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		rc = pkey_findcard(&kfc.seckey,
+				   &kfc.cardnr, &kfc.domain, 1);
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_ioctl pkey_findcard()=%d\n", rc);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		if (copy_to_user(ufc, &kfc, sizeof(kfc)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	case PKEY_SKEY2PKEY: {
+		struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp = (void __user *) arg;
+		struct pkey_skey2pkey ksp;
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		rc = pkey_skey2pkey(&ksp.seckey, &ksp.protkey);
+		DEBUG_DBG("pkey_ioctl pkey_skey2pkey()=%d\n", rc);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+		if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	}
+	default:
+		/* unknown/unsupported ioctl cmd */
+		return -ENOTTY;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sysfs and file io operations
+ */
+static const struct file_operations pkey_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= nonseekable_open,
+	.llseek		= no_llseek,
+	.unlocked_ioctl = pkey_unlocked_ioctl,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice pkey_dev = {
+	.name	= "pkey",
+	.minor	= MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.mode	= 0666,
+	.fops	= &pkey_fops,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Module init
+ */
+int __init pkey_init(void)
+{
+	cpacf_mask_t pckmo_functions;
+
+	/* check for pckmo instructions available */
+	if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &pckmo_functions))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (!cpacf_test_func(&pckmo_functions, CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_128_KEY) ||
+	    !cpacf_test_func(&pckmo_functions, CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_192_KEY) ||
+	    !cpacf_test_func(&pckmo_functions, CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_256_KEY))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	pkey_debug_init();
+
+	return misc_register(&pkey_dev);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Module exit
+ */
+static void __exit pkey_exit(void)
+{
+	misc_deregister(&pkey_dev);
+	mkvp_cache_free();
+	pkey_debug_exit();
+}
+
+module_init(pkey_init);
+module_exit(pkey_exit);
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c
index 144a17941e6f..93015f85d4a6 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static long zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ica_xcRB *xcRB)
+long zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ica_xcRB *xcRB)
 {
 	struct zcrypt_card *zc, *pref_zc;
 	struct zcrypt_queue *zq, *pref_zq;
@@ -444,6 +444,7 @@ out:
 			      AP_QID_CARD(qid), AP_QID_QUEUE(qid));
 	return rc;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(zcrypt_send_cprb);
 
 static bool is_desired_ep11_card(unsigned int dev_id,
 				 unsigned short target_num,
@@ -619,7 +620,7 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void zcrypt_device_status_mask(struct zcrypt_device_matrix *matrix)
+void zcrypt_device_status_mask(struct zcrypt_device_matrix *matrix)
 {
 	struct zcrypt_card *zc;
 	struct zcrypt_queue *zq;
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h
index 274a59051534..6c94efd23eac 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h
@@ -190,5 +190,7 @@ void zcrypt_msgtype_unregister(struct zcrypt_ops *);
 struct zcrypt_ops *zcrypt_msgtype(unsigned char *, int);
 int zcrypt_api_init(void);
 void zcrypt_api_exit(void);
+long zcrypt_send_cprb(struct ica_xcRB *xcRB);
+void zcrypt_device_status_mask(struct zcrypt_device_matrix *devstatus);
 
 #endif /* _ZCRYPT_API_H_ */