Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull seccomp fixes from Kees Cook:
 "This gets the seccomp selftests running again on powerpc and sh, and
  fixes an audit reporting oversight noticed in both seccomp and ptrace.

   - Fix typos in seccomp selftests on powerpc and sh (Kees Cook)

   - Fix PF_SUPERPRIV audit marking in seccomp and ptrace (Mickaël
     Salaün)"

* tag 'seccomp-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  selftests/seccomp: sh: Fix register names
  selftests/seccomp: powerpc: Fix typo in macro variable name
  seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
  ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability

3 files changed, 11 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 43d6179508d6..79de1294f8eb 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,17 +264,11 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
-			   unsigned int mode)
+static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
-		ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
-	else
-		ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
-	return ret == 0;
+		return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+	return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
 }
 
 /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
@@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	    gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
 	    gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
 		goto ok;
-	if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
+	if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
 		goto ok;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return -EPERM;
@@ -345,7 +339,7 @@ ok:
 	mm = task->mm;
 	if (mm &&
 	    ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
-	     !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
+	     !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
 	    return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 8ad7a293255a..53a7d1512dd7 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
 	 * behavior of privileged children.
 	 */
 	if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
-	    security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
-				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+			!ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 
 	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 4a180439ee9e..26c72f2b61b1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -1758,10 +1758,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
 		 * and the code is stored as a positive value.	\
 		 */						\
 		if (_result < 0) {				\
-			SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = -result;		\
+			SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = -_result;		\
 			(_regs).ccr |= 0x10000000;		\
 		} else {					\
-			SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = result;		\
+			SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = _result;		\
 			(_regs).ccr &= ~0x10000000;		\
 		}						\
 	} while (0)
@@ -1804,8 +1804,8 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
 #define SYSCALL_RET(_regs)	(_regs).a[(_regs).windowbase * 4 + 2]
 #elif defined(__sh__)
 # define ARCH_REGS		struct pt_regs
-# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs)	(_regs).gpr[3]
-# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs)	(_regs).gpr[0]
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs)	(_regs).regs[3]
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs)	(_regs).regs[0]
 #else
 # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls"
 #endif