Merge tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle

Pull powerpc Spectre-RSB fixes from Michael Ellerman:
 "We failed to activate the mitigation for Spectre-RSB (Return Stack
  Buffer, aka. ret2spec) on context switch, on CPUs prior to Power9
  DD2.3.

  That allows a process to poison the RSB (called Link Stack on Power
  CPUs) and possibly misdirect speculative execution of another process.
  If the victim process can be induced to execute a leak gadget then it
  may be possible to extract information from the victim via a side
  channel.

  The fix is to correctly activate the link stack flush mitigation on
  all CPUs that have any mitigation of Spectre v2 in userspace enabled.

  There's a second commit which adds a link stack flush in the KVM guest
  exit path. A leak via that path has not been demonstrated, but we
  believe it's at least theoretically possible.

  This is the fix for CVE-2019-18660"

* tag 'powerpc-spectre-rsb' of /home/torvalds/Downloads/powerpc-CVE-2019-18660.bundle:
  KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Flush link stack on guest exit to host kernel
  powerpc/book3s64: Fix link stack flush on context switch

5 files changed, 95 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
index 8561498e653c..d84d1417ddb6 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -152,9 +152,12 @@ void _kvmppc_save_tm_pr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_msr);
 /* Patch sites */
 extern s32 patch__call_flush_count_cache;
 extern s32 patch__flush_count_cache_return;
+extern s32 patch__flush_link_stack_return;
+extern s32 patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack;
 extern s32 patch__memset_nocache, patch__memcpy_nocache;
 
 extern long flush_count_cache;
+extern long kvm_flush_link_stack;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
 void kvmppc_save_tm_hv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 msr, bool preserve_nv);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
index 759597bf0fd8..ccf44c135389 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(unsigned long feature)
 // Software required to flush count cache on context switch
 #define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE	0x0000000000000400ull
 
+// Software required to flush link stack on context switch
+#define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK	0x0000000000001000ull
+
 
 // Features enabled by default
 #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
index 6467bdab8d40..3fd3ef352e3f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ flush_count_cache:
 	/* Save LR into r9 */
 	mflr	r9
 
+	// Flush the link stack
 	.rept 64
 	bl	.+4
 	.endr
@@ -546,6 +547,11 @@ flush_count_cache:
 	.balign 32
 	/* Restore LR */
 1:	mtlr	r9
+
+	// If we're just flushing the link stack, return here
+3:	nop
+	patch_site 3b patch__flush_link_stack_return
+
 	li	r9,0x7fff
 	mtctr	r9
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
index 7cfcb294b11c..bd91dceb7010 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ enum count_cache_flush_type {
 	COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW	= 0x4,
 };
 static enum count_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
+static bool link_stack_flush_enabled;
 
 bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
 static bool no_nospec;
@@ -212,11 +213,19 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, c
 
 		if (ccd)
 			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
+
+		if (link_stack_flush_enabled)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
+
 	} else if (count_cache_flush_type != COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
 		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
 
 		if (count_cache_flush_type == COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
 			seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
+
+		if (link_stack_flush_enabled)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
+
 	} else if (btb_flush_enabled) {
 		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
 	} else {
@@ -377,18 +386,49 @@ static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
 device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init);
 #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
 
+static void no_count_cache_flush(void)
+{
+	count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
+	pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
+}
+
 static void toggle_count_cache_flush(bool enable)
 {
-	if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
+	if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE) &&
+	    !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK))
+		enable = false;
+
+	if (!enable) {
 		patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache, PPC_INST_NOP);
-		count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
-		pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
+		patch_instruction_site(&patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack, PPC_INST_NOP);
+#endif
+		pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush disabled.\n");
+		link_stack_flush_enabled = false;
+		no_count_cache_flush();
 		return;
 	}
 
+	// This enables the branch from _switch to flush_count_cache
 	patch_branch_site(&patch__call_flush_count_cache,
 			  (u64)&flush_count_cache, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
+	// This enables the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack
+	patch_branch_site(&patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack,
+			  (u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
+#endif
+
+	pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
+	link_stack_flush_enabled = true;
+
+	// If we just need to flush the link stack, patch an early return
+	if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
+		patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return, PPC_INST_BLR);
+		no_count_cache_flush();
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
 		count_cache_flush_type = COUNT_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
 		pr_info("count-cache-flush: full software flush sequence enabled.\n");
@@ -407,11 +447,20 @@ void setup_count_cache_flush(void)
 	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED) ||
 		    security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED))
-			pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not under software control, can't disable\n");
+			pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n");
 
 		enable = false;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to
+	 * flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see
+	 * either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace.
+	 */
+	if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED) ||
+	    security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE))
+		security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK);
+
 	toggle_count_cache_flush(enable);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S
index faebcbb8c4db..0496e66aaa56 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <asm/ppc_asm.h>
+#include <asm/code-patching-asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/reg.h>
 #include <asm/mmu.h>
@@ -1487,6 +1488,13 @@ guest_exit_cont:		/* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */
 1:
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_XICS */
 
+	/*
+	 * Possibly flush the link stack here, before we do a blr in
+	 * guest_exit_short_path.
+	 */
+1:	nop
+	patch_site 1b patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack
+
 	/* If we came in through the P9 short path, go back out to C now */
 	lwz	r0, STACK_SLOT_SHORT_PATH(r1)
 	cmpwi	r0, 0
@@ -1963,6 +1971,28 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)
 	mtlr	r0
 	blr
 
+.balign 32
+.global kvm_flush_link_stack
+kvm_flush_link_stack:
+	/* Save LR into r0 */
+	mflr	r0
+
+	/* Flush the link stack. On Power8 it's up to 32 entries in size. */
+	.rept 32
+	bl	.+4
+	.endr
+
+	/* And on Power9 it's up to 64. */
+BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+	.rept 32
+	bl	.+4
+	.endr
+END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)
+
+	/* Restore LR */
+	mtlr	r0
+	blr
+
 kvmppc_guest_external:
 	/* External interrupt, first check for host_ipi. If this is
 	 * set, we know the host wants us out so let's do it now